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Abstract 
 
 
Raimo Puustinen 
     
 
Is it Psychosomatic? 
- An Inquiry into the Nature and Role of Medical Concepts  
 
 
Medical diagnoses define the possible modes of being ill from the medical point of 
view. Medical diagnoses are theoretical concepts that gain their meaning as a part of 
the prevailing medical theory. As medical theories change over time, also medical 
concepts change, as can be seen in the long history of medical thinking.  
 
The purpose of this essay is to illustrate medical thinking through examining the 
formation and use of one example of a particular medical concept “psychosomatic” in 
medical theory and practice.  
 
The approach taken in this essay reflects the writings of Lev Vygotsky, who argued 
that scientific concepts are tools for scientific thinking. Since all conceptual tools 
have their own developmental history, to understand the content of any scientific 
concept to the full we need to understand the processes leading to adoption of that 
particular concept for scientific inquiry at that particular moment in history.  
 
Vygotsky’s approach for analysing the development of science through analysing its 
concepts is reflected to the writings of Kuhn and Fleck on the development of science. 
It is argued, that Kuhn’s theory does not apply to the development of medicine. While 
Fleck’s approach seems to fit better to analysing the theoretical development in 
medicine, it remains somewhat superficial in analysing the nature and role of concepts 
in medical thinking.  
 
The use of medical concepts in medical practice is discussed in the light of Mikael 
Leiman’s ideas on the therapeutic encounter as a dialogical process. While Leiman 
also draws from Vygotsky he takes the issue further toward semiotic understanding of 
clinical dialogue by using Bakhtin’s and Voloshinov’s ideas of the semiotic nature of 
human communication.  
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“The concepts of health and disease have far-reaching 
consequences for diagnosis and therapy, the attitude and 
behavior of physicians, how patients deal with disease, 
social attitudes and structure, the shape of moral 
choices, and the cultural significance of sickness and 
wellness behaviors.”  
von Engelhardt D. Health and Disease:  
History of the Concepts.1  
 
Introduction 
 
“Could it be psychosomatic?” a patient asked me the other day when we were 
discussing her weekly attacks of migraine. I asked her what she meant. She paused for 
a moment and started to ponder her domestic problems wondering whether they were 
causing her headaches. I admitted that they might precipitate her migraine but added 
that the underlying mechanism is biological with neurovascular dysfunctions and 
apparent heredity, since her mother and grandmother had suffered from the same 
condition at her age. She was also likely to have an attack if she drank red wine or ate 
particular types of cheese, which underlines the biochemical essence of migraine. We 
then discussed her diet and stress management and I prescribed sumatriptane to 
control her headaches. 
 
A conversation with a patient as presented above is not uncommon in today’s medical 
practice. However, a century ago it could not have taken place, simply because before 
the 1930s there was no such concept as psychosomatic in everyday medical or lay 
use. The patient’s clinical picture of migraine may have been more or less the same 
in, say, 1910 but instead of using the concept psychosomatic she might have asked 
whether her problem was due to neurasthenia, which was a widely used concept in 
medicine to denote a great variety of problems of health and illness in the early 20th 
century. But why did we not retain the concept neurasthenia rather than adopt a new 
concept psychosomatic into medical theory? On the other hand, the concept 
neurasthenia itself was introduced into the medical vocabulary in the mid 19th century 
only to disappear from medicine during the following century. Such has indeed been 
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the fate of many medical concepts in the long history of medical thinking. We do not 
encounter terms such as phrenitis, dyscrasia or phthisis in our contemporary medical 
textbooks denoting the phenomena of feverish derangement of the mind, distorted 
constitution of the blood or prolonged cough accompanied by blood stained sputum 
and wasting, respectively. Yet, we may assume that to this day many if not most of 
the phenomena physicians have encountered since the dawn of medicine have not 
essentially changed. People sustain injuries for various reasons, recover, are crippled 
or die. They have pains, fevers, rashes and diarrhoeas. Sometimes they develop 
seizures, are sleepless, become delusional and may go around raging. Some stop 
talking, become paralysed or simply waste away. And all who live up to an old age 
become eventually frail and die. Why, then, do we have medical concepts appearing 
and fading away if the phenomena we encounter as physicians remain essentially the 
same? This question raises more than mere historical interest since, as we saw in the 
clinical example above, medical concepts such as psychosomatic and neurasthenia 
carry assumptions about the nature and aetiology of the ailment they denote and guide 
the therapeutic measures applied accordingly. By using the concept psychosomatic 
my patient implied a psychological cause for her migraine. Now that I did not adhere 
to that concept I did not only reconceptualise her problem to a biochemical disorder, 
but, while doing that, resorted to treatments that targeted to adjust biological 
processes in her body with medicaments and behavioural changes instead of 
suggesting psychotherapeutic measures to relieve her ailment.  
 
Despite the central role of theoretical concepts in medical thinking there have been 
relatively few attempts to examine their nature and role in medical theory and 
practice. In 1981 Pellegrino and Thomasma stated in their book A Philosophical Basis 
of Medical Practice, that “medicine must begin questioning its conceptual 
framework”.2 The overall aim for the authors was to develop philosophy of medicine 
on what they called the ontology of practice, that is, on the “search for meaning in the 
practice of medicine, and specific applications of the results of this search.”3 An 
ontology of practice addresses “the context or situations in which ideas come forth, 
including theories about health and disease.” That context is situated in the dialogue 
within medical consultation, which forms “the locus of meaning” in medicine.4 
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Pellegrino and Thomasma wrote that their primary aim in developing philosophy of 
medicine was to understand the nature of medical activity,5 where “the starting point 
is an inter-human event, the relationship between physician and patient.”6 “But”, they 
continue, “there is no common anthropology upon which to base such a philosophy”. 
7 As for their methodology, they claimed that “any philosophical method chosen must 
pay attention to praxis as well as theoria.”8 (italics original) That is, philosophy of 
medicine needs to be built on medical practice and address what kinds of knowledge 
medicine generates and what “logical tools” 9 are used in clinical consultation. The 
authors did not, however, go as far as to study the nature and role of those “logical 
tools” in medical theory and as used in clinical practice. Instead, after considering the 
complexity of modern medicine they chose to be eclectic in their philosophical 
methodology and attempted to combine “American pragmatism and European 
phenomenology”10 to take “the first step toward what we hope will become a 
systematic philosophy of medicine”.11  
 
There have been a few other attempts during the last couple of decades to develop 
philosophy of medicine on the basis of clinical practice and the cognitive tools 
applied in it. Lolas, for example, wrote in an article published in 1996, that  “the main 
task of a critical theory of medicine should be to develop a perspectival, context-fair, 
and multidimensional science of actions which integrates both diversity and 
heterogeneity within medicine without eliminating either one.”12 For Lolas the 
methodological solution was not eclectic, since that would lead to mere “juxtaposition 
of different perspectives”. Instead, he emphasized the need to define the 
epistemological status of medicine as a science of actions, or praxiology, where the 
focus is on the constitutive actions of the persons performing them. Lolas was 
content, however, to outline the task but he did not offer any methodology to explore 
the issue to any greater depth. 
 
In 1998 the journal Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics devoted a whole thematic 
issue of medicine conceptualised and examined as a practice. The editors justified the 
effort by observing, first, that there was little interest among philosophers of the first 
half of the 20th century in the issue of human activity, and that it is only since the 
1970s that practical philosophy has been rehabilitated. This renewed interest has 
largely emerged, according the editors, from within medicine. The editors proposed 
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that the desired unifying principle for medicine as an activity might be established on 
the idea that in medicine scientific knowledge is instrumental and hence secondary to 
the practice of clinical medicine.13 
 
In the same issue Hucklenbroich asserted that the idea of medicine as divided into 
theoretical and practical spheres is misleading. To overcome this he suggested that the 
conceptual and philosophical analysis of medicine should distinguish between 
medical knowledge, different fields of medical practice and medical research. This 
might be done by using case-based studies as well as conceptual and theoretical 
analysis of medical concepts and principles.14 Hucklenbroich does not, however, offer 
us tools to pursue that line of thinking any further and dividing medicine into three 
instead of two realms does not, unfortunately, clarify the relation between medical 
theory and practice. 
 
Following Hucklenboich’s paper, Paul also asked whether the current juxtaposition in 
medicine, medical science vs. medical practice, is incurable or if it could be 
theoretically surmounted.15 He suggested that in attempting to answer this question 
philosophy of medicine should define and explain the theoretical preconditions of 
medical practice. It should also offer definitions for the conceptual cornerstones of 
medicine, such as health, illness, disease etc. Paul concluded, however, that 
philosophy of medicine is still far away from providing answers to these questions.  
 
Another attempt to address the nature and role of theoretical concepts in medical 
thinking has been made by Thagard in his 1999 book How Scientists Explain Disease.  
Because Thagard’s approach holds broader theoretical interest in terms of this essay 
his work will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 11. 
 
As can be seen in the above, there has been a call to develop philosophy of medicine 
on the basis of medical practice seen as a form of human activity where medical 
knowledge holds an instrumental role. Yet, while acknowledging the need to examine 
the issue, none of the authors quoted above offered methods to execute the task they 
were proposing. In an attempt to contribute to this quest proposed by Pellegrino & 
Thomasma among others I will examine, in what follows, medical practice as 
dialogical activity and the nature and role of medical concepts within that activity.  
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To accomplish my task I will draw upon so-called sign-mediated activity theory, 
which has its roots in social-historical activity theory (activity theory for short). 
Activity theory was originally developed on the basis of Lev Vygotsky’s theories on 
the social construction of mind by the Soviet-Russian scholars Leontjev and Luria, 
among others, since the 1930s.16 Despite its roots in Vygotsky’s psychology, activity 
theory should not, however, be considered as just another psychological theory, but 
rather as a broad approach “that develops novel conceptual tools for tackling many of 
the theoretical and methodological questions that cut across the social sciences today” 
as Engeström and Miettinen have emphasized.17  
 
Activity theory sees human activity as object oriented, collective and culturally 
mediated. The basic elements of activity consist of the object, subject, mediating tools 
and the rules and the division of labour within the community in which the action is 
performed.18 In this approach the different components of activity are not, however, 
addressed as distinct entities but as “individual(s)-acting-with-mediational-means…in 
the concrete [cultural-historical] situation”, as Wertch19 has expressed it.  
 
According to the activity theory, no human activity can be apprehended without 
considering the goal of the activity, since the goal “determines the horizon of possible 
actions”.20 For example, if we see a person sawing, planing and nailing wood and try 
to understand that activity, we need to understand the goal of that activity. That is, if 
the person is building a table s/he will use different materials, tools and methods than 
when building a boat. To understand what kind of table or boat is under construction, 
we need to understand the cultural-historical content of the goal, since tables and 
boats vary widely in their shape and structure in regard to time, place and purpose 
when, where and for what use they are constructed. 
 
This also applies to medical practice. We may hold that the primary goal of medical 
consultation is diagnosis, without which any therapeutic choice remains haphazard. It 
follows that it is the set of diagnoses as expressed in medical theory that constitutes 
the possible goals of the physician’s actions and determines what materials and tools 
are needed to achieve them.  
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Medical diagnoses are a part of a medicine’s conceptual system. While medical 
consultations are conducted to a large extent with everyday language that is familiar 
to both physician and patient, medical concepts differ from everyday concepts in that 
they derive their meaning from being a part of a certain theoretical structure. Like all 
human semiotic devices, medical concepts, too, have their own developmental history 
and are subjected to change. Therefore, to understand the content of medical concepts, 
whether used in theoretical texts or within clinical encounters, we need to understand 
their developmental history.  
 
The aim of this essay is thus twofold. To understand the content of medical concepts, 
we need to examine first their nature, origin and development as theoretical entities 
and, second, we need to analyse their role in medical practice in determining the 
measures needed to transform the patients’ complaints into medical concepts.  
 
As to the first task, I will adopt Vygotsky’s approach to the development and 
acquisition of concepts in human thinking in general and in scientific thinking in 
particular. To examine the role and function of medical concepts in medical 
consultation, I will adopt the approach developed from Vygotsky’s ideas by Leiman, 
who has taken activity theory towards a more semiotic understanding of human 
cognition and communication in the psychotherapeutic context under the rubric of 
sign-mediated activity theory.  
 
Of all the changing medical concepts, I have chosen the concept psychosomatic as a 
token because it holds a special interest in medical theory when addressing one of the 
most central and also one of the most perennial problems in medicine: the question of 
the relation of man’s mind to his body. It is our everyday experience, as it has been 
since the earliest written accounts of the human condition, that our state of mind does 
seem to influence the workings of our body and, conversely, various phenomena in 
our bodies affect our mental well-being in one way or another. But how can this 
phenomenon be understood? Are there really two distinct substances in man’s being, 
mind and body, acting on each other? If so, how is their mutual effect mediated? And 
what, if any, are the pathological and therapeutic consequences that follow from that 
mediation? These questions have been addressed in the medical literature since 
antiquity and they are still debated in present day medicine. However, as noted above, 
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the concept psychosomatic was adopted into the medical vocabulary only in the first 
half of the 20th century to spread with astonishing speed throughout the world. This 
concept is, thus, rather recent and its developmental history is relatively easy to trace 
and illustrate for the purposes this essay.  
 
The structure of the argument 
 
I will start my inquiry by examining the role of concepts in medical thinking in 
general. To accomplish this I will draw on the philosophy of biology, where there are 
three central features to be discerned in biological theory. First, there are no strict and 
universal laws to be found in biology that can be expressed in mathematical formulae 
such as are used in physics and chemistry. Biological theory is cast, instead, in 
concepts. Second, since biological phenomena cannot be reduced to chemistry and 
physics, biology resists the idea of the unification of science. It resorts, instead, to 
scientific pluralism in its theories and methods. And third, since biology is concerned 
with changing and developing phenomena in relation to time and place, biological 
inquiry can be considered as a special case of historical inquiry as will be discussed in 
Chapter 1.  
 
When addressing the human body, medicine borrows heavily from biology for its 
concepts and methods. Therefore, the three fundamental features in biology, theory 
cast in concepts, theoretical and methodological pluralism and historical inquiry can 
be seen also to apply in medicine. However, in medicine the object of its inquiry, 
human health and illness, is even more complex than in biology, because human 
beings exist and act with an agency in a human society. Thus the subject matter of 
medicine exceeds that of biology. It follows that medicine needs to build its own 
conceptual and methodological apparatus to be able to address the phenomena it deals 
with in a scientifically productive way.  
 
I will then proceed to analyse concepts in medical theory. For this I will apply 
Vygotsky’s idea of concepts as tools for our thinking. The acquisition of concepts is a 
social phenomenon and it has a characteristic developmental pattern, both for 
individuals and for the collective.  
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Medical concepts differ from our everyday concepts by acquiring their meaning as a 
part of the theoretical structure of medicine. Medical theory, in turn, is built on those 
concepts. There is, therefore, a constant dialogical relationship between theoretical 
concepts and the overall theoretical structure in medicine. Owing to their social and 
historical nature, medical concepts are in a constant state of change, emerging and 
disappearing from use. It follows that to understand the content of medical concepts, 
such as psychosomatic, we need to examine their developmental history in relation to 
medical theory.  
 
I will start my inquiry by tracing in Chapter 2 the appearance of the word 
psychosomatic in the medical literature in the 19th century to the point at which it 
gained the status of a medical concept in the late 1930s. To understand the novelty of 
the concept, I will then examine in Chapters 3 and 4 how the mind-body problem was 
addressed in medicine prior to the introduction of the concept psychosomatic into 
medical theory. In Chapter 5 I will turn to a more detailed analysis of the formation of 
the concept psychosomatic on the basis of psychoanalytic theory of mind and its role 
in medical theory.  
 
As a part of this historical analysis I will reflect on the material presented so far in 
light of Kuhn’s and Fleck’s theories of scientific development in Chapter 6. I will 
argue that Kuhn’s theory does not apply to the development of medicine. As Kuhn 
derived his basic ideas from Fleck, it seems that Fleck’s approach is better suited to 
the examination of the development of medicine (after all, Fleck was a physician 
writing about medicine). Yet Fleck’s analysis of the nature and role of concepts in 
medical development remains rather superficial and needs to be developed 
accordingly. 
 
In Chapter 7 I will follow the theoretical development of the concept psychosomatic 
to the point at which it started to lose psychoanalysis as its explanatory apparatus. The 
conceptual disarray into which the concept eventually fell is discussed in Chapter 8. 
In Chapter 9 I will claim that this conceptual disarray was largely attributable to the 
question of monism vs. dualism in medical thinking with regard to the mind-body 
issue. In Chapter 10 we shall see how the mind-body issue was eventually resolved by 
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cutting the psyche out of the equation and replacing psychoanalysis with 
behaviourism. Accordingly, the concept psychosomatic was shunned and the concept 
biobehavioral was introduced in its place. In this process the concept psychosomatic 
lost its content as a scientific concept and transformed into an everyday concept. In 
Chapter 11 I will discuss the developmental pattern of the concept psychosomatic 
from a word to a scientific concept to an everyday concept in light of Vygotsky’s 
theory of the developmental pattern of scientific concepts in general. A note on the 
implications of the above for medical historiography is also made.  
 
In Chapter 12 I will consider how medical concepts function in medical consultation. 
To explore this I will draw on Leiman, who builds his approach to analysing 
psychotherapeutic consultations on the idea of human thinking and communication as 
a dialogical and sign-mediated activity, as inspired by the Soviet-Russian 
philosophers of language Voloshinov and Bakhtin. I will reflect this approach in light 
of the so-called representational theory of mind and attempt to show that its stimulus-
computing-response schema is too simple to account for the content and conduct of 
medical consultation. Since the primary goal of the consultation is diagnosis, this goal 
is shared by the participants in the clinical consultation. What emerges within the 
consultation is jointly created by the patient and the physician through the 
anticipatory and polyphonic clinical dialogue as directed by the goal of the 
consultation, that is, transforming the patients’ problems into medical concepts.  
 
As a conclusion I will claim that in order to understand medical practice we need to 
address it as a form of human activity determined by its goal, the diagnosis. Medical 
concepts contain the possible set of interpretations the doctor has at his or her 
disposal. They function as tools for the physician’s thinking during the consultation 
when transforming the patient’s complaints into medical concepts as a joint activity 
with the patient. To understand the content and conduct of medical practice we need 
to understand its goal, that is, the nature and role of the medical concepts guiding the 
process. This approach may offer a means to continue toward building a systematic 
philosophy of medicine from where Pellegrino and Thomasma’s stood almost three 
decades ago. 
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Note on concepts used 
 
The idea of examining the nature and role of theoretical concepts in medical thinking 
has its roots in a long tradition in German philosophy, at least since Hegel, of 
studying the content, development and use of concepts in areas such as political 
history, theology and philosophy. This enquiry is seen as crucial to understanding the 
“sprachliche Erfassung der moderne Welt” (linguistic constitution of the modern 
world).21 Acknowledging this background, it needs to be emphasized that when I use 
the term concept in this essay I do not use it in its common Anglophone sense 
denoting a “mental impression of an object”, a “mental picture” or an “idea” as a 
dictionary defines the word.22  Instead, when mentioning in this essay medical 
concepts, I will use the term concept strictly in the sense of an idea cast in verbal form 
as a word or a string of words. 
 
Furthermore, the English word concept has its roots in the Latin word concipere 
meaning to take in, denoting a passive reception of something. My use of the word 
concept derives, following the basic theoretical approach in this essay, from the 
German word concept Begriff, coming from the word greifen, which means to grab or 
to reach for something, (nach etwas zu greifen), denoting an active relation between 
subject and object. Likewise, in the Finnish language the word concept käsite derives 
from the word käsi, a hand, from which comes also the word käsitellä, to handle 
something.  
 
When I use the term activity in this essay as a theoretical concept, I use it, again, in a 
narrower sense than in its common English sense. In Vygotskian theory the Russian 
term for activity deyatel’nost does not denote activity in general but activity that is 
aimed to transform something. German equivalents to that are Tätigkeit or Handlung 
denoting activity that is purposeful and aimed at a goal, to handle something for a 
specific reason.23 I contend in this essay that the primary goal of medical consultation 
is diagnosis, that is, to transform the patient’s problem into a medical concept. This 
transformatory process takes place through the sign-mediated activity between doctor 
and patient. 
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When I use the word science in this essay I do not use it in its Anglophone sense 
denoting natural sciences as apart from social sciences and humanities but what in 
German language falls under a general term Wissenschaft (Naturwissenschaft for 
natural sciences, Gesellshaftswissenschaft for social sciences and, for history, 
Geschichtswissenschaft). Hence, when I discuss natural sciences, in what follows, I 
will use the term natural science instead of science on those occasions. 
 
Note on abbreviations 
 
For the journal Psychosomatic Medicine I will use the word Journal. 
 
For the American Psychosomatic Society I will use the word Society. 
 
For the archive of the American Psychosomatic Society, stored in the Oscar Diethelm 
Library, Cornell University, New York City, I will use the word Archive. The 
footnotes indicating Archive material are written according to the filing system used 
in the library.  
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Chapter 1 - Medicine and conceptual thinking in science  
 
We may consider the clinical consultation to be the core event in medicine. This event 
is based on communication between people. A person seeks a physician in order to 
find an explanation, alleviation and cure to a problem s/he, or someone on his or her 
behalf, considers as needing a physician’s attention. The patient expresses his or her 
problem to the physician with the language s/he is able to use. Even in cases when the 
patient cannot express him or herself verbally (unconscious, a small child, demented) 
there is usually someone around to explain the reason for attending the surgery at this 
particular moment of time. The physician’s task is to draw from the patient’s 
expressions those details that s/he finds relevant to construct what the problem might 
be from a medical point of view, that is, to proceed to establishing a diagnosis. This 
basic setting in the clinical encounter was well recognised by the earliest medical 
authors, as expressed in a Hippocratic treatise The Science of Medicine (also known 
as The Art) dating to the end of 5th century BC24:  
 
"...physician must have recourse to reasoning from the symptoms with which 
he is presented...the symptoms which patients… describe to their physician 
are based on guesses about a possible cause rather than knowledge about it... 
By weighing up the significance of…various signs it is possible to deduce of 
what disease they are the result...25    
 
As the ancient author observes, patients do not necessarily have knowledge on what is 
the matter with them. This is in many, if not most, cases the very reason people seek a 
physician’s advice: to gain an understanding of the nature their ailment and, through 
gaining it, to find a means to cure or alleviate it.  
 
The knowledge the physician possesses is based on medical theory. That theory is, in 
turn, historically situated and continuously evolving, as is our understanding of the 
phenomena of the world in general. Medical theory is expressed in language. While 
the linguistic structure of medical texts follows the language used at the time of their 
writing, the main theoretical assumptions in medicine are expressed with concepts 
specific to the prevailing theory such as infection, cancer and schizophrenia. Although 
many of these concepts may also be used in everyday speech, such as “her laughter is 
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infectious”, “corruption is the cancer of society” or “your attitude is schizophrenic”, 
their medical content can be discerned only in relation to the medical theory of which 
they are a part.  
 
The question of the nature and role of theoretical concepts in medicine has attracted 
relatively little attention in the medical literature. This may  partly be due to the fact 
that medicine regards itself as having dual domains of existence, art and science. 
Medicine as an art is seen as what doctors do with their patients, while medicine as a 
science is the study of the structure and function of the human body in health and in 
illness. What we call medical science falls, when addressing the human body, into the 
realm of biological sciences and does not seem to differ theoretically and 
methodologically from these, apart from the interest of medicine in pathological 
processes alongside the study of the normal structure and function of the body. And 
when medicine addresses questions such as the prevalence of a certain illness, say 
lung cancer among smokers, and discovers connections between low social class, 
smoking and cancer, these problems fall into the field of social sciences and statistics. 
It follows from this that theoretical concepts used in medicine can be seen to be 
derived from other sciences and that medicine does not enjoy the status of a science in 
its own right; it is merely a practical activity applying the concepts and methods of 
sciences proper to its ends. Kuhn, for example, excluded medicine from his theory of 
scientific development, and he mentions medicine only in passing in his book on 
scientific revolutions, equating it with crafts such as metallurgy and calendar 
making26 and with fields such as technology and law27.  
 
On the other hand, one may claim, as Forstrom28 has done, that medicine can be seen 
as a science in its own right since it does have a definitively stated object of inquiry, 
health and illness in the human organism in its environmental context. This particular 
object of inquiry distinguishes it from all other scientific disciplines. Furthermore, 
medicine can be seen as an empirical science proper deriving its concepts and 
methods according to its object of inquiry as presented in its practice and it develops 
and corrects its hypotheses and methods in both in vitro and in vivo testing. And 
although there is considerable overlap in medicine with other sciences such as 
physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology etc. when attempting to 
understand its object, this overlap is also common in other sciences, since the 
 22 
boundaries of sciences are not, in practice, strictly fenced. Medicine does not, thus, 
merely apply the theories and methods of other sciences but operates with concepts 
and methods that are specific to medicine and which cannot be derived from or 
applied to any other scientific disciplines.  
 
Furthermore, as noted in the Introduction, the problem of the scientific status of 
medicine may partly also be due to the way we use the word science itself. For 
Anglophone writers the term science refers to natural sciences, that is, physics, 
chemistry and biology, together with their subdisciplines. Other realms of systematic 
inquiry, such as linguistics, history and sociology are left outside of this conception of 
science by definition and they are thus identified as social sciences and humanities. In 
this sense it is justified to claim that medicine does not qualify as a science because its 
object of inquiry exceeds the limits of natural sciences. On the other hand, if we 
accept the argument that in order for any discipline be called a science, it needs to 
seek knowledge in a systematic, critical and open manner, then the humanities and 
social sciences do indeed qualify as sciences, as does medicine in its attempt to create 
knowledge as a means to understand the causes and mechanisms of human illness.  
 
Accepting that medicine is a science in its own right and that it creates and operates 
with a conceptual system of its own, what is, then, the role of concepts in medical 
theory and practice? To try to answer this question, let us review first how biologists 
perceive the place and function of concepts in biological theory. After all, medicine 
relies heavily on biology when studying the structure and function of the human body. 
 
Role of concepts in biological theory  
 
We can discern three fundamental features of current biological theory. First, 
underlying all current biological theorizing is the evolutionary principle. Yet the 
concept evolution defies all empirical testing. There is absolutely no way to replicate 
and test the reasons for the extinction of dinosaurs, for example. Therefore, as 
Rosenberg29 has noted, historical method is required for biology because biological 
theories give accounts of living processes over limited periods of time of varying 
lengths. These narratives can be evaluated for their explanatory value in light of 
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emerging new evidence. We may consider, therefore, biological explanation to be a 
special case of historical explanation.  
 
Second, biology resists the idea of the unification of science, where all scientific 
theories are seen to be hierarchically ordered so that theories of chemistry could be 
derived from the laws of physics, biological theories from chemistry and theories of 
social sciences from biology. Most philosophers of biology insist that owing to the 
properties of living organisms acting in a given environment in a certain period of 
time, no such unification is possible, even in principle. Therefore, instead of 
attempting to reduce biological phenomena to chemistry and physics, biology needs 
to adopt a pluralistic approach to science where theoretical concepts and methods are 
built according to its objects of inquiry.30   
 
Third, as Ernst Mayr has argued, when classical physics looks for and finds laws in 
inanimate matter, there are no similar deterministic laws to be found in the living 
world where randomness, chance and environmental diversity play a central role. 
Furthermore, in the living world every individual is, for genetic reasons, unique. And 
when populations (conglomerations of individuals of a certain type) can be seen to 
differ from each other, it is not by their essences but by statistical mean values of their 
properties, which change gradually from generation to generation as a function of 
their existence in a particular environment and time. Therefore, in biology the 
properties or behaviour of individuals or populations cannot be defined by strict 
universal and deterministic laws. Instead of laws, theoretical fundamentals in biology 
are presented in the form of concepts, such as phylogeny, adaptedness, ecosystem, 
evolution etc.31 Let us ask, then, whether these three fundamentals in biology, 
historical inquiry, theoretical and methodological pluralism and theory cast in 
concepts apply in medicine? 
 
As in biology, medicine’s scrutiny of the problem of human illness is based on 
historical method. People do not fall ill all of a sudden; every illness has its 
developmental history, which is always unique for each and every patient. This is 
precisely why a medical examination starts with “taking the patient’s history”. When 
building theoretical descriptions of the features of any disease, those descriptions are 
also based on the knowledge of the development of a great number of cases with more 
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or less similar features. They are historical descriptions from which some common 
features are discerned to form a diagnostic category.  
 
Furthermore, while intra- and intercellular processes in the human body may be 
explained to a degree with physico-chemical principles, the workings of a patient’s 
body cannot be reduced to the actions of any single cell or an organ nor even an entire 
organism, since a human organism exists in a particular historical period of time in a 
particular environment which modifies and affects the organism’s structure and 
functions. But when an organism exists in a given environment, only people exist and 
act with an agency in a human society. It follows that in order to deal with people, 
medicine cannot operate merely with biological concepts and with the principle of 
dual causation of genetic programme and environment. Medicine in its attempt to 
understand, explain, prevent and cure human illness has been forced to develop its 
own conceptual system and methodology based on tripartite causation, genetic 
programme, environmental influences and human agency within a given society in a 
particular historical period of time. This tripartite theoretical structure makes 
medicine unique among sciences.  
 
When medicine builds theoretical descriptions and explanations from its observations, 
they are cast and presented in concepts such as infection, epidemic and immunity. As 
in biology, these concepts do not operate as laws in the sense we understand laws in 
physics, but rather as building blocks for medical theories that are tested both at the 
bedside and through empirical medical research conducted on that particular field of 
inquiry.  
 
But how do medical concepts differ, if at all, from our everyday words and what is 
their role in medical theory and practice? To try to answer these questions, let us first 
examine the role of language in our thinking in general and in scientific thinking in 
particular.  
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Concepts as tools for thinking 
 
The question of the role of language in our thinking was already examined, as so 
many of our perennial questions were, in the Age of Antiquity. In Cratylus Plato 
presents Socrates discussing the issue with Hermogenes: 
 
Socrates: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with something? 
Hermogenes: Yes. 
Socrates: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or 
pierced with something? 
Hermogenes: Certainly. 
Socrates: And that which has to be named has to be named with something? 
Hermogenes: True. 
Socrates: What is that with which we pierce? 
Hermogenes: An awl. 
Socrates: And with which we weave? 
Hermogenes: A shuttle. 
Socrates: And with which we name? 
Hermogenes: A name. 
Socrates: Very good: then a name is an instrument? 
Hermogenes: Certainly.32 
 
The idea of the instrumental role of language in our thinking was elaborated further, 
among others, by a Russian psychologist and  philosopher of language Lev 
Semenovich Vygotsky (1896-1934). During his short career that ended in premature 
death from pulmonary tuberculosis, Vygotsky wrote studies of lasting importance on 
the development of speech and thinking. Because of the political tension within 
Soviet Russia much of his work was left to wait for decades before being published 
and translated into other languages.33 
 
Vygotsky’s theory of the development of human thinking is summarised in his 
treatise Thought and Language, published posthumously in Soviet Russia in 1934 and 
translated into English in 1964.34 In this essay Vygotsky holds that the process of 
language acquisition is based on human activity: “in the beginning was the deed. The 
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word was not the beginning – action was there first; it [the word] is the end of 
development, crowning the deed”.35 (italics original) That is, we learn to speak a 
language via social activity. When mastering a language it functions as a tool for our 
thinking, not only in our everyday lives but also in our scientific undertakings:  
 
“Thus, language itself contains the basis and possibilities for the scientific 
knowledge…The word is the germ of science and in this sense we can say 
that in the beginning of science was the word.”36  
 
Yet, for Vygotsky, word meaning is a phenomenon of thought only in so far as 
thought is embodied in the activity of speech, be that inner or outer, and of speech 
only in so far as speech is connected to thought. Word and thought are thus united in 
the phenomenon of verbal thought in meaningful speech.37  
 
Vygotsky illustrates the development of the ability to use language in one’s thinking 
with a child who reaches a stage where s/he can form a concept table or a skirt to refer 
to these objects as separate from other objects. S/he is not, however, mature enough at 
that stage to be able to adopt and use higher-level concepts such as furniture or 
clothes. The appearance of these generalized concepts is, then, a sign of progress to a 
new level of thinking. This development is also a necessary prerequisite to understand 
scientific concepts.38 Historical concepts, for instance, can be assimilated and used 
only when the growing child’s everyday conception of the past is sufficiently 
differentiated, that is, when his own life and the life of those around him can be fitted 
into the elementary generalization in the past and in the present. Similarly, a child is 
able to grasp geographical concepts only after s/he has acquired the schema here and 
elsewhere. The same process may be seen in university freshmen courses where the 
students are introduced to the concepts of a particular scientific discipline. It is 
necessary for the students to understand and master the general concepts of the 
subject to be able to proceed deeper into the conceptual system of the given area of 
knowledge and to be able to operate mentally within it. The process, as a whole, is 
analogous to learning a language, be it the first or any other to follow. The simple 
elements of a language need to be acquired before the more complex ones can be 
mastered.39  
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Vygotsky presented his ideas on the development of science in the essay The 
Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology: A Methodological Investigation40, 
which was completed in 1927 but, owing to political pressures in Soviet Russia, only 
published in 1982.41 In this essay Vygotsky argues that science develops through the 
development of concepts and, like the development of thinking in general, the 
development of scientific ideas is also thoroughly social in nature.  
 
Vygotsky holds that the formulation of concepts forms the basis for the development 
of any scientific discipline since concepts predetermine the objects of inquiry for that 
particular science and the way it explains the facts it obtains, that is, its main 
explanatory principles.42  The material for science is logically elaborated natural 
material selected on the basis of certain features observed in the object of inquiry. 
Naming a feature by a word means framing this fact into a concept, to single out one 
of the object’s innumerable aspects such as, in physics, mass or velocity. This naming 
is an act toward understanding the fact by including it in a category of phenomena 
that has been studied empirically before. To name an object is to apply a concept to it. 
By means of the concept we seek to comprehend the object within a certain system of 
thought.43  
 
A scientific fact is thus a feature of an object that is explained through a certain 
theoretical system of knowledge.  It follows that science is not merely a matter of 
amassing a greatest possible number of facts but of arranging and naming them 
according to some common feature which, in turn, guides and organises further 
questions and methods. What determines a common feature amongst the phenomena 
observed in an object is expressed in a theory. For example, we may appreciate 
sunrise, the phases of the moon and the changing position of stars but these 
perceptions do not, as such, constitute a scientific observation. With the concept of 
gravity Newton connected these phenomena under a set of explanatory principles, 
which offered tools for further research on the nature of these events. Similarly, we 
may admire the richness of nature, but only with concepts such as evolution, selection 
and biodiversity has biology obtained conceptual tools to address the phenomena of 
the living world in a theoretically coherent and methodologically productive way. 
When Pavlov conducted his experiments he did not content himself with measuring 
the amount of saliva from dogs waiting for a meal, but abstracted the concept 
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conditioned reflex from his observations on the relationship between sound, food and 
saliva. We may say, then, that a scientific concept, be it gravity or evolution or 
conditioned reflex, is a theory in itself. It contains the methods needed to obtain the 
facts, accumulation of observations gathered and assumptions made on the nature of 
the phenomena under inquiry.44  
 
Each scientific field formulates a set of concepts specific to itself. It follows, then, 
that scientific concepts cannot be transposed from one theory, i.e. conceptual system, 
to another as such, even if it may seem that a fact is always a fact. For example, one 
may assume that observing one and the same object, say, the movement of a planet, 
and applying one and the same method, objective measurement of that movement, 
should render the transformation possible. However, while the models of Ptolemy and 
Copernicus rested upon observing the same facts (movements of planets), it turned 
out that the results obtained by means of different conceptual systems led to different 
interpretations of those facts.45 Therefore, while the facts were the same (as objective 
events in the world), they were, nevertheless, different facts in the sense that the 
definition of these facts as facts rested on different conceptual systems. To use a 
medical example, when the ancient physicians observed a feverish patient with 
painful, swollen and coated tonsils they may have discerned the same phenomenon as 
we do today. Yet, they are deemed different, since the underlying theory (humoral 
pathology vs. cellular pathology) and its explanatory principles (humoral imbalance 
vs. microbial infection) are fundamentally different. 
 
Theory cast in concepts and its explanatory principles determine scientific fields 
together. In psychology, for example, when psychopathological problems are 
approached through psychoanalytic theory, the phenomena observed are not 
organized through the concept of the unconscious only; a causal interpretation is also 
attempted through the explanatory principle of sexuality. This has led to an attempt to 
explain all psychological phenomena through these principles. Such an attempt is 
characteristic among rival theories in any scientific discipline where they compete for 
the status of universal theory.46  
 
Vygotsky’s approach to the development of thinking in general and scientific thinking 
in particular is materialistic in the sense that for him material reality determines our 
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experience. It is, therefore, impossible to study the concepts of any scientific 
discipline independent of the realities they represent.47 The task for a science is to 
transcend the boundary of our perceived consciousness and continue by separating the 
concept from immediate sensations (i.e. sun does not set, the earth rotates). For 
Vygotsky the fact that scientific knowledge can transcend the boundaries of our plain 
everyday perceptions is rooted in the psychological essence of knowledge itself.48  
 
To summarize Vygotsky’s position, the concepts we use in any scientific theory are 
not isolated and immutable formations, but active and developing tools for our 
intellectual processes, constantly engaged in serving our communication and 
understanding.49  Therefore, in order to understand any field of inquiry, such as 
medicine, we need to examine which conceptual instruments it utilizes, how they are 
derived and formulated, in what circumstances and for what reasons.  
 
The epistemological implications of Vygotsky’s thesis of socially formed concepts as 
tools for our thinking have been examined by another Soviet-Russian philosopher, 
Evald Ilyenkov (1924-1979), who argued that our idea of concept as verbally 
expressed generalities is too narrow. Ilyenkov traces this narrow conception of the 
word concept back to Kant and Locke, and even further to medieval nominalism, 
which did not distinguish at all between word and concept.50  
 
For Ilyenkov, the narrow understanding and use of the word concept derives from an 
individualistic Robinson Crusoe model of epistemology, in which the knowing 
subject is seen atomistically, isolated from the social nexus into which s/he has been 
born and in which s/he develops. In reality the whole idea of an isolated individual is 
impossible. A child inevitably grows up as a part of a community of some kind, if 
only from  sheer necessity to survive. When a child matures to conscious life, the 
process takes place within a certain society in a certain historical period of time with 
its pre-existing spiritual environment from where s/he acquires mental tools to 
observe and address the world and its phenomena. It follows that a maturing person 
does not encounter the world face to face, as a Lockean tabula rasa, but through the 
prism of the ideas of the nature of the world as comprehended in the prevailing 
community and as expressed in the language used in it. Therefore, the material for 
mental activity available to the observer, his or her sensory data, is not what s/he  
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contemplates directly, but rather what s/he knows about the object from all the others 
s/he is involved with. And this can be known only through what has been recorded in 
social notions, that is, in speech.  
 
To illustrate this with a medical example, let us consider our opening case where the 
conversation with my patient was based on the concept psychosomatic instead of 
neurasthenia. This derives directly from the fact of the time and culture in which we 
were brought up and where our meeting took place, although the patient’s migraine 
would have been the same now as a hundred years earlier. To use another clinical 
example, when I was practising as a GP in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the early 
1990s, I had several conversations with my Arab Muslim patients on the possible role 
of evil eye and jinns (malevolent spirits) causing their ailments. For my Arab patients 
the presence of evil eye and Jinns in their lives was not folklore but a plain fact of 
life.51 Those conversations would sound rather odd, however, if I were to try to 
initiate them with my Lutheran Finnish patients in Tampere, Finland. Medical 
anthropology is rich, indeed, with examples of diverse ideas about health and illness 
from all around the globe. Ideas that flourish and make sense in a particular 
community in a particular historical period of time but which may be considered 
strange, if not wholly incomprehensible, in some other times and surroundings even if 
the objective phenomena addressed with those ideas were the same. 
 
This all applies to our scientific thinking as well. We do not get our scientific ideas 
spontaneously as revelations falling on us while contemplating some object of our 
personal interest. Scientific ideas emerge and develop as a part and consequence of 
our scientific work conducted in a particular community in a particular period of time. 
In order to do scientific research we need to acquire basic tools to start with, be they 
the skill to comprehend scientific language, use laboratory instruments or understand 
mathematical formulae. All this is acquired during our education, which defines for us 
the problems worth studying in the first place and offers the conceptual and technical 
tools to address them. Only when our tools turn out to be unfit to resolve a problem 
that we find ourselves facing, do we have to develop new tools to resolve the 
question, be they better instruments for measurement, new equations to disclose 
connections between phenomena under inquiry or novel concepts to redefine the 
problem at hand.  
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With the idea of the developmental basis for acquiring and using concepts as tools for 
thinking in general and scientific thinking in particular both Vygotsky and Ilyenkov 
echo Hegel, who writes in the Introduction to the Philosophy of History, how  
 
“Kepler had to have a priori, acquaintance with ellipses, cubes and squares, 
and with the theory of how they are related, before he could invent – from 
empirical data – his immortal laws consisting of determinations of those 
concepts. One who is ignorant of the elementary concepts of that science 
could no more understand those laws than he could invent them – no matter 
how long he stared at the heavens and the movement of the stars.” 52 (italics 
original) 
 
It is precisely in this sense that Newton’s famous maxim (in a letter to Hooke in 1676) 
“if I have seen further it is by standing ye shoulder of giants”53, is to be understood.  
 
What, then, makes scientific concepts scientific? That is, how do scientific concepts 
differ from our everyday concepts? Ilyenkov maintains that reality is not construed as 
a sea of individual things, in which separate individuals catch abstract general 
definitions, but consists rather of an articulate system of men’s relation to nature. 
Language is a direct expression of this system of relations between men and things. 
Scientific language does not, therefore, merely give names to the phenomena of the 
world; it expresses the relations between them as revealed by scientific research and 
expressed in scientific theory.  
 
For example, when Newton defined the concept of mass in his Principia, he did not 
merely adopt a name to refer to an object. Instead, he formulated a concept denoting 
the relation of two other concepts, density and bulk, to introduce a theoretical entity 
mass as a part of a larger theoretical system. As Newton writes:  
 
“The quantity of matter is…arising from its density and bulk conjunctly…It 
is this quantity that I mean hereafter everywhere under the  name of body or 
mass”.54  
 
When Marx defined commodity as one of the fundamental concepts for his economic 
theory he wrote that in order for a thing (i.e. a mere material object outside of us) to 
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become a commodity it needs to contain both use-value and exchange-value. These 
values, in turn, are created through the socio-economic relations and activities 
between people in a given time in a given society.55 Furthermore, as we saw before, 
biology does not operate only with living, concrete objects such as singular plants and 
animals and their constituents, but with concepts such as organism, species and 
selection. By means of these concepts biology studies the same reality as its sub-
disciplines botany and zoology, but it does so at still more theoretical level than those 
sub-disciplines. It is concerned with the abstractions and concepts by which its objects 
of inquiry (spanning its sub-disciplines) are related; whereas the sub-disciplines 
proceed on the basis of prior classifications and distinctions from within biology’s 
objects.  
 
It is precisely in this sense, Ilyenkov claims, that a word (notion, term, everyday 
concept) as a verbal symbol and a scientific concept as a form of thought need to be 
considered as essentially different. A definition of any scientific concept refers, thus, 
to a system of relations of concepts expressing the system’s organisation. A scientific 
concept is not just an empirical generalisation, but addresses the relations between the 
objects observed and links them as a part of a theoretical system. Studying the logical 
processing of empirical data into scientific concepts needs, therefore, to extend 
beyond merely observing the naming of an object with a word. 56  
 
Let us illustrate the difference between everyday concepts (words, terms, notions) and 
scientific concepts with an everyday example. Cooking is a highly developed human 
activity with its own and distinct vocabulary used in cookbooks and spoken in 
kitchens, both domestic and professional.  Terms such as boiling, stirring, raw and 
ripe are commonly used to denote certain phenomena in the activity of cooking. If we 
claim that science operates with and develops through concepts, why do we not, then, 
consider gastronomic notions as concepts similar to scientific concepts when we are 
discussing about the preparation and taste of our last dinner? The answer is that even 
though the concept as a word might appear identical, such as boiling in cookery and 
in chemistry, in the kitchen the word boiling is used in a narrow technical sense to 
denote a certain phenomenon occurring in a heated pan, but in chemistry the term is 
used as a scientific concept encapsulating a whole theory of the behaviour of liquids 
and gases in relation to thermodynamic laws and the explanatory principles used in 
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chemistry and physics. When uttered in the kitchen, the word boiling contains no 
theoretical dimension apart from its technical use and it remains restricted to the 
realms of a stove only, while in chemistry it is used as a theoretical concept denoting 
a phenomenon which is logically connected to other concepts used in chemistry as a 
part of its theoretical structure.  
 
Likewise, to take a medical example, a patient may complaint to his or her physician 
of a sore throat. For the patient sore throat is an everyday concept. In medicine 
everyday concepts do not qualify as diagnoses and a physician needs to transform the 
patient’s complaint to medical concepts such as laryngitis, pharyngitis, tonsillitis, 
mononucleosis etc, depending on the location and aetiology of the ailment, to express 
the nature of the problem according to the theory.  
 
We may claim, then, that medicine is not based on technical procedures but on 
conceptual thinking, that is, on discerning the relations between phenomena observed 
and casting them into concepts that serve as tools in medical theory and practice. But 
how are new concepts formed and adopted into medicine? To analyse this necessitates 
a historical method.  
 
On historical method  
 
As argued above, concepts in different sciences such as physics, chemistry, biology 
and medicine have been formulated as theoretical tools for their particular fields of 
inquiry. These concepts change over time. Therefore, to understand the formulation 
and adoption of any scientific concept as a part of scientific theory entails a historical 
examination of the scientific discipline in question.57 Vygotsky holds that the 
development of scientific ideas, the rise and fall of concepts, the renewal of 
classifications etc, need to be analysed in relation to the general socio-cultural context 
of the era, together with the general conditions of the prevailing scientific knowledge 
and the objective demands upon the scientific approach that follow from the nature of 
the phenomena studied in a given stage of scientific investigation.58  
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For Vygotsky, the historical development of scientific concepts is fully dialectic and 
social in its nature. The evolution of a scientific field has its zigzags, returns, and 
loops which all have their own historical character and which are necessary links and 
stages in that development.59 Therefore, an examination of the history of a scientific 
field is needed to explain why, at a given stage of its development, the demand and 
possibility for a new concept, such as psychosomatic in medicine, emerged and why 
that concept did not come into existence, say, a hundred years earlier. Which ideas 
developed into scientific concepts and which did not, which ideas were advanced, 
which paths they covered, what their fate was, all this depends upon often 
extrascientific factors that affect the development of that particular science and 
determine its history.60  
 
It follows from the foregoing that we should not approach medical concepts as 
random products of solitary geniuses. Yet in medicine we like to think that the 
discoveries of the past are single-handed achievements of individual luminaries. We 
also like to think of the development of medicine as a logical process, where one idea 
has progressed to another and presumably better idea, as Burnham notes in his recent 
survey on the writing history of medicine.61 Indeed, when we read books on the 
history of medicine we learn that Vesalius revealed the structure of the human body, 
Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood, Jenner introduced inoculation, 
Fleming discovered penicillin etc. True enough. Many of the landmark discoveries in 
medicine have been achieved because of the tenacity of some certain individuals. 
They have often been practising physicians facing the fact that prevailing medical 
theory and treatment has been, as indeed it still is, insufficient by far to resolve many 
of the problems we encounter in our everyday surgeries. Many if not most physicians 
have contemplated ways of finding better methods for diagnosis and cure but only a 
few have had the time and means to do scientific research in the midst of their 
everyday workloads and responsibilities. And even fewer of those who have had the 
means, have possessed the insight, stamina and luck to end up with anything useful. 
These are the individuals we hail as heroes in the history of medicine.  
 
Alongside the individualistic approach, our traditional inquiries into the development 
of medicine have started from our current medical theory to look back twards those 
who have shown the way to the truth as we understand it today. As Tauber and 
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Chernyak point out, while exploring the birth of immunology, we have a tendency to 
replace “the history of a thought with our thoughts about the history”.62 This approach 
marks those occasions that suit our present ideas of the way things are but leaves 
unnoticed the terrains those early researchers encountered when trying to answer the 
questions they felt it necessary to ask. Moreover, it fails to address the dynamics of 
these questions, that is, the dialogues and debates within medicine and in society at 
large. That is, we tend to fill the description of the development of an idea with our 
final, redefined and filtered appraisal of how things are and came to be. 
 
The widely used individualistic and retrospective approach in writing history of 
medicine is, thus, too narrow, as beaten paths often are, to accommodate the variety 
of ideas and metaphors alive in the minds of our early colleagues while tackling 
clinical problems they encountered in their surgeries - those very problems that we 
face today and which justify, in the end, the whole existence of medical endeavour. 
As Tauber and Chernyak propose, we may attempt to adopt a complementary 
approach to examine theoretical developments in medicine. That is, to appreciate an 
idea as cast into a medical concept, we need to correlate the retrospective approach 
with a prospective inquiry, where the development of an idea is evaluated against its 
own historical context. 63 That is to say that whatever has been formulated in the past 
has been formulated in certain intellectual circumstances that provided the questions 
to be asked and the tools to search for answers.  
 
Applying a historical approach to analysing the development, meaning and use of 
medical concepts faces two basic methodological problems inherent in any 
historiography. First, when attempting to illustrate the birth and fate of a concept we 
shall not, as Carr has reminded us64, deceive ourselves with the idea of history as 
merely collecting the facts and reconstructing the past as it was.  Yet, to be plausible, 
constructing a historical development must be based on factual evidence. No 
evidence, no history, as the historian John Vincent has bluntly stated.65 But historical 
facts are not there just waiting to be picked up and put into  chronological order. They 
are, to use Carr’s metaphor, more like fish swimming about in a vast and often 
inaccessible ocean. What the historian will catch depends partly, as for any fisherman, 
on sheer luck, but also, and more importantly, on where he chooses to fish and what 
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tackle he chooses to use. And all this is, of course, determined by the kind of fish he 
wants to catch.66 
 
Tracing the birth and development of a medical concept is, therefore, a process of 
selection from available historical material chosen for the aims of the study. As Carr 
notes, the historian chooses from the infinite number of available facts those which 
are significant for his purpose. From the multiplicity of sequences of cause and effect 
he extracts those that can be fitted into a rational explanation and interpretation. All 
the other facts and sequences of cause and effect have to be rejected as accidental, not 
because the facts are not true or that the relations between causes and effects are 
vague, but because the sequences themselves are irrelevant for that particular 
analysis.67 
 
The second problem when analysing the development of scientific concepts from the 
early to modern era is that the meanings of concepts, even when similar as words, 
have changed over the course of time. For example, in chemistry the meaning of 
concepts such as quality, element, composition etc. have changed to the extent that no 
medieval chemist could understand a modern law of chemistry in the same way as we 
do and conversely, as Fleck68 has pointed out. To use a medical example, the concept 
hypochondria has been a part of medical vocabulary for ages. For us the term refers to 
a patient’s constant concern about his or her health and conviction that s/he has some 
unnoticed moribund disease lurking behind his or her occasional discomforts. Yet, in 
the seventeenth century hypochondria was considered a disease entity of its own with 
pains in the upper abdomen (hypo chondros, beneath the sternal cartilage), flatulence, 
constipation and irritability as its characteristic symptoms.69 These examples 
underline the idea that a scientific concept cannot be comprehended without 
consideration of its particular historical context and the intellectual environment in 
which the concept was adopted and given its structure and content.  
 
Therefore, when examining the adoption of the concept psychosomatic into medical 
theory I will start by first analysing how the question of the possible effect of the 
mind (psyche) on the body (soma) has been addressed in the medical literature 
throughout the history of medicine and, second, what historical circumstances and 
theoretical arguments led to the formulation and introduction of the concept into 
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medical vocabulary during the first half of the 20th century. It is only after this 
background information that we can attempt to comprehend the content and 
subsequent development of the concept psychosomatic in medical theory. 
 
To summarise, I am testing, in what follows, a conceptual-historical approach which 
may offer us tools to examine, to quote Pellegrino and Thomasma, “not only what 
medicine is but also what kinds of knowledge it generates [and] what logical tools it 
uses” in medical theory and practice. We shall see in the subsequent chapters, whether 
the approach outlined in the foregoing may help to shed light on the understanding of 
the development of medicine by examining the development of its concepts before 
addressing the role these concepts have in everyday medical practice.  
 
 38 
Chapter 2 - Psychosomatic, a word 
 
Although bodily manifestations of various states of man such as anger, fear, joy and 
pleasure have been well recognised and depicted in the medical literature since 
antiquity, the word psychosomatic is of relatively recent origin. Several authors 70 71 72 
73 attribute the first use of the word psychosomatic to Coleridge, who used the term 
twice in an unpublished manuscript in 1828 when discussing the problem of passions 
in Descartes’ writing.74 While this may be the first known use of the word 
psychosomatic in the English language, Margetts has traced the first occurrence of the 
word in the medical literature to a Lehrbuch der Störungen des Seelenlebens oder der 
Seelenstörungen und Ihrer Behandlung. Vom rationalen Standpunkt aus Entworfen 
(A Textbook of the Disturbances of the Life of the Soul or Disturbances of the Soul. 
Treatment Considered from a Rational Point of View) by a German physician Johann 
Christian August Heinroth, published in Leipzig in 181875. Margetts’ finding has not 
been disputed to this day and it stands as a standard reference in the psychosomatic 
literature.76 77 78 79 80 Since Margetts’ observation has more bearing on the discussion 
to follow than that of a mere historical detail of interest, let us first take a closer look 
at Dr. Heinroth and his use of the term psychosomatic in his book.  
 
Johann Heinroth was born the son of a surgeon in Leipzig in 1773. He studied 
medicine in the town of his birth and was awarded a doctorate in medicine in 1805. In 
1810 he published his first significant work Beyträge zur Krankheitslehre 
(Contributions to the Study of Illness). Since he had developed an interest in 
Seelenheilkunde (healing of the soul), a topic he had elaborated in his 1810 book, he 
was nominated an extraordinary professor in der Psÿchischen Therapie in 1811 and a 
full professor in 1827. That made him, in effect, the first professor of psychiatry in the 
history of medicine. He died in 1843 while serving as Dean at the University of 
Leipzig.81 82 
 
Among Heinroth’s prolific writings the two volume Seelenstörungen constituted his 
Magnum Opus. In his book Heinroth gave an overview of the present state of the 
understanding and treatment of disturbancies of the soul in medicine together with an 
account of the history of medicine in relation to mental problems from antiquity to the 
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19th century. He also addressed, among various other topics, the problem of 
sleeplessness. Heinroth assumed that ”Gewöhnlich sind die Duellen der 
Schlafslösigkeit psychisch-somatisch, doch kann auch jede Lebensphäre für sich 
allein den vollständigen Grund derselben enthalten”. 83 That is, the problem of 
sleeplessness may be partly due to the inner psychic-somatic conflict. It is important 
to realise, however, that this is the only occasion Heinroth used the term psychisch-
somatisch in his whole literary output.84 Furthermore, he did not develop any 
theoretical considerations whatsoever based on that particular term. As a word, 
psychisch-somatisch remained in Heinroth’s writings a solitary semantic expression.  
 
It is also noteworthy that in Heinroth’s thinking the terms Seele (soul) and 
Seelenströrung (soul-disturbance) had a strong religious resonance in the Christian-
Protestant sense due to his profoundly Pietist background (Roy Porter is mistaken 
here when he claims that Heinroth was a Roman Catholic85). For Heinroth, sin was 
the ultimate cause of mental problems. Sin was not, however, a single event of 
wrongdoing, but rather as a life wrongly led as a whole, that is, aspiring solely to 
earthly possessions and bodily satisfaction instead of the Kingdom of God. It follows 
that the treatment of mental problems needed to be based on a moral readjustment  
of the patient’s life through persuasion and education and even disciplinary 
measures.86 87  
 
During the 19th century there are occasional occurrences of the word psychosomatic 
both in lay and medical literature. The Oxford English Dictionary gives an example of 
the use of the word by referring to a passage in Reade’s novel Hard Cash, published 
in 1863: “The nocturnal and diurnal attendance of a Psycho-physical physician, who 
knows the Psychosomatic relation of body and mind.” A British physician  Bucknill 
discusses this approach in medicine in his book Unsoundness of Mind in Relation to 
Criminal Acts published in 185688. For Bucknill, there were three prevalent theories 
of insanity in the mid-19th century, the somatic, the psychic and the somato-psychic. 
The first considered mental disorders to be of purely bodily origin. The second, 
according to the author, was founded by Heinroth who, as we saw, considered 
insanity to be a perversion of the soul and tantamous to sin. As for the third, Bucknill 
writes that “the psychosomatists find in the liability of the cerebral instrument to 
disease, a reasonable basis for the irresponsibility of the insane; and, in the freedom of 
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the spiritual will, a just ground for the responsibility of the sane.” The term 
psychosomatist thus denotes here the idea that the workings of one’s mind are 
dependent on the workings of the cerebral instrument (that is, the brain) and, as any 
other organ, the brain may also become diseased leading to mental impairment. The 
problem was where does one’s personal responsibility end if one’s ability to reason is 
diminished because of a brain disease.89 This discussion was a part of a wider issue of 
man’s responsibility for his deeds before the law and under the legislation, an issue 
that had gained prominence by the Woyzeck case, where an apparently mentally ill 
man was executed in 1824 in Leipzig for murdering his ladyfriend.90  
 
Toward the end of the 19th century an increasing number of papers were published in 
medical journals discussing the effects of man’s mind to the body. This was owing to 
the rapid advancements in both psychology and physiology, which offered novel 
theoretical and methodological tools to examine the workings of the human body and 
mind and their effects on each other. The earliest use of the term psychosomatic in an 
article heading that I have been able to trace91 is a paper by a Henry Smith Williams 
entitled as A Few Psycho-Somatic Base-Lines, published in American Journal on 
Insanity in 1891.92 The author, an assistant physician in Bloomingdale Asylum, New 
York, does not, however, use the term psychosomatic anywhere in the text but 
concentrates on discussing the neurological basis of the mind-body relationship.  
 
During the decades to follow articles and books dealing with the mind-body issue in 
medicine did not seem to use the term psychosomatic in their discussions. Instead, the 
term psychogenesis was commonly used to indicate the supposed mental origin of 
various bodily ailments, especially in the German medical literature as, for example: 
Zur Psychogenität des Asthma bronchiale (1913)93, Kriegserfahrungen über 
psychogene Taubheit und Stummheit (1916)94 and Ueber psychogene Dermatosen 
(1922)95. Meanwhile, the growing influence of psychoanalytic theory on medicine 
was seen in the early decades of the 20th century in article titles such as Psoriasis as 
an hysterical conversion symbolization (1914)96, Die Heilung eines schweren Falles 
von Asthma durch Psychoanalyse (1914)97 and Ueber die Psychoanalyse des 
Organischen im Menschen (1921) 98. 
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Another concept coming into fashion, especially in the USA, in the early 20th century 
was psychobiology. Adolf Meyer, one of its main proponents and a professor of 
psychiatry at Johns Hopkins University, defined the concept in an article published in 
JAMA in 1915 as follows:  
 
“Psychobiology…forms clearly and simply the missing chapter of ordinary 
physiology and pathology. The chapter dealing with functions of the total 
person and not merely of detachable parts…”99 
 
Concepts such as psychophysical or psychophysiology can be traced back to Wundt 
and his studies on human psychology as introduced in his Grundzüge der 
physiologischen Psychologie in 1874.100 Zweig explains the use of these concepts in 
medicine in his article of 1931 that it is based on an idea of “…dem psychophysischen 
Materialismus, welcher durch die kausale Bondung der seelischen Funktionen an die 
Gehirnvorgänge charakterisiert erschient…”.101 (psychophysical materialism where 
there is a causal bond between mental functions and the brain). 
 
In the early years of the twentieth century the literature on the effects of the mind on 
the body burgeoned to the extent that in 1925 Oswald Schwarz, a Privatdozent at the 
University of Vienna, edited a compendium on the studies conducted on the issue so 
far entitled: Psychogenese und Psychotherapie Körperlicher Symptome. 102 Schwarz 
writes in the Foreword how a new age in medicine was dawning. This was due to the 
post-war developments in culture and society in general which were also reflected in 
science and, alas, in medicine. In past decades medical research had provided new 
knowledge on human physiology while psychological research had revealed the 
workings of the human mind. These taken together presented an opportunity to 
understand how psychical phenomena may lead to bodily symptoms (Psychogenese 
körperlicher Symptome) and it could form a new basis for medicine as a whole. In 
this compendium we encounter terms such as psychogenie and psychophysische but 
the word psychosomatic does not appear anywhere in the book.  
 
The term psychosomatic occurred, albeit in a truncated form in an article title in 1928 
Disease, a psysomatic reaction published in JAMA by an American physician, 
George Draper.103 The author writes, how  
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“This perfectly coordinated interplay of different tissues is accomplished 
through the physical agency of the sympathetic nervous systems and the 
imponderable forces of the emotional life. It is for this reason that man cannot 
be looked on segmentally as having a soma or body department on the one 
hand, and a psyche or spiritual-mental-nervous department on the other. He 
is, in fact, a psysome, or mind-body, and all his reactions to environment are 
psysomatic.” 
 
The breakthrough for the word psychosomatic into medical literature was in 1935, 
when an American physician Helen Flanders Dunbar published a compendium 
Emotions and Bodily Changes. A Survey of Literature on Psychosomatic 
Interrelationships 1910-1933.104  Dunbar’s book was to a large extent an expanded 
copy of Schulz’s work quoted above. (The subtitle of Dunbar’s book can, in turn, be 
seen to draw on an article by Hellmut Marx Psychosomatische Wechselwirkungen, 
published in Germany in 1933). 105 
 
In the first edition of her massive inquiry into the prevailing medical literature on the 
mind-body issue Dunbar writes how 
 
“In the past it has been occasional leaders who have called attention to the 
problem of psyche-soma as fundamental for the physician, within the last 
decades this realization has begun to permeate medical literature, changing it 
intrinsically…there is no major division in the quarterly Cumulative Index 
Medicus devoted to our problem…The nearest group heading is “physical-
mental relationships”, which appeared, incidentally, in 1931, after this study 
was already under way”106 
 
Dunbar’s work ultimately led to the founding of a new medical journal 
Psychosomatic Medicine - Experimental and Clinical Studies in New York in 1939. 
In the first issue the editors discussed the novelty of the term psychosomatic medicine:  
 
“Psychosomatic medicine is an expression which has not yet obtained 
citizenship. It does not appear in the standard medical dictionaries. To 
physicians this expression will have various connotations. Like all new 
expressions, the term “psychosomatic medicine” may lead to misconceptions 
and misunderstanding unless a definition is provided.” 
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The editors then define the object of inquiry for their approach as follows: 
 
“Its object is to study in their interrelation the psychological and 
physiological aspects of all normal and abnormal bodily functions and thus to 
integrate somatic therapy and psychotherapy.” 
 
We may conclude, then, that despite the occasional occurrence of the word 
psychosomatic in the medical literature since the early 19th century, it was introduced 
and adopted as a scientific concept in medicine only in the latter half of the 1930s 
with the founding of a scientific journal that focused on integrating somatic medicine 
with psychotherapy. How this integration was achieved on a conceptual level will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, but to put the Journal’s theoretical background 
into a wider medical context let us consider the following paragraph in the same 
editorial: 
 
“…intensive interest and research in medical psychology is a symptom of a 
new orientation toward the problem of disease, in fact the sign of the 
beginning of a new era in etiological and therapeutic thought.”107  
 
The editorial thus proclaims that their integrative approach marks the beginning of a 
“new era” in medical thinking. To understand the meaning of this claim we need now 
to consider against what their approach was offered as new. That is, we need to 
examine how the mind-body issue was addressed in medicine as a clinical and 
theoretical problem prior to the introduction of the concept psychosomatic into the 
medical vocabulary.  
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Chapter 3 - Mind and body in early medical theory  
 
Medical thinking was based on the humoral theory of health and illness for more then 
two millenia, until it was gradually abandoned toward the second half of the 19th 
century, when the cellulopathological approach replaced the remnants of the age-old 
assumptions on the workings of the human body and mind. To understand this 
conceptual change in regard to the mind-body issue we need to start our inquiry by 
outlining the basic features of the humoral theory. The main source for this approach 
is Galen, whose writing formed the basis of European medicine for centuries. To 
understand Galen’s position we shall, however, make a brief transgression into the 
Hippocratic tradition since Galen considered Hippocratic texts as his ultimate 
authority in medicine, both in theory and in practice.108 
 
The Hippocratic Corpus 
 
The early Greek medical treatises, constituting what we today call the Corpus 
Hippocraticum, date from the last centuries BC. What is extant through medieval 
translations includes a variety of manuscripts, some seventy in all, on the theoretical 
and practical aspects of illness and healing. Various historians of medicine have 
stressed that the Corpus was not written or compiled by any single author, but it may 
rather be considered as the remains of an ancient medical library.109 110 Among the 
works are practical textbooks dealing with topics such as ulcers, fractures and 
haemorrhoids, manuals for physicians, philosophical contemplations, lectures and 
notebooks. The original writings underwent numerous translations, editions and 
compilations in subsequent centuries. The oldest manuscripts extant date back to the 
10th century AD, while the majority of surviving copies were written during the 14th-
16th century. In what follows, I will rely on Loeb Classical Library Volumes I-VIII 
together with some other contemporary English translations. I will leave aside the 
scholarly debates on the historical and linguistic problems of the texts since it is 
beyond the scope of this study and also of my professional competence. An interested 
reader may find well-founded arguments on the problems of translation and the 
authenticity of the texts in recent studies on the subject.111  
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The Theory 
 
Plutarch comments on the Greek approach to health in his treatise Aetia Romana in 
the first century AD: 
 
"Why is the shrine of Asclepius outside the City? Is it because they consider 
it more healthful to spend their time outside the city than within its walls? In 
fact the Greeks, quite reasonably, have their shrines of Asclepius situated in 
places which are both clean and high.112  
 
“Quite reasonably” is not a coincidental expression used by Plutarch. Reasonably, 
indeed, is the prevailing tone in the Hippocratic writings when dealing with problems 
of health and illness. The authors of the Corpus represent a down-to-earth approach to 
medical practice. A physician needs to establish his diagnostic and therapeutic 
reasoning on sense perception, observation and experience. These are combined with 
medical theory, which, in turn, needs to be based on demonstrated facts instead of 
vague hypotheses.  
 
Hippocratic medicine is based, as a whole, on the ancient Greek theory of the world 
as being composed of four elements: air, fire, water and earth. Man's body, in turn, 
consists of four humours elemental to man's living and wellbeing as the author of 
Nature of Man writes:  
 
"The body of man has in itself blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile; 
these make up the nature of his body, and through these he feels pain or 
enjoys health. Now he enjoys the most perfect health when these elements are 
duly proportioned to one another in respect of compounding, power and bulk, 
and when they are perfectly mingled. Pain is felt when one of these elements 
is in defect or excess, or is isolated in the body without being compounded 
with all the others." 113  
 
The ancient authors stressed, however, that these theoretical fundamentals should not 
be applied in a mechanistic manner when evaluating man's condition. Instead, they 
need to be considered in caution and in relation to each and every patient's particular 
constitution.114 Furthermore, the patient does not live in a vacuum but the physician 
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needs also to consider the particular circumstances the patient lives in and their effect 
on the patient’s symptoms. 115 
 
 Diseases 
 
We may assume that the human condition has not essentially changed since the days 
of the emergence of Hippocratic medicine. The joys and sorrows, pains and pleasures, 
ills and enjoyments of man are basically the same today as two millennia ago. In the 
Corpus we find discussions on conditions such as fevers, colds, sore throat, cough, 
diarrhoea, sciatica, asthma, varicose veins, haemorrhoids, wounds, fractures, tumours, 
joint problems and all sorts of other ills and ailments familiar to us also in the 21st 
century. It is therefore reasonable safe to assume that most, if not all, of diagnostic 
labels found in the Corpus refer, more or less, to same phenomena we observe in our 
patients today. 
 
Together with bodily ailments there are various diagnoses in the Corpus referring to 
the patient's altered state of mind such as melancholia, sleeplessness, fear, dysthymia 
and mania, which we classify within our present diagnostic system as psychiatric 
symptoms. However, interpreting ancient terms such as mania or melancholia is not 
as straightforward as understanding diagnoses such as fractured leg, constipation or 
nosebleed. It seems that the authors of the Corpus applied their terminology of what 
we would consider mental derangements to a fairly wide spectrum of phenomena. 
Melancholia implies, for example, a range of symptoms from severe depression to 
mere nervousness.116 Moreover, mania seems to include a cluster of symptoms when, 
broadly speaking, a person is "out of his mind".117 But let us ask next, how are these 
mental phenomena related to the workings of the body?  
 
Mind and body 
 
The Corpus holds fairly unanimously that all mental phenomena have a bodily basis. 
In short: Man's mind is seated in the brain. The author of the Sacred Disease is very 
clear on this: 
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"Men ought to know that from the brain, and from the brain only, arise our 
pleasures, joys, laughter and jests, as well as our sorrows, pains, griefs and 
tears. Through it, in particular, we think, see, hear, and distinguish the ugly 
from the beautiful, the bad from the good, the pleasant from the 
unpleasant...It is the same thing which makes us mad or delirious, inspires us 
with dread and fear, whether by night and by day, brings sleeplessness, 
inopportune mistakes, aimles anxieties, absent-mindedness, and acts that are 
contrary to habit. 118 
 
Since man's mental capacities are dependent on the brain, they are, consequently, 
subject to alterations in the brain's functions:  
 
"These things that we suffer all come from the brain, when it is not healthy, 
but becomes abnormally hot, cold, moist, or dry, or suffers any other 
unnatural affection to which it was not accustomed. Madness comes from its 
moistness. When the brain is abnormally moist, of necessity it moves, and 
when it moves neither sight nor hearing are still, but we see or hear now one 
thing and now another...But all the time brain is still a man is intelligent."119 
 
We may conclude from the above and other examples in the Corpus that in the 
Hippocratic theory the basic explanatory principle for mental phenomena is physical 
in the sense that the imbalance of humours leads to mental derangement. This 
imbalance is, in turn, caused by wrong conduct of life or unhealthy environment. But 
can the situation be the other way around? Did these ancient writers consider the 
possibility that man's mental state could affect his or her body to the extent that it 
caused diseases? 
 
Mind-body causality 
 
It appears that the Hippocratic writings as presented in the Loeb editions are rather 
sparse in discussing the possible effects of man’s mind on the workings of the body. 
For example, the author of Epidemics III describes a woman in Thassos 
 
"...of gloomy temperament, after a grief with a reason for it, without taking to 
bed lost sleep and appetite, and suffered thirst and nausea.120 
 
The poor lady eventually developed  
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"...fears, much rambling, depression and slight feverishness. Early in the 
morning frequent convulsions; whenever these frequent convulsions 
intermitted, she wandered and uttered obscenities; many pains, severe and 
continuous."121 
 
The case history ends with the patient having copius menstruation on the third day. 
How the illness eventually developed, we have no accounts to rely on. But how is 
grief, or any other emotion, transmitted to physical symptoms? It seems that the case 
is, according to the Corpus, the other way around: bodily changes cause mental 
aberrations. The author of the Sacred Disease explains: 
 
"Those who are mad through phlegm are quiet, and neither shout nor make 
disturbance; those maddened through bile are noisy, evil-doers and restless, 
always doing something inopportune. These are the cause of continued 
madness. But if terrors and fears attack, they are due to a change in the brain. 
Now it changes when it is heated, and it is heated by bile which rushes to the 
brain from the rest of the body by way of blood-veins. The fear besets the 
patient until the bile re-enters the veins and the body."122 
 
The author continues by distinguishing causeless distress, nightly terrors and fears, 
which are due to chilling and contraction of the brain caused by phlegm, heating of 
the brain due to bile, and excess of blood in the brain, respectively. When the balance 
of humours is achieved, the patient will regain his sanity. 
 
There are a few other occasions in the Corpus where mental problems are presented 
together with bodily symptoms, but there are next to no remarks on possible mind-
body causality whatsoever, as seen in following examples:  
 
"Among psychical symptoms are intemperance in drink and food, in sleep 
and in wakefulness..." 123 
 
"In every disease it is a good sign when the patient's intellect is sound and he 
enjoys his food; the opposite is a bad sign."124 
 
For madness to be followed by dysentery, dropsy or raving is a good sign. 125
  
The Corpus is also scant in addressing what we would consider  psychotherapeutic 
measures to alleviate patients’ problems. Only a couple of practical observations can 
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be found on the importance of considering man's state of mind during the course of 
treatment and recovery: 
 
"One must also take into consideration the inclinations of the person's mind 
and the strength of his body. For different patients carry out different 
instructions either easily or with difficulty."126 
 
"For some patients, though conscious that their condition is perilous, recover 
their health simply through their contentment with the goodness of the 
physician...But he  who has taken the sick man in hand, if he displays the 
discoveries of the art, preserving nature, not trying to alter it, will sweep away 
the present depression or the distrust of the moment....Yet I do not forbid you 
trying to please, for it is not unworthy of a physician's dignity.127 
 
There are, however, a few remarks to be found in the Corpus referring to the bodily 
manisfestation of emotions. The author of Humours remarks how 
 
"...the sudden sight of a snake causes pallor."128 
  
Different emotions such as fear, shame, pleasure, passion etc. were seen to affect 
different organs specific to the emotion: 
 
"...to each of these the appropriate member of the body responds by its action. 
Instances are sweats, palpitation of the heart and so forth."129 
 
The author of the Sacred Disease observes how when in pain the body shivers and is 
tense, the same phenomenon is 
 
"…produced by excess of joy, because the heart and the diaphragm are best 
endowed with feeling." 130 
 
The explanatory principle for the mediation in these phenomena is physical, or, to be 
more accurate, humoral. On the whole, there are no attempts whatsoever in the 
Corpus to explain bodily illnessess with mental processes. The case between psyche 
and soma in Hippocratic medicine seems to fall on the benefit of the soma, as 
 50 
indicated in Regimen IV (also known as Dreams), which offers a strong argument on 
the superiority of man's body to his soul: 
 
"...For when the body is awake the soul is its servant, and never her own 
mistress, but divides her attention among many things, assigning a part of it 
to each faculty of the body - to hearing, to sight, to touch, to walking, and to 
acts of the whole body; but the mind never enjoys independence."131 
 
We need to be cautious, of course, of inferring from the Corpus unanimous ideas of 
early Greek physicians on any of the matters presented in the text available. As noted 
earlier, we are dealing with remnants of treatises written by several authors during the 
last centuries BC, when various ideas and theories of health and illness were alive and 
well and rivalling.  The approach presented in the Corpus is, however, the one that 
formed the basis for medical thinking for centuries to follow as compiled, expanded 
and explained by Galen in the second century AD. Let us then see, what he has to say 
about the mind-body issue in medicine. 
 
Galen 
  
Galen (AD129-200) was by far the most influential medical writer of antiquity – if 
not in the entire history of medicine. Born in Pergamum, he made a career in Rome 
where he practised as personal physician to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. He wrote 
some 300 treatises on medicine and philosophy of which some 150 have been 
preserved to our day in Kühn’s Greek edition with Latin translation.132  
 
To the best of my knowledge no comprehensive studies have been published on the 
mind-body question in Galen’s thinking. This is partly due to the lack of critical 
modern translations of Galen’s extant texts. While only a small portion of Galen’s 
writing has been translated into English I try, nevertheless, to build a case for Galen’s 
position on the mind-body issue on available translations.  
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Mind and body 
 
Galen discusses the problem of the origins and essence of man’s soul in his book The 
Construction of the Embryo. He contents himself, however, with describing different 
approaches to the question while avoiding taking a definite stand to any of them and 
ultimately leaves the issue open.  
 
Galen follows closely the Hippocratic doctrine in his treatise The Soul’s Dependence 
on the Body, where he sees man’s rational soul as being seated in the brain. 
 
“The rational soul, seated in the brain, is able to perceive through  the organs 
of perception, through the objects of that perception to remember, and by 
itself to discern the conflict and consistency between facts, and to analyse and 
collate them…the rational soul has several faculties: perception, memory, and 
understanding, as well as all the others…it can hear, smell, taste, and 
touch…it has the following faculties: visual, acoustic, olfactory, gustatory, 
tactile.” 133 
 
The faculties of the rational soul depend on the mixtures of the body while their 
composition is affected by the way we conduct our lives: 
 
“…we derive a good bodily mixture from our food and drink and other daily 
activities… this mixture is the basis on which we then build the virtue of the 
soul.”134  
 
When dealing with the substance of body and soul Galen follows Aristotle’s doctrine, 
where the common substance of all bodies comprises on two principles, matter and 
form. Matter is in itself lacking in quality but contains within it a mixture of four 
qualities, heat, cold, dryness and wetness and these qualities give rise to the flesh, fat, 
gristle and other bodily entities. Since the soul depends on the body, its properties 
follow those of the body. The soul is 
 
“…the ‘form’ of the body…meaning the mixture of these qualities…thus the 
substance of the soul, too, must be some mixture of these four qualities, heat, 
cold, dryness, and wetness – or …the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry." 135 
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Galen opposes the Platonic idea of the immortality of the soul in favour of the soul’s 
mortality and dependence on the body.136 Not only is man’s soul dependent on the 
body and thus mortal, but its workings are also based on the composition and 
workings of the brain. Galen illustrates this in his treatise The Art of Medicine: 
 
“Quick-wittedness is an indication of a fine substance in the brain, while 
slowness of intellect is an indication of a thick one; aptitude to learn an 
indication of a substance which takes impressions easily; and memory of a 
stable one. Similarly, inability to learn indicates a substance which takes 
impressions with difficulty, and forgetfulness one which is loose and fluid. 
Changeability of opinion indicates a hot one, while stability indicates a cold 
one.”137 
 
Mind-body causality 
 
If the rational soul is entirely dependent on the body to the point of being mortal what, 
then, might be the reverse situation? Is there a way in which the workings of the soul 
can affect the body? This seems, in Galen’s opinion, to be the case. In the treatise The 
Best Constitutions of our Bodies Galen writes that 
  
“There are two causes of harm to our bodies: external influences and 
excretions from our food. External influences are, for example, when 
someone is heated, cooled or moistened, or dried beyond the appropriate 
level. Exhaustion, grief, insomnia, worry, and all such matters should also be 
put into this category…”138  
 
In his book The Art of Medicine he deliberates the matter as follows: 
  
“And if we make a classification of all the necessary factors which alter the 
body, to each of these will correspond a specific type of healthy cause. One 
category is contact with the ambient air; another is motion and rest of the 
body  as a whole or of its individual parts. The third is sleep and waking; the 
fourth, substances taken; the fifth, substances voided or retained; the sixth, 
what happens to the soul.”139  
 
What, then, may happen to the soul to the extent that it may harm one’s bodily well-
being? In his treatise The Affections and Errors of the Soul Galen writes that there are 
five  “affections of the soul”, grief, rage, anger, desire and fear.140 The effects of 
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anger to the body are illustrated in Galen’s short introductory book for medical 
freshmen The Pulse for Beginners: 
  
“In anger the pulse is deep, large, vigorous, quick, and frequent. In pleasure it 
is large and sparse…In grief it is small, slow, faint and sparse. In…fear it is 
quick, tremolous, irregular.”141  
 
The ill effects of the affections of the soul on the body are mediated, according to the 
underlying theory, through imbalance of humours in the body as noted, for example, 
in The Art of Medicine: 
 
“…motion, emptiness, sleeplessness, evacuation, and all mental affections 
dry the body, while their opposites moisten it.”142  
 
Clinical applications 
 
It seems that while there is little to be found in the Hippocratic Corpus in terms of the 
effects of the mind on the body, Galen is more generous in reflecting on the effects of 
one’s mental state to his or her bodily well being. But what are the therapeutic 
consequences, if any, of these deliberations on the effects of the soul on the body? In 
The Best Constitution of our Bodies Galen writes, that 
 
“the relative immunity of the well-proportioned body to external influence is 
clear from the very fact of its good mixture, which is equidistant from all 
extremes and therefore not liable to fall into imbalance…Such a body will 
automatically be endowed with the best humours of all, and will thus be 
better able to withstand grief, anger, insomnia, worry, rain, drought, plague, 
and  indeed all causes of disease.”143  
 
In The Art of Medicine Galen advises us: 
 
 “Obviously one must refrain from excess of all affections of the soul: anger, 
grief, pride, fear, envy, and worry; for these will change the natural 
composition of the body.”144 
 
In The Affections and Errors of the Soul Galen takes the issue further: 
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“Since errors arise from false opinion, while affections arise from irrational 
impulse, I judged that one should first free oneself from affections: it is not 
unlikely that these may in themselves constitute another source of false 
opinion. There are affections of the soul that are universally acknowledged as 
such: spirit, anger, fear, envy, excessive desire; and I would add excessive 
haste in forming love or hatred for any object as another affection. 
‘Moderation is best’ seems to me a good saying, nothing that happens without 
moderation is good.”145  
 
To summarise, for centuries to follow these treatises formed the basis for the question 
of the effects of  mental phenomena to the bodily workings and vice versa for 
physicians. According to this approach, whatever mental alterations a patient 
presented with, they are, in essence, a result of the imbalance of humours affecting the 
functions of the brain. These imbalances, in turn, are consequences of wrong diet and 
unbalanced conduct of life. One’s soul is, thus, totally dependent on the workings of 
the body and there was little room for the idea of the mind affecting the body causally 
as an independent entity.  On the other hand, there was the Platonic doctrine, adopted 
and defended by Christian theology during the centuries to follow, that man’s soul is 
independent and immortal and guided his or her bodily existence. Aristotle, in turn, 
stood somewhere in between those two approaches favouring neither the one nor the 
other. This ambiguity left Aristotle open to be enlisted by either side of the debate, as 
will be seen below.  
 
While remnants of Galenic ideas were influential for European medical thinking until 
the 19th century (and can still be heard to echo in our own days) new fundamentals for 
medical theory started to emerge during the Renaissance leading to what we now 
consider to be modern medicine. To outline the development of these fundamentals 
from Galenic thinking, I shall examine the ideas of Descartes as the next starting point 
for what follows.  After all, it is Descartes who is commonly presented as the central 
figure for the transformation of European philosophy from Medieval to Modern146 
and who is, simultaneously and erroneously, blamed for the separation of man’s mind 
from his body.  
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Chapter 4 - Passions, imagination and the body 
 
According to his own testimony, the central motive and theme for Descartes in all of 
his works was medicine. In his treatise Discourse on Method, published in 1637, he 
declares how the principal aim of practical philosophy is not only to gain mastery 
over nature but the  “preservation of health, which is undoubtedly the first good, and 
the foundation of all the other goods of this life”.147 Furthermore, he assumed that “if 
it is possible to find some means of rendering men as a whole wiser and more 
dexterous than they have been hitherto, I believe it must be sought in medicine”.148 
Descartes was convinced that with proper methods of research it would eventually be 
possible to “…free ourselves from an infinity of illnesses, both of the body and of the 
mind, and even perhaps also of the decline of the age, if we knew enough about their 
causes and about all the remedies with which nature has provided us.”149  
 
Although Descartes formulated his basic ideas about body and soul already in the 
Discourse, he entered head on into the perennial dispute on the mind-body problem in 
the Preface of his Meditations:  
  
“…as regards the soul, although many have considered that it is not easy to 
know its nature, and some have even dared to say that human reason has 
convinced us that it would perish with the body, and that faith alone could 
believe the contrary, nevertheless, inasmuch as the Lateran Council held 
under Leo X (in the eighth session) condemns these tenets, and as Leo 
expressly ordains Christian philosophers to refute their arguments and to 
employ all their powers in making known the truth, I have ventured in this 
treatise to undertake the same task.”150 
 
Descartes was not, thus, inventing the idea of the separation man’s soul from his 
body. Instead, he took the challenge to defend the doctrine of the Catholic Church 
with philosophical, instead of theological, arguments together with “natural reason” 
following the Pope’s dictum as a devoted Christian and a Catholic philosopher. But 
what was that Lateran Council declaration all about and why did the Church take such 
a strong position on that issue at that particular moment in history, a position that was 
worthwhile for Descartes to defend more than a hundred years after its introduction?  
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Body and soul 
 
By the time of the Lateran Council meeting in 1517 the Catholic Church had adopted 
Thomas Aquinas’ (1225-1274) formulation of the structure of the human soul. 
Aquinas had postulated, relying on Aristotle, that in each living thing the soul is one 
substantial form and it determines the nature of man’s living body and it also has 
powers to activate the body. In addition to this, human beings have another, rational 
soul with five faculties: intellection, vegetative and sensitive powers, local motion and 
appetite. The last four are immersed in particular organs and activate them 
accordingly, while intellection is a psychic power which is active without the use of 
any specific organic structure. As the body is destructible and mortal, the soul could 
be destroyed only if it were totally dependent on the body for its activities, as is the 
case with the souls of animals. But since humans have rational soul with an activity 
(intellective cognition), that is not dependent upon any bodily organ, it can exist 
independently of the body and it is, hence, immortal.151 
 
At the time St Thomas wrote his essays, the treatise On Generalities by Abu al-Walid 
Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Rush (known in the Latin West as Averroes, a polymath 
born in 1126 in Cordoba, Spain) had become one of the standard textbooks in 
European medical education. Averroes also based his argumentation on Aristotle and 
he asserted, aligning himself with St Thomas, that body and mind are two distinct 
substances. He claimed, however, that there is a single eternal mind common to all 
human beings, while each human body entails a mortal soul. This idea raised serious 
concerns in the Catholic Church, since it suggested that there is no individual 
immortal soul to survive after a person’s death. By the 15th century Averroes’ ideas 
had been deeply immersed in the Italian medical schools, especially those in Padua 
and Bologna. This doctrinal controversy, eventually, led to an open conflict between 
medical scholars and the Catholic Church. In an attempt to end the dispute once and 
for all Pope Leo X banned Averroist ideas in the Lateran Council of 1517, the very 
text Descartes refers to in his Preface mentioned above.152 
 
The Pope’s dictum did not, of course, solve the theoretical problem of the relationship 
between man’s mind and his body. Only three years after the Lateran declaration 
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Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525), a professor of medicine at the University of Padua, 
published a treatise On the Immortality of the Soul where he argued, relying again on 
Aristotle’s reasoning, that each human rational soul is material and it is dependent 
upon the body in all its activities: “…the human soul is unqualifiedly the act of a 
physical and organic body, since it has no operation in which it does not depend in 
some way on the body”.153 It is, therefore, inseparable from the body and, therefore, 
mortal.  
 
Pomponazzi’s book fuelled the debate on the nature and relationship of the human 
mind to the body to continue both in theology and in medicine. This controversy 
gained further momentum in the late Renaissance, with new attempts to prove the 
immortality of the soul apart from the Thomist interpretations of Aristotle. For 
example, Francesco Piccolomini (1582-1651), a professor of philosophy at the 
University of Padua and the head of the Jesuits, postulated against Pomponazzi and 
claimed that humans are composed of a body, an organic soul and a mind that are all 
distinct. The organic soul is mortal material form immersed in and extending 
throughout the body, whereas the human mind is an immaterial substantial form 
created by God. The power of the organic soul activates the bodily organs but the 
mind has no organic powers whatsoever, it only thinks. The organic soul operates by 
means of organs. Sense perception is the result of motions produced by external 
objects affecting sense organs, nerves and brain. The mind, in turn, can understand 
and contemplate concepts such as God, religion and the infinite, which are not 
produced by sense organs, but are workings of a mind independent of the body. 154 
 
These controversies were not limited to the Italian medical faculties, but flourished 
throughout the Catholic medical world of the time. For example, Thomas Fienus, a 
professor of medicine at the deeply Catholic University of Louvain, joined the debate 
in 1608 with his book De Viribus Imaginationis155 where he discussed the relation of 
the soul, or “imagination”, to the body relying on the Catholic interpretation of the 
issue. He held that imagination was a cognitive, immanent and immaterial faculty and 
could act directly upon matter, including the human body. It follows that imagination 
cannot cause or cure diseases either. Imagination may, however, arouse emotions, 
which can affect the body via the movement of humours and spirits and if that 
affection lasts long enough, that can lead to disease. As a general conclusion Fienus 
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established that “diseases…are caused and cured through the natural vegetative 
powers, and vegetative powers are not directed or commanded by the sensitive 
powers of the intellect.”  
 
Returning now to Descartes, it is obvious that the problem of the relation of man’s 
mind to his or her body had been widely discussed well before Descartes entered the 
scene and his ideas concerning the mind-body question were not so very original. His 
main thesis concerning the relation of the mind to the body had been formulated and 
discussed before and he merely repeated and defended contemporary Catholic 
interpretations of the issue. What Descartes propagated was the idea that the essence 
of all things material is extension and what is extended can be measured and analysed 
with mathematical, that is, precise and “infallible” methods. The human body is 
material and, hence, extended and has the same properties as any other corporeal 
entity, size, shape, position, rest and motion. The human body can, therefore, be 
analysed by mechanics and mathematics like any other mechanical system, be it a 
water pump or a mechanical clock. (The clock metaphor is not Descartes’ idea for 
describing the structure and function of the human body; it seems to have appeared in 
the European literature some time in the 14th century.156) The human mind, as the 
Catholic doctrine maintained, is not material, and being immaterial, it lacks extension 
and it cannot, therefore, be divided into parts or measured. As Descartes plainly 
established his position in the Sixth Meditation: “…body, by its nature, is always 
divisible and …mind is entirely indivisible”.157 The human mind cannot, thus, be 
measured and analysed by mathematical, that is, exact methods. Mind has only one 
function, to think. It is related to the whole body but it is not the agent that moves the 
body. The workings of the body are to be explained solely on corporeal and 
mechanical principles such as the circulation of the blood. The death of the body is 
due to the disintegration of bodily systems without interference from the mind.  
 
Even though the mind is unextended, Descartes was of the opinion that it is related to 
the body as a whole and communicates with the body. In the Passions of the Soul 
Descartes writes how the mind, when desiring something,  moves “the little gland to 
which it is closely united to move in the way requisite to produce the effect which 
relates to this desire”.158 It follows, then, that wrong desires may harm the body. And 
similarly, events in the body may move the gland and thereby affect the mind. This 
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entails therapeutic possibilities since: “the health of the body…very much aid the 
mind to rid itself of all the passions that are involved in sadness and make way for 
those that are involved in joy”.159 Descartes does not, however, take these conclusions 
any further in a clinical sense to analyse their pathological and therapeutic 
implications. 
 
Descartes’ reasoning and optimism about revealing the secrets of nature through 
mathematical methods were met with enthusiasm as well as criticism already in his 
lifetime. Indeed, Descartes’ confidence in mathematics as a solid foundation for 
disclosing the true nature of things must have been assuring to those aspiring minds 
who have found endless scholastic debates leading, seemingly, nowhere. As Descartes 
writes in Discourse:  
 
“Above all I enjoyed mathematics, because of the certainty and self-evidence 
of its reasoning…I was astonished that on such firm and solid foundations 
nothing more exalted had been built…”160  
 
In short, Descartes was convincing his readers, that there is “an infallible method”, 
which could solve our problems in understanding the world. But that method, 
mathematics, was to be applied merely to corporeal phenomena since only corporeal, 
that is, extended phenomena can be measured and analysed by mathematical methods. 
While this approach boosted the study on the workings of the human body, leading to 
what in medicine was to be called iatromechanics, it inhibited the possibility of the 
development of psychology as a science since, being unextended, the human mind 
could not be measured or analysed by mathematical methods, even in principle. 
However, as it turned out, disputes on the relation of man’s mind to his or her body 
and on the effect of one’s mind to one’s bodily health and illness were not settled with 
Descartes’ doctrines either and the debate continued.  
 
Mechanistic vs. spiritual doctrines 
 
By the time of the debates taking place between Catholic theologians and medical 
scholars, the developing doctrines of the Reformation had to face the same questions 
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on the relation of man’s mind to his body and to formulate answers based on 
emerging Protestant theology.  
 
Luther’s main associate Philipp Melanchton, (1497-1560), a professor of theology at 
the University of Wittenberg, can be seen, quite naturally, as the first to attempt to 
address the mind-body issue from the Protestant point of view. In his writing 
Melanchton followed the ideas accepted by the Catholic Church (Melanchton was, 
after all, educated as a Catholic). The rational soul is divinely created and infused into 
the body. It has the capacity to think, create and judge. Since no corporeal organ can 
perform these activities, the human mind must be distinct from the body and, thus, 
immortal.161 While this doctrine did not essentially differ from Catholic 
interpretations, it nevertheless formed the basis of the theoretical developments within 
emergent Protestant medical scholarship.  
 
Towards the end of the 17th century the rapidly developing German Protestant 
economic and intellectual life was concentrated within a triangle formed by Berlin, 
Erfurt and Dresden. Within that triangle we find towns such as Leipzig, Wittenberg, 
Halle and Jena, which hosted renowned universities with theological faculties 
defining and defending the essence of Protestant ideas of what Christianity and the 
world are all about. But it was not merely academic Protestant doctrines that  guided 
the intellectual and practical lives of the 17th and 18th century Prussians and Saxons, 
but also, and perhaps more importantly, emerging German Pietism that gained a 
strong hold over the minds of the people struggling between the demands of the Faith 
and the urges of their earthly and seducing minds and bodies.  
 
German Pietism originated in Frankfurt in the late 17th century as a response to the 
rigid Lutheran orthodoxy and secularization that had crept into the parish life. A 
group of believers started to gather together to pray in people’s homes instead of in 
churches. Their aim was to encourage people to read the Bible themselves instead of 
listening to the clergy and to take personal responsibility for one’s spiritual life. These 
ideas soon developed into a vastly influential movement throughout the Protestant 
Christian world (the movement gained its name from the way the forerunners named 
their groups, Collegium Pietatis).162  
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In 1694 a new university was opened in Halle, less than forty kilometres from 
Leipzig, by order and under the protection of Elector Frederick III of Brandenburg-
Prussia. From its very beginning the university became the stronghold of the Pietist 
movement, when August Herman Francke, one of the central figures of early Pietism, 
was appointed as the first professor of theology. There was, however, increasing 
tension among Pietists between those with strong emotional undertones to those 
preferring a more moderate approach to the questions of faith and Christian life. This 
tension was also palpable in the new university, which was to be fully staffed with 
Pietist professors. 163 
 
The university also established a medical faculty, which became widely influential in 
the developments of 18th century medicine through the works of Hoffmann (1660-
1742), who was appointed as a professor of medicine in 1693 and Stahl (1660-1734) 
who received a chair in medicine in 1694. They defended somewhat antithetical ideas 
of how man’s mind is related to his body and welbeing.  
 
Friedrich Hoffmann was born in 1660 the son of a town physician in Halle. In 1678 
he enrolled at the medical faculty in Jena to follow in his father’s footsteps in 
medicine. After graduating in 1681 he travelled in Holland and England. On his return 
he practised in various positions and was eventually elected the first professor of 
medicine and natural philosophy in Halle.164  
 
Hoffmann was a devout Pietist, but he kept his distance from the enthusiastic side of 
Pietism on the grounds that a physician should not be superstitious. According to 
Hoffmann, the light of grace is to be found in the Scriptures and the sacraments, 
whereas the light of nature can be found only by studying nature. The purpose of the 
latter was to expose the relationship between Creator and His skilful Creation as 
expressed in Hoffmann’s inaugural oration On Defeating Atheism by Reference to the 
Skilful Structure of the Body.165  
 
Hoffmann was an ardent admirer of Descartes. He published a small medical textbook 
Fundamenta Medicinae ex Principiis Naturae Mechanicis in 1695, where he writes in 
the Introduction how natural philosophy must avoid speculation, rest on experience 
and establish its conclusions by a clear mathematical method. Truth rests, in short, on 
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sensory observation and mathematical proof. For Hoffmann, the ultimate principles 
for nature and the body were matter and motion and all motion stems, ultimately, 
from God, the prime mover of all things.166  
 
In 1694 Hoffmann invited his old friend Georg Ernst Stahl, with whom he had studied 
and shared a room in Jena, to work as a second professor of medicine in Halle. Stahl 
(1660-1734) was born the son of a Protestant clergyman in Anspach, Bavaria. After 
graduating in medicine at the University of Jena in 1684, he remained at the 
university as a teacher. In 1687 he was appointed as a court physician to Duke Johann 
Ernst von Sachsen-Weimar. He held a chair in medicine at Halle from 1694 to 1717, 
when he was appointed physician to King Friedrich Wilhelm I of Prussia in Berlin.167 
 
Like Hoffmann, Stahl was also a devout Pietist. He was a prolific writer on various 
fields of knowledge and by coming generations he was to be remembered especially 
for his ideas on chemistry. He supported a theory according to which combustible 
bodies contained a substance phlogiston that was released during combustion, leaving 
behind vitreous earth as ashes, such as after burning coal.168 Stahl’s influence, 
however, was at least as important for the medicine of his time as it was for chemical 
theory. In his magnum opus Medicina Vera of 1708 he outlined his ideas on the 
human body and soul from the medical point of view.  
 
Stahl developed his approach to the workings of the body by observing his patients 
and presenting them as case studies in his writings. For example, when dealing with 
General von Natzmer’s sleeplessness and nausea he dismissed simple somatic causes. 
He sought instead the aetiology and cure from the mental problems the general was 
having at the time. When Stahl observed the symptoms of the enthusiastic Pietists 
while being in a state of religious turmoil, he paid attention to the overall changes in 
the working of their bodies. These, he found, did not fit satisfactorily with the mec-
hanistic explanations that were in fashion at the time and favoured by Hoffmann. 169 
 
For Stahl, the human body was in the service of the soul, which penetrated and guided 
it to the full. His work De Passionibus Animae Corpus Humanum Varie Alterantibus 
(On the passions of the mind variously affecting the human body) published in 1695 
was one of the first attempts ever to establish the connection between cognitive, 
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emotional and bodily changes within the human organism.170 
 
Stahl’s Pietism was more enthusiastic than of Hoffmann, who took a more rational 
approach to life. While Hoffmann considered a Christian to have two lives, the one 
spiritual communicating with God and the other physical as a regular appearance of 
motions in the body, Stahl considered all motions of the body to be derived from 
spiritual life. The soul, in Stahl’s view, gave momentum and direction to all bodily 
motions. Body and soul thus formed an indivisible unity.171 Intelligence is, in turn, a 
sum of sensory, imaginative, emotive and mental perception and these are coordinated 
in an individual organism. He maintained that mechanical theories could not possibly 
explain the purposeful action of living beings. 172 
 
Stahl’s ideas were keenly adopted by the Pietists since they were readily compatible 
with their worldview of man as a total and independent actor in the world.173 This 
particular vein of German medical thinking leads, eventually, to the early 19th century 
Leipzig medical circles and to Professor Heinroth and his profound Pietist conviction 
that Sin is the ultimate cause of man’s illness and misery in this world. 
 
Physics, psychology and medicine 
 
As seen in the above, the solutions suggested to the mind-body problem in 17th and 
18th century medicine were closely tied to Catholic and Protestant interpretations of 
the issue. These approaches rested on Aristotelian ideas of the structure of man’s soul 
where man’s mind is seen to act as an independent entity, unable to directly affect the 
body. A mediator was needed, and this was found in the harmful effects of the 
emotions on the body, aroused by unsound thinking or sinful conduct of life.  
 
While Descartes’ doctrines had left man’s mind outside the systematic study of 
nature, the rapidly developing research on natural phenomena based on mathematical 
method opened up possibilities to address medical problems with novel concepts. To 
illustrate this new phase in medical thinking let us consider the following paragraph 
from a medical paper published in Paris in 1779: 
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“According to the familiar principles of universal attraction, ascertained by 
observations which teach us how the planets mutually affect one another in 
their orbits, how the sun and moon cause and control the ocean tides on our 
globe and in the atmosphere, I assert that those spheres also exert a direct 
action on all parts that go to make up animate bodies, in particular on the 
nervous system, by an all-penetrating fluid. I denoted this action by the 
Intensification and the Remission of the properties of matter and organic 
bodies, such as gravity, cohesion, elasticity, irritability, electricity...By these 
considerations I established that the animal body, being subjected to the same 
action, likewise underwent a kind of ebb and flow. 174 (italics original) 
 
In this short paragraph we meet an attempt to apply the recently developed concepts 
of physics, such as gravity and electricity, to explain the workings of living bodies. 
Indeed, why would forces able to influence the movement of oceans and planets not 
affect living bodies as well?   
 
While phenomena such as magnetism and the attraction of hair to objects rubbed with 
cloth were already recognised and described in antiquity, the first large scale 
systematic study on magnetism, De Magnete, was published as late as in 1600 by 
William Gilbert (1540-1603), the appointed physician to Queen Elizabeth I. The next 
major step in publishing observations on electricity and magnetism was due to 
another Englishman, Stephen Gray (1666-1736) who, apart from describing the 
properties of conductors and insulators, demonstrated the ability of the human body to 
act as a conductor.175 As a consequence of these and many other contemporary 
studies, public demonstrations of various magnetic and electric phenomena using 
people as media had become fashionable throughout Europe by the mid 18th century. 
It is from this vein of experimenting and theorizing that the quotation above from a 
Swabian-born physician Anton Mesmer (1743-1815) derives. Mesmer wrote, how 
 
“I possessed the usual knowledge about the magnet: its action of iron, the 
ability of our body fluids to receive that mineral. The various tests carried out 
in France, Germany and Britain for stomachache and toothache were known 
to me. These reasons, together with the analogy between the properties of this 
substance and the general system, induced me to regard it as being the most 
suitable for this type of test.”176 
  
Mesmer observed, however, that mineral magnetism was not sufficient to explain the 
phenomena encountered in the living body, since obviously 
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“another principle was causing the magnet to act, the magnet itself being 
incapable of such action on the nerves, and I saw that I only had a short way 
to go in order to arrive at the Imitative Theory, which formed the subject of 
my research.”177 (Italics original) 
 
To replace the concept mineral magnetism Mesmer offered a new concept animal 
magnetism to refer to the phenomena he observed in his practice. This new concept 
was to be understood as a whole new theoretical opening, since 
 
“I have always stressed in my writings that the use of the magnet, however 
convenient, was always imperfect without the assistance of the theory of 
Animal Magnetism...The desire to refute such errors once and for all, and to 
do justice to truth, determined me to make no further use of electricity or of 
the magnet from 1776 onwards.”178 
 
Mesmer offered, thus, a new concept Animal Magnetism as the explanatory principle 
for the phenomena encountered in therapeutic sessions where the patients experienced 
and demonstrated various bodily phenomena during his treatment. Mesmer postulated 
that these phenomena were due to magnetic fluid that emanates from the physician 
and affects the patient.  
 
Mesmer’s theory of Animal Magnetism was widely accepted and also much disputed 
in medical circles well into the 19th century. Especially so, when the essence of 
Animal Magnetism as distinct from mineral magnetism or electricity was lacking a 
plausible physical explanation. We shall not go into detail on the often venomous 
debates that took place especially in British medical circles in the early decades of the 
19th century, when Mesmerism had become famous in Britain. We may note, 
however, that by 1843 the dispute on Mesmerism had become so heated among the 
British medical establishment, that the supporters of Mesmerism saw fit to launch a 
journal of their own, The Zoist, to publish studies in the field. In the first issue of their 
journal the editors were convinced that “The science of Mesmerism is a new 
physiological truth of incalculable value and importance”179 while in the decennial 
issue of the Journal in 1853 the Editorial declared that  
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“Our work is the most important, though not the most able, work of the age. 
For it conducts mankind into a new region of physiology, a new region of 
psychology, and a new region of the healing art. Animated nature transcends 
the inanimate: cerebral physiology transcends the physiology of all the rest of 
the body; and medicine, comprehending the good formation and training of 
the whole human being, and the prevention, cure, and assuaging of disease 
and suffering, transcends all other arts, however noble, and whatever talent 
and labour their successful cultivation may require.”180 
 
In this editorial we encounter the idea of bringing together a “new region of 
physiology” and a “new region of psychology” to develop a “new region of healing 
art”. We also see, how cerebral physiology is able to have a command of the workings 
of the body both in health and illness. However, the opponents of Mesmerism were 
not so enthusiastic. For example, a few years prior to the editorial above, an American 
physician Herbert Mayo wrote, referring to phenomena Mesmer and his followers had 
produced in their practice, that 
 
“…regarding it from our present vantage ground, it presents no marvellous 
characters. The phenomena were the same which we have been recently 
contemplating – a group of disorders of the nervous system. The causes 
which were present are not less familiar to us, not their capability of 
producing such effect; they were – mental excitement, here consisting in 
raised expectation and fear; the contagiousness of hysteria, convulsions, and 
trance, its force increased by the numbers and close-packing of the 
patients.”181 
 
What the editorial of the Zoist addressed as cerebral physiology (itself taken to be the 
dominating influence over those bodily phenomena that were supposedly produced by 
‘animal magnetism’ in therapeutic sessions) was regarded instead by Mayo, a “group 
of disorders of the nervous system” for whom any remaining influences could be 
explained by hysteric group reactions. It was evident to the critics that the conceptual 
apparatus offered by Mesmer and his followers was not satisfactory, since no one had 
been able to demonstrate the existence of any such physical entity as animal 
magnetism or magnetic fluid to explain the  phenomena observed in their patients. 
Yet, the patients’ reactions during treatment sessions were there for anyone to see 
with their own eyes. Obviously new conceptual openings were needed. 
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In 1843 a British surgeon, James Braid (1795-1860), presented a critical inquiry into 
Mesmerism in a book titled Neurypnology, or the Rationale of Nervous Sleep, 
Considered in Relation with Animal Magnetism.182 In his book Braid suggested a new 
concept Neurypnology to address the phenomena previously referred to by the 
concept Animal Magnetism. Braid derived his concept from the Greek words neuron 
(nerve), hypnos (sleep) and logos (discourse). He defined neurypnology as a study of 
“a peculiar condition of the nervous system, into which it can be thrown by artificial 
contrivance…induced by a fixed and abstracted attention of the mental and visual eye, 
on the one object, not of an exciting nature.” From neurypnology Braid derived the 
term Neuro-Hypnotism to denote the activity to induce the condition. For the sake of 
brevity Braid suggested the term Hypnotism that is to be understood as nervous sleep. 
183 He wrote how he had with his new conceptualisation 
 
“…now entirely separated Hypnotism from Animal Magnetism. I consider it 
to be a merely simple, speedy, and certain mode of throwing the nervous 
system into a new condition, which may be rendered eminently available in 
the cure of certain disorders.”184 
 
While the word hypnosis was offered as a new medical concept, it was rapidly 
deployed as a common notion used in public stage shows both in the USA and Europe 
where volunteers were hypnotized to perform awkward activities. Everyone attending 
those events could testify with their own eyes how strong and often strange reactions 
could be caused to the body with mere words and gestures. But apart from the 
amusement, the phenomenon also had scientific interest. There was a genuine call for 
an understanding of the hypnotic process, a call which boosted the adoption of the 
developing new discipline of psychology into medicine as the editorial in Zoist had 
proposed. For example, in 1866 an American physician, Wright, wrote in his book  A 
Treatise on Medical Psychology or The Influence of the Mind over the Health of the 
Body, referring to the public presentation of hypnosis, how we may   
 
 “…appreciate the influence of the mind over the body. This being a new 
science, the author cannot more than approximate to completion. 
Scientifically considered, Psychology is the science of all sciences, for 
without mind there is no science. Any influence operating so powerfully over 
the health of the body as does the mind must at once become a proper object 
of study.” 185   
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Wright concludes by stating that the best medical minds of his era have agreed that 
psychology is essential in considering the patients’ ailments and treatments. 186  
 
Another American physician, John Gray, wrote in the American Journal on Insanity 
in 1868 that “The reciprocal influence of body and mind is a fact constantly before the 
physician”. For Gray, bodily ailments have mental consequences since “through the 
emotions we have all those ephemeral disturbances denominated passions, and with 
the subsidence of the cause, reason reasserts itself.” According to the author 
psychological medicine should thus be advanced to foster the development of 
medicine as a whole and include the study of mental disturbances in its all variety as a 
part of medicine.187  
 
A British physician, Daniel Tuke, also supported the idea of adopting psychology as a 
part of medicine in his treatise Illustrations of the Influence of the Mind upon the 
Body in Health and Disease published in 1872:  
 
“The medical reader who, I hope, may be induced to employ Psycho-
Therapeutics in a more methodical way than heretofore, and thus copy nature 
in those interesting instances, occasionally occurring, of sudden recovery 
from  the spontaneous action of some powerful moral cause, by employing 
the same force designedly, instead of leaving it to mere chance. The force is 
there, acting  irregularly and capriciously. The question is whether it cannot 
be applied and guided with skill and wisdom by the physician. Again and 
again we exclaim, when some new nostrum, powerless in itself, effects a 
cure, ‘It’s only the Imagination’. We attribute to this remarkable mental 
influence a power which ordinary medicines have failed to exert, and yet are 
content, with a shrug of the shoulders, to dismiss the circumstance from our 
further thought. I want medical men who are in active practice to utilise this 
force, to yoke it to the car of the Son of Apollo, and rescuing it from the 
eccentric orbits of quackery, force it to tread, with measured step, the orderly 
path of legitimate medicine.” 188  
 
While Tuke’s text sounds familiar to us even today, the word psychosomatic does not 
appear anywhere in his book and it took another sixty years for the concept to develop 
and find its way into medical theory. 
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Chapter 5 - Psychosomatic, a concept 
 
Having now outlined some central developments in medical theory in regard to the 
mind-body problem, let us examine next in what sense the editorial of the first issue 
of the Journal portrayed the concept psychosomatic as being new. As the theoretical 
approach adopted in this essay suggests, to understand the meaning of a scientific 
concept we need to understand its relations to a larger system of concepts constituting 
the theoretical framework of that particular area of scientific inquiry. This can be 
discerned from the way concepts are used in scientific articles and books. However, 
what is published is an end product, a refined form of a concept as used in its 
accepted form after having gone through rigorous referee procedure. To examine 
merely the end product hides the formative progress from an idea to a generally 
accepted scientific concept. Therefore, in what follows, I will trace the formation of 
the term psychosomatic into a scientific medical concept not only by analysing its use 
in print but also by considering the theoretical discussions that led to the introduction 
of that particular concept into medical theory.  
 
Let us start by examining an unpublished memorandum written in December 1937, a 
year before the publication of the first issue of the Journal Psychosomatic Medicine. 
The memorandum was written by the would-be Editor of the Journal, Dr Dunbar, and 
sent to Adolf Meyer, the proponent of psychobiology, who by then had become one 
of the most influential figures in american psychiatry. I will quote the memorandum 
in full as a basis for what follows. 
 
December 24th, 1937  
Memorandum to Dr. Meyer 
Dear Dr. Meyer 
 
“This memorandum is by way of confirmation our conference and recent 
telephone conversations. Considerations have arisen which make it seem 
more that ever desirable to have a section or column in the [Psychiatric] 
Quarterly dealing specifically with what is coming to be called 
Psychosomatic Medicine. 
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As Analysts we are drawn into this field inevitably because no patient 
completes an analysis without developing some symptoms in the somatic 
sphere; often these are puzzling and serious. More than this, general 
physicians are beginning to discover that psychoanalysis may be of both 
diagnostic and therapeutic aid in dealing with patients with actual somatic 
disorders. Some of us are especially interested in the psychosomatic problems 
from the point of view of research, both because of its importance to 
medicine today and because it represents a meeting ground with general 
physicians and representatives of the other medical specialties where we are 
constantly called upon to answer vital questions. For all its importance, 
however, this is a field where it is very difficult to be well informed because 
literature of basic is so widely scattered throughout general and special 
periodicals, and to make matters worse, inadequately cross-listed in the 
CUMULATIVE INDEX MEDICUS. 
 
At present I am in touch with several groups of physicians interested in this 
problem on whom we could depend for bibliographical references, book 
reviews, abstracts, and even clinical case reports should these seem to be 
desirable. There has been discussion of inaugurating a section dealing with 
such material in an American and an English journal devoted to general 
medicine. It occurred to me that it might be highly desirable before this is 
done for the Quarterly to take the lead. Such a measure would probably be 
helpful in terms of subscriptions, but more important in the opportunity it 
would give us for real leadership in a field where there is much confusion, 
some of it resulting from failure to recognize the fact that psychoanalysis is 
an indispensable tool. General medicine and physiology for example, are 
demanding help with the psychic aspect of this problem of a more scientific 
nature than general psychiatry can offer. These points I think, represent the 
gist of our discussion, although if requested I could say more on the 
subject.”189 
 
There are three keys to be found in this concise summary of the theoretical bafflement 
in medicine in relation to the mind-body issue in the late 1930s. First, the initiative for 
establishing a special field of medical research, psychosomatic medicine, came from 
psychoanalysts and their need to comprehend the physical manifestations of their 
patients’ problems as observed during the analysis. Second, it was well known then, 
as it is today, that general practitioners encounter a variety of psychic problems in 
their patients with somatic illnesses and there is a need to understand the relationship 
of these phenomena. Third, although there was extensive scientific activity addressing 
the mind-body issue in medicine at the time, it was scattered to the extent that there 
was even no proper terminology available to have them organised in a coherent 
manner in the Cumulative Index Medicus. Dunbar concludes that the time was ripe to 
take real leadership in the field and to bring order to this line of inquiry, especially 
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because there was now an “indispensable tool” available for research, that is, 
psychoanalysis.  
 
Dunbar’s explicit quest was, thus, to introduce and apply psychoanalysis as a tool to 
comprehend the interplay of psychological and somatic phenomena in patients. To 
understand the theoretical developments leading to Dunbar’s initiative, we need first 
to follow how psychoanalytic theory found its way into general medicine. To 
accomplish this, let us begin wih examining the contribution of Dr Felix Deutsch, a 
Viennese internist and a family friend of Sigmund Freud.  
 
“Indispensable tool” 
 
Felix Deutsch (1884-1964) was an internist by training and, according to his 
biographers, he came to know the Freud family through Freud’s son, Martin. He 
developed a close relationship with Freud senior to the extent that he came to be 
Freud’s personal physician.190 (Jones mentions him to be as the one who realised that 
Freud had developed cancer in his oral mucosa, leading to years of suffering through 
repeated and agonising operations to control the disease.)191 
 
Deutsch developed an interest in psychoanalysis and had himself analysed. He then 
took on the task of expanding Freud’s theory of conversion hysteria from psychiatry 
to patients who were suffering from various somatic diseases as encountered in 
internal medical wards. Deutsch presented his ideas in a paper he read at the Seventh 
International Psychoanalytic Congress in Berlin in 1922. The paper was developed to 
an article and published in the Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse in 1924.192 
(The article was translated into English and published in 1959 in a book edited by 
Deutsch. 193) The argumentation in Deutsch’s 1924 article can be summarised as 
follows. 
 
Deutsch justifies the adaptation and broadening of the meaning of Freud’s concept 
conversion from hysteric patients to somatic diseases by noting that similar 
transformatory processes from psychic to bodily phenomena can be also observed on 
patients in medical wards with illnesses that have been commonly considered to be 
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purely somatic. Deutsch then proceeds to explain the process of conversion with 
physiological concepts. He describes how our bodily reactions are embedded in 
subcellular phenomena where the chemical compounds of a cell constitute the basis 
for the reactions of the organism. Whatever happens to the organism, it stores the 
memory of these events into what Deutsch calls the functional memory of a cell or of 
an organ system. This memory may be activated in the future and guides bodily 
reactions accordingly. Endocrine factors influence the chemical process in the 
organism altering cell activity. Mental processes, in turn, may influence the hormonal 
activity of the endocrine glands governing the metabolic processes. This may lead to 
hypo- or hyperactivity of cells. Now that cells have retained the memory of previous 
experiences, each time the memory of an experience is evoked, it will affect the 
activity of the cell system.  
 
Deutsch asserts that a continuous conversion process is necessary in a normal 
individual for the maintenance of health and well-being and to adjust the individual’s 
instinctual drives to the demands of the culture in which s/he lives. The conversion 
symptom originates when the memory of a cell system or of a whole organism reacts 
in a deviant form to certain stimuli as a consequence of a previous traumatic 
experience. A conversion symptom does not, however, appear suddenly but as a result 
of gradual and long-lasting psychic processes. It occurs only when, as Deutsch 
expresses it, “well-defined psychic components coincide most suitably with an 
organic disorder. The relationship between psychic and organic determinants is 
interlinked, similar to that of two communicating tubes. If the level in one goes down, 
it goes up in the other.”  
 
Deutsch introduces two more psychoanalytic concepts, libido and unconscious, into 
somatic medicine when he expands the concept conversion to cover everyday 
symptoms such as blushing, excessive perspiration, spells of diarrhoea and attacks of 
migraine. They all occur, however, only “as discharges of pent-up libido and of the 
emotional debris which through its accumulation burdens the unconscious. The 
concept of conversion has to be broadened to encompass such reactive patterns.”  
 
For Deutsch the temporal coincidence of psychic and physical manifestations 
develops from the identity of these processes. Therefore, the concept of a 
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psychophysical parallelism must be rejected since, as Deutsch writes, “nothing 
parallel occurs here”. Deutsch concludes that “perhaps with the exception of the 
infectious diseases or bodily injuries through accidents, all illnesses are subject to the 
principle of psychophysiological determination.”  
 
It is noteworthy that Deutsch did not use the term psychosomatic anywhere in this 
paper. Yet his article is one of the first systematic attempts to introduce 
psychoanalytic concepts into the diagnosis and treatment of general medical patients 
treated in a regular clinic for internal medicine. As we already saw with Oswald 
Schwarz’s compendium published in 1925, there was widespread interest on 
psychogenesis and the psychotherapeutic approach to bodily symptoms at the time 
Deutsch wrote his paper. This interest had been boosted with the development of 
psychological theories such as Pavlov’s theory of conditioned reflexes and also with 
the experiences in the battlefields of the World War I denoted as shell shock and 
psychogenic blindness. Psychoanalytic concepts encountered, therefore, a fertile 
ground to address this field of interest. However, as Schwarz (1922) shows, in the 
early 1920s terms such as Psychoanalyse and Ödipuskomplex could be read in 
medical articles of the time, while terms such as Conversion or Unbewusstsein 
(unconscious) had not as yet found their way into general medical papers. 
 
In 1928 Deutsch deepened his approach in another article Die Stellung der 
Psychoanalyse in der internen Klinik (The Place of Psychoanalysis in the Internal 
Medicine Clinic) published in Medizinische Klinik.194 In this paper Deutsch did not 
introduce any new conceptual openings but discussed his approach in relation to some 
well-defined somatic illnesses such as asthma.  Some authors consider this paper 
groundbreaking in the development of psychosomatic medicine because Deutsch used 
in his article the term psychosomatic. He did, however, use the term only once in the 
form psychosomatischen Bindungen (psychosomatic bonds) when referring to the 
relation between mind and body in illness without giving any deeper theoretical 
definition or position for the term.  
 
Since Deutsch builds his approach firmly on Freud’s concept conversion and that 
concept will have a central position in the theoretical developments in the late 1930s 
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onwards in what will be called psychosomatic medicine, a closer look at the sense in 
which Freud himself used the concept and for what purposes is appropriate. 
 
Conversion 
 
The details of Freud’s (1856-1939) career are less relevant here exept for a brief 
mention of  the often-told story that, after receiving a medical degree in Vienna in 
1881, Freud developed a special interest in neuropathology and was considering a 
future in adolescent neurology. In 1885 he obtained a grant from the University of 
Vienna to go to Paris to improve his skills and understanding in neuropathological 
laboratory techniques. The laboratory in Salpêtriére proved a disappointment for the 
aspiring young Doctor Freud. However, during his stay he attended Professor 
Charcot’s weekly clinical demonstrations with hysterical patients and this experience 
turned Freud’s interest for the rest of his life from neuropathology to 
psychopathology. As he wrote in his Paris Report for the University of Vienna, the 
laboratory had failed his expectations, but the Salpêtriére  
 
“provided such a plethora of new and interesting material that it needed all 
my efforts to profit from the instruction which this favourable opportunity 
afforded…I had an opportunity of seeing a long series of patients, of 
examining them myself and hearing Charcot’s opinion on them…”195   
 
Freud seemed to be genuinely astonished when witnessing hypnotic phenomena 
during Charcot’s demonstrations: “…it was quite impossible to doubt, but which were 
nevertheless strange enough not to be believed unless they were experienced at first 
hand.”196 Freud notes how Charcot did not show any preference for rare and strange 
material to exploit them for any mystical purposes but regarded hypnotism merely as 
a field of phenomena to be submitted to scientific description in the same manner as 
multiple sclerosis or progressive muscular atrophy.197 
 
In his Report Freud quotes Charcot, who had proclaimed that “the work of anatomy 
was finished and the theory of the organic diseases of the nervous system might be 
said to be complete: what had next to be dealt with was the neuroses.” 198 By the time 
Freud visited Salpetriere Charcot had already made a great effort to distinguish and 
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define hysteria as a clinical entity in its own right with a number of characteristic 
somatic signs such as anaesthesia, disturbances of vision, distorted movements of the 
limbs etc.  
 
One of the main conclusions for Freud was, according to his Report, the “enormous 
practical importance of male hysteria”199 and particularly of the hysteria which 
follows upon trauma. Freud writes how through the works of Charcot “hysteria was 
lifted out of the chaos of the neuroses, was differentiated from other conditions with a 
similar appearance, and was provided with symptomatology which, though 
sufficiently multifarious, nevertheless makes it impossible any longer to doubt the 
rule of law and order.“ 200 
 
Soon after returning to Vienna, Freud translated Charcot’s book Lecons sur les 
maladies du systeme nerveux into German under the title Neue Vorstellungen über die 
Krankheiten des Nervensystemen inbesondere über Hysterie (New Lectures on the 
Diseases of the Nervous System, particularly on Hysteria, published in Leipzig and 
Vienna in 1886). Freud writes in the Preface how, after he had overcome his “initial 
bewilderment at the findings of Charcot’s new investigations” and “learnt to 
appreciate their great importance”, he had asked Charcot’s permission to translate his 
lectures to introduce “the teachings of a master of clinical medicine to wider medical 
circles”. For Freud the core of Charcot’s book “lies in the masterly and fundamental 
lectures on hysteria, which, along with their author, we may expect to open a new 
epoch in the estimation of this little known and, instead, much maligned neurosis.” 
Freud writes, that this was the reason he added (with Charcot´s permission) the term 
hysteria to the original French title of the book.201  
 
On October 15, 1886, some six months after Freud’s return from Paris, he presented a 
paper before the Wiener Gesellschaft der Aerzte (The Vienna Society of Medicine) 
with the title Über männliche Hysteria (On Male Hysteria).202 Freud discussed a case 
of a 29 year old man with no previous history of nervous or mental disorder. The man 
had been attacked by his brother with a knife over a debt the brother had refused to 
pay. He had escaped unhurt but developed, during the months to follow, a cluster of 
somatic symptoms such as palpitations, ringing in the ears, numbness of the left arm, 
clumsiness in walking etc. Freud then described his findings from a thorough 
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neurological examination and argued that since the symptoms were not anatomically 
and functionally constant, they were to be understood, therefore, as a case of hysteria. 
It is noteworthy, however, that Freud did not make any references to possible 
underlying psychological mechanisms except that of a psychic trauma caused by the 
attack. Instead, he approached his patient as a neurologist dealing with a case of 
hysteria as understood through Charcot’s writings.203  
 
In 1887 Freud published two short reviews on the literature on neurasthenia. (The 
concept neurasthenia is commonly attributed to an American surgeon, Georg Beard, 
in 1869204 although the term can be found in medical discussions predating Beard in 
the form neurosthenia205.) The rationale in Beard’s conceptualisation rested partly on 
the idea suggested by a Scottish physician, John Brown (1735-1788), who divided 
illnesses into sthenic and asthenic, an idea that developed into what was to be called 
Brunonian medicine and was widely discussed in medical periodicals and textbooks 
in the early 19th century.206 Beard also drew on the rapidly developing field of 
neurology, where the studies focused on electrical phenomena in nerves based on 
Galvani’s works and called animal galvanism in the late 18th century and which 
subsequently developed into medical galvanism in the early 19th century. Beard’s 
idea, as cast into the concept neurasthenia, was that in the case of a patient’s 
exhaustion, other causes being eliminated, his or her nervous energy was lost due to 
overstrain. The new concept was readily adopted into the medical vocabulary and 
Freud considered it to be the commonest of all diseases in the society of his time. 
Since it also complicates all other diseases, neurasthenia deserved, in Freud’s opinion, 
“the most general attention on the part of the physicians who are working 
scientifically”.207 In the second review Freud evaluated the German translation of 
Silas Weir Mitchell’s book on the method of treatment for neurasthenia, which 
consisted of bed rest, isolation, feeding-up, massage and electricity. Since the method 
follows, quite logically, the idea of the loss of nervous (electrical) energy in need of 
recharging, Freud concluded that with this book a consistent therapeutic measure was 
introduced into German medicine to treat the condition.208  
 
In 1888 Freud wrote an entry on hysteria for Villaret’s Händwörterbuch der gesamten 
Medizin (Handbook of Medicine) published in two parts in 1888 and 1891 
respectively. In this paper Freud still closely follows Charcot’s approach but the 
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cathartic method adopted by Freud’s close associate Breuer is discussed. In the 
opening paragraph Freud defines hysteria as  
 
“…a neurosis in the strictest sense of the word – that is to say, not only have 
no perceptible changes in the nervous system been found in this illness, but it 
is not to be expected that any refinement of anatomical techniques would 
reveal any such changes. Hysteria is based wholly and entirely on 
physiological modifications of the nervous system and its essence should be 
expressed in a formula that took account of the conditions of excitability in 
the different parts of the nervous system. A physio-pathological formula of 
this kind has not yet, however, been discovered; we must be content 
meanwhile to  define the neurosis in a purely nosographic fashion by the 
totality of symptoms occurring in it, the same sort of way as Graves´ disease 
is characterised by a group of symptoms – exophtalmus, struma, tremor, 
acceleration of the pulse and physical change – without any consideration of 
the closer connection between these phenomena.”209  
 
Freud then discussed the conceptual problems in the medical literature of his time 
where hysteria was grouped among other ill-defined neurotic conditions. He 
maintains, relying again on Charcot, that hysteria is an illness in its own right with its 
characteristic nosology. Hysteria can be well differentiated e.g. from neurasthenia and 
it is, in fact, contrary to it. (Neurasthenics tend to be lethargic due the lack of nervous 
energy while hysterics are often over-excited). Freud listed the typical symptoms of 
hysteria in detail, such as convulsive attacks, the presence of hysterogenic zones, 
disturbances of sensibility, disturbances of sensory activity, paralyses and 
contractures. 
 
It is noteworthy, however, that in this paper Freud saw hysteria as “a constitutional 
anomaly rather than a circumscribed illness”210. The first signs of the condition are 
already exhibited in early youth as a rule and the course and manifestations of 
hysteria follow certain stages and phases of life with somatic manifestations in the 
foreground. In a number of cases, however, the hysteria is merely a symptom of a 
deep-seated degeneracy of the nervous system, which is manifest in permanent moral 
perversion. 
 
For the treatment of hysteria Freud proposed another method, used by Breuer, where 
the patient is led back to the prehistory of his or her symptoms by hypnosis to reveal 
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and acknowledge the psychical occasion on which the disorder originated. Freud 
noted, however, that it was not at the present possible to know with certainty how far 
psychical influence plays a part alongside physical treatments. Freud summarised, 
that “anything that alters the distribution of the excitations in the nervous system may 
cure hysterical disorders: such effects are in part of a physical and in part of a directly 
psychical nature.”211  
 
At this stage Freud had, thus, come to the firm conclusion that hysteria needed to be 
approached as an entity in its own right and separated from other neuroses. The 
following years Freud was occupied with applying hypnosis as a treatment method 
but he eventually abandoned it for not reaching the therapeutic successes he had 
hoped for. Meanwhile he was facing the fundamental theoretical problem of the 
relation of man’s mental phenomena to the nervous system. Freud had started off as a 
neuropathologist, but when entering into the problematics of neurotic phenomena he 
soon realised that there were no clinical correlatives to be found between the somatic 
symptoms of neurotic patients and the anatomy and physiology of their nervous 
systems. While a physiological explanation, as yet undiscovered, was plausible, how 
did psychological problems actually transfer to somatic symptoms via the nervous 
system? No current neuropsychological theory was able to satisfactorily explain these 
phenomena. Freud, then, took the task of delving into theoretical issues to explain 
hysteric phenomena together with his long-time friend and colleague Joseph Breuer. 
Their basic theoretical formulations were first presented in an article Über den 
Psychischen Mechanismus Hysterischer Phänomene (Vorläufige Mitteilung) (On the 
Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary Communication), 
published in Vienna in 1893. The paper was eventually developed into a book Studien 
über Hysterie (Studies in Hysteria) published in 1895.  
 
Breuer and Freud start their Preliminary Communication by noting, how 
 
“A chance observation has led us, over number of years, to investigate a great 
variety of different forms and symptoms of hysteria, with a view to 
discovering their precipitating cause – the event, which provoked the first 
occurrence, often many years earlier, of the phenomenon in question. In the 
great majority of cases it is not possible to establish the point of origin by a 
simple interrogation of the patient, however thoroughly it may be carried out. 
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This is in part because what is in question is often some experience which the 
patient dislikes discussing; but principally because he is genuinely unable to 
recollect it and often has no suspicion of the causal connection between the 
precipitating event and the pathological phenomenon.” 212  
 
They continue by observing how the precipitating event is easily discerned in cases of 
‘traumatic’ hysteria, where what provokes the symptoms is an accident:  
 
“In traumatic neuroses the operative cause of the illness is not the trifling 
physical injury but the affect of fright – the psychical trauma…Any 
experience which calls up distressing affects – such as those of fright, 
anxiety, shame or physical pain – may operate as trauma of this kind; and 
whether it in  fact does so depends naturally enough on the susceptibility of 
the person affected.”213 
 
In other cases the connection is not so straightforward. It may consist only in what the 
authors chose to call a symbolic relation between the precipitating cause and the 
pathological phenomenon. For example, neuralgia may follow upon mental pain, and 
vomiting may be caused by a feeling of moral disgust.214 Yet, the causal relation 
between the psychical trauma and the hysterical phenomenon is not that the trauma 
merely acts like an “agent provocateur” in releasing the symptom. Rather, the 
psychical trauma, or more precisely the memory of the trauma, acts “like a foreign 
body which long after its entry must continue to be regarded as an agent that is still at 
work”. The authors concluded that the determining process continues to operate in 
one way or another for years – not indirectly, through a chain of intermediate causal 
links, but as a directly releasing cause – “just as a psychical pain that is remembered 
in waking consciousness still provokes a lachrymal secretion long after the event.” It 
follows, as the authors put it, that “hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences”.215 
 
As for the therapeutic measures the authors write, relating to their clinical experience, 
that while treating their patients each individual hysterical symptom immediately and 
permanently disappeared when they had succeeded in bringing to light “the memory 
of the event by which it was provoked and in arousing its accompanying affect, and 
when the patient had described that event in the greatest possible detail and had put 
the affect into words. Recollection without affect almost invariably produces no 
results.” 216  
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In a footnote the authors acknowledge that a therapeutic procedure of this kind had 
been recognized before their attempt by various authors such as Delboeuf in 1889 and 
Binet in 1892. They also refer to Janet’s study of 1889, where there is an account of 
the cure of a hysterical girl by a method similar to that used by Breuer and Freud.217 
But apart from their clinical observations and theoretical formulations a question 
remained: why do events experienced long ago still provoke physical symptoms? 
Why do painful memories not just fade away? The authors reasoned that an event 
provokes an affect (an emotion). An affect needs to be discharged, be that by tears, 
action etc. If the reaction to the affect is adequate, it exercises a cathartic effect. 
Language may serve as a substitute for action. Therefore, with the help of language an 
affect can be abreacted as by lamenting or e.g. by confessing a tormenting secret. If 
there is no such opportunity, whether in deeds or words or even tears, any recollection 
of the event retains its affective tone.218   
 
The Preliminary Communication does not, however, dig any deeper to reveal the 
mediating mechanisms between the suppressed affects and the physical consequences 
of that suppression. In 1894, a year after the publication of the Preliminary 
Communication, Freud continued to discuss the basic mechanisms behind symptom 
formation as a result of inhibited traumatic memories in his study Die Abwehr-
Neuropsychosen (The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence). 219 In this paper Freud 
introduced two new concepts, defence and conversion, both of which  are of 
fundamental importance for the rest of his emerging theory and also for the 
development of the concept psychosomatic in medicine decades later. Freud writes 
how for some of his patients with previously good mental health “an occurrence of 
the incompatibility took place in their ideational life” (Freud’s italics).220 That is, 
when a person is faced with an idea or an experience that is too difficult to face, s/he 
suppresses it from his or her consciousness. This suppression Freud chose to call a 
defence. This process may lead to somatic phenomena since an 
 
“incompatible idea is rendered innocuous by its sum of excitation being 
transformed into something somatic. For this I should like to propose the 
name of conversion.221 (italics original) 
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Freud postulates further, that in mental functions there must be a  
 
“quota of affect or sum of excitation which possesses all the characteristics of 
a quantity (though we have no means of measuring it), which is capable of 
increase, diminution, displacement and discharge, and which is spread over 
the memory-traces of ideas somewhat as an electric charge is spread over the 
surface of the body…This hypothesis, which, incidentally,  already underlies 
our theory of ‘abreaction’ in our ‘Preliminary Communication’… can be 
applied in the same sense as physicists apply the hypotheses of a flow of 
electric fluid. It is provisionally justified by its utility in co-ordinating and 
explaining a great variety of psychical states.”222  
 
In this closing passage of his paper Freud sketches a working hypothesis for 
understanding hysterical phenomena by drawing analogies with physics with the idea 
of  the flow of electric fluid as an explanation for somatic manifestations in patients 
with mental problems.  
 
For the next year and a half Freud continued to work intensively to develop this 
hypothesis further. In April 1895 Freud wrote in a letter to his friend Wilhelm Fliess 
that he was deeply involved in writing a treatise with no title as yet. (He never 
published his material; the English title Project for a Scientific Psychology223 was 
given by Strachey, who made a revised translation of the text, published in London in 
1954).  
 
Freud wrote, that his intention was  
 
“to discover what form the theory of psychical functioning will take if a 
quantitative line of approach, a kind of economics of nervous force, is 
introduced into it, and, secondly, to extract from psychopathology a yield for 
normal psychology. It is in fact impossible to form a satisfactory general view 
of neuro-psychotic disorders unless they can be linked to clear hypotheses 
upon normal psychical processes.”. 224 
  
Some six months later he wrote in another letter to Fliess that  
 
“…it was possible to see through from the details of the neuroses to the 
determinants of the consciousness...The three systems of neurone, the free 
and bound conditions of quantity, the primary and secondary processes, the 
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main trend and compromise trend of the nervous system, the two biological 
rules of attention and defence, the indications of quality, reality and thought, 
the state of the psycho-sexual groups, the sexual determination of repression, 
and, finally, the determinants of consciousness as a perceptual function  – 
all this fitted together and still fits together.”225  
 
Freud’s approach in his Project may be summarised by noting that he regarded the 
“cathectic” processes as material events (nerves loaded and discharged) and he 
established his idea on two distinct premisses. First was the recent discovery that the 
nervous system consisted of chains of neurons where the impulses pass from one 
neuron to another over synapses. The second was the idea that excitation of the 
neurons was to be regarded as a quantity which is subject to the general laws of 
motion. By combining these two assumptions Freud arrived at the idea that “a 
‘cathected’ neuron is filled with a certain quantity, though at other times it may be 
empty” and this may serve as a neurological principle through which a hysterical 
symptom formation may be understood. 226  
 
Freud has, thus, built his ideas of discharge of drives, the principle of constancy and 
repression of psychic energy on the images of electrical and hydraulic science 
prevalent in that era. This phase in Freud’s thinking culminated in two major works, 
the above-mentioned Studies in Hysteria with Josef Breuer and the unfinished Project 
for a Scientific Psychology. In these works Freud theorized that in hysteria disturbing 
emotions or affects underwent a process he called conversion to a motor or sensory 
symptom. In hysteria, the body did the talking and feeling so that the individual could 
forget. Freud had moved, thus, from a simple trauma theory to a theory of defence 
and conversion that was available to be applied not just to hysteria but also to a wide 
variety of other symptomatic situations.  
 
To return to Dunbar’s Memorandum we may now conclude that the new in Dunbar’s 
initiative was, specifically, to introduce Freud’s psychoanalytic theory and concepts 
described above into general medicine. This process had already started at the 
beginning of the century when Freud’s theoretical concepts were finding their way 
beyond psychiatric problems into somatic medicine, for which Deutsch’s works serve 
as an example. This development culminated in the publication of the first issue of the 
Journal Psychosomatic Medicine in New York in January 1939.  
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Birth of a Journal 
 
By the time Deutsch was formulating his ideas Europe was recovering from war and 
the USA was rapidly taking the leading role in medical science. This development 
was promoted by wealthy American philanthropists, in particular the Rockefeller 
Foundation (established in 1913), which sponsored the formation of the infrastructure 
of modern medical science in the USA in the early decades of the 20th century.227 A 
crucial part of this process was to finance targeted research projects, which were 
executed by full-time salaried scientists. While the Foundation’s general mission was 
“to promote the well-being of mankind throughout the world”, it laid special emphasis 
on financing medical research in general and, since the early1930s, psychiatric 
research in particular.228 Pressman has argued that one of the main reasons for the 
Rockefeller Foundation to promote research with a wide perspective on the human 
condition was that many of the officers and trustees of the Foundations were deeply 
religious in the Baptist tradition and were openly sceptical about the power of 
laboratory science alone to redeem humankind. The science of man could not, thus, 
rest on reductionist and mechanistic models of natural sciences, but on the holistic 
study of the entire organism, echoing the Pietist roots of the Baptist movement229 and 
its approach to man’s well-being as exemplified in Stahl’s ideas of medicine 
discussed in Chapter 4. That is, in order to fulfill its goals, medicine needed to 
broaden its scientific approach and also to heed the knowledge derived from the social 
sciences and humanities.230 
 
The idea to include psychiatry on the Foundation’s medical agenda was brought into 
the discussion in the mid-1920s when the Foundation’s Annual Report declared that 
part of the medical funding should be directed to studying the borders of the fields of 
biology and psychology as both of these have a bearing on medicine and public 
health.231 The Foundation urged its Division of Medical Sciences to work with 
existing medical school departments of psychiatry and neurology to develop closer 
relations with natural scientists by use of measurable and precise methods. 232 
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One of the first concrete steps in the Foundation’s initiative was the decision to 
support the Institute of Psychiatry in Munich under the direction of Emil Kraepelin, 
who was considered the world’s leading psychiatrist at that time. Kraepelin’s overall 
approach was to examine the structure and function of the psychopathological 
phenomena and combat mental illness with the methods of natural sciences, an idea 
compatible with the Foundation’s overall objective to combine different scientific 
approaches for the benefit of mankind.233 Kraepelin was, however, openly intolerant 
of the growing influence of Freud’s psychoanalytic theories in psychiatry.234 In the 
USA, too, tensions between biological and psychoanalytical approaches to psychiatric 
problems were on the rise toward the end of the 1920s.  
 
A central figure in forming the Foundation’s agenda toward reconciling these 
opposing trends in American psychiatry was Dr Alan Gregg, who had joined the 
Foundation in 1922 as an assistant to the Division of Medical Education. In the mid-
1920s Gregg was stationed in Europe with the special task of examining the present 
state of medical education in Italy. During his stay he also travelled in German 
speaking Europe, where he met prominent psychiatrists of the time such as Bleuler in 
Zurich and Oskar Vogt in Berlin, where clinical psychiatric research was combined 
with studies of the cellular structure of the brain, neuropathology and physiology. In 
Berlin Gregg also met with Franz Alexander, who had received an MD from 
Budapest in 1913 and published studies on brain metabolism before becoming a 
psychoanalyst. By the time of Gregg’s visit, Alexander was already a well-known 
expert in psychoanalysis frequently visited by many American psychiatrists.235  
 
Although Gregg had originally been trained as a serologist and had published studies 
on hookworm disease in Brazil, he had developed an interest in psychoanalysis when 
he met Freud personally in 1909 during Freud’s visit to the USA. As a consequence, 
Gregg felt that psychoanalysis could and should be combined with biological studies 
on psychopathology.236 Gregg’s grand idea was to join psychoanalysis with natural 
sciences and to promote extensive research programmes based on this amalgamation 
with the Foundation’s financial support.237  
 
In 1931 Gregg was appointed Director of the Foundation’s Division of Medical 
Sciences. Within the next couple of years he managed to persuade the Foundation to 
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support medical research programmes intended to bring together psychoanalytic ideas 
with physiological research to study the workings of the human mind and body. 
Although there was great scepticism among the American medical elite toward 
psychoanalysis, the Foundation agreed upon the programme. This was partly due to 
support for Gregg’s ideas offered by Adolf Meyer, who had promoted already in his 
1915 article published in JAMA Objective psychology or psychobiology with 
subordination of the medically useless contrast of mental and physical the importance 
of “the activity and behaviour of the total organism or individual as opposed to the 
activity of single detachable organs”238. Meyer had suggested that 
“Psychobiology…forms clearly and simply the missing chapter of ordinary 
physiology and pathology…functions of the total organism which blend…constituting 
a special level of integration which has been especially and most characteristically 
enriched the inter-individual and social development of language”. 239 Another 
prominent supporter of Gregg’s project was Stanley Cobb of Harvard, who was the 
leading American neurologist of the time and who had had himself psychoanalysed to 
deal with his life-long problem of stuttering.240 (Part of Gregg’s success may also be 
due to the fact that Max Mason, the President of the Rockefeller Foundation from 
1931, had a special interest in psychiatry since his wife had died after a long and 
severe mental illness.)241  
 
In 1933 the Rockefeller Foundation’s trustees agreed to promote psychiatric studies 
according to the ideas put forward by Gregg despite  severe financial difficulties due 
to the Great Depression. Several projects were supported, including topics such as 
epilepsy, schizophrenia, dynamic psychology, neurophysiology, conditioned reflexes, 
neuroanatomy and neurosurgery.242  
 
Meanwhile, in 1930 Franz Alexander had travelled to America to participate in an 
International Congress on Mental Hygiene held in Washington. Alexander’s 
attendance led to an invitation to become a visiting professor of psychoanalysis in 
Chicago. Alexander was eventually appointed director of the newly founded Chicago 
Institute of Psychoanalysis in 1932. The Institute soon became the leading centre for 
American psychoanalytic thinking and was first funded by private supporters and, 
starting from 1936, by the Rockefeller Foundation under Gregg’s supervision.243 The 
Institute made detailed plans for systematic research into psychological factors in 
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various somatic problems such as gastrointestinal disorders, respiratory ailments, 
hypertension, endocrine gland disturbances and skin disorders. These were based to a 
large extent to Alexander’s general idea to amalgamate psychoanalytical and 
physiological approaches. He suggested a particular neurophysiological pathway, 
which conveys the psychic stimulus from the cerebral  cortex to the midbrain and 
further to the internal organs via parasympathetic stimulation.244 
 
While the Rockefeller Foundation was building its research agenda, another American 
philanthropic fund, the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, was also preparing to sponsor an 
integrative medical research programme in 1930 where, as the patroness of the 
Foundation Mrs Kate Macy Ladd expressed it, health was seen as residing in the 
“wholesome unity of mind and body”.245 The Foundation set out to fund projects 
addressing “the interrelations between the psychological and physiological aspects of 
normal and abnormal bodily functions”.246 A part of this initiative was to conduct a 
bibliographical survey of the medical literature on the “relation of emotions and 
bodily changes”.247 This task was assigned to Dr Helen Flanders Dunbar, a polymath 
with degrees in medieval literature, theology and medicine and who had developed a 
special interest in the relation between religion and health, an interest widely shared 
among American theologians and physicians since the beginning of the century.248 
 
In the 1920s Dunbar had spent time in Europe preparing her dissertation on Dante. 
During her travels she learned to know Dr. Felix Deutsch in Vienna. Dunbar 
developed an interest in psychoanalysis and undertook an analysis with Deutsch’s 
wife Helen, a noted analyst at the time. Dunbar also met with Carl Jung while visiting 
the famous Burgholzi clinic in Zurich. After returning to the USA Dunbar was 
appointed in 1931 Director of the Joint Committee on Religion and Health of the 
Federal Council of Churches and the New York Academy of Medicine, sponsored by 
the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation.249  
 
Dunbar’s task to build a bibliography of early 20th century medical literature dealing 
with the mind-body issue was accomplished in 1935 when Columbia University Press 
published her compendium under the title Emotions and Bodily Changes. A Survey of 
Literature on Psychosomatic Interrelationships 1910-1933. The book consisted of 
more than 400 pages with some 2,000 references to articles and books on the field.250 
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(During the years to follow Dunbar edited and enlarged her book and the fourth 
edition, published in 1954, consisted of twelve hundred pages with almost five 
thousand references. 251) 
 
Dunbar’s book was the first systematic attempt at a comprehensive survey of the early 
20th century English language medical literature on the mind-body problem in 
medicine. It made Dunbar the leading figure in the field in the USA in the late 1930’s 
and her book became the  standard reference and established the use of the concept 
psychosomatic in the discussions and debates on the ensuing mind-body issue in 
medicine.  
 
By the time of the publication of Dunbar’s book the discussions on establishing a 
scientific journal on psychosomatic questions with the Macy Foundation’s support 
were already under way. 252 With the Foundation’s support Dunbar took on the task of 
finding and bringing together scientists involved with research programmes related to 
the mind-body problem in medicine from various fields in the USA.  
 
After a period of intense preparation Dunbar sent a letter of invitation to Dr. Franz 
Alexander, Dr. Stanley Cobb, Dr. Hallowell Davis and Dr. Walter S. Palmer to attend 
a luncheon meeting “at the Waldorf-Astoria on Tuesday December 28th 1937 at 12:30 
o’clock, in a private dining-room engaged in my name”.253 
 
At the time of the meeting Stanley Cobb was working as Psychiatrist-in-Chief and a 
professor of neuropathology at the Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston. He was 
widely regarded as a neurologist but, as he reflected in a letter to Dunbar in July 1938 
“…we are people who are broad and able to see the overlaps [in neurology and 
psychiatry]. Personally…I am not especially enthusiastic about being labelled a mere 
neurologist.”254. Hallowell Davis was, in turn, a professor of physiology at the 
Department of Physiology, Harvard Medical School and Walter S. Palmer was 
working at the Columbia-Presbyterian hospital in New York City.  
 
The idea of establishing a journal devoted to the field had obviously been discussed 
among the interested parties for some time, as Alexander indicated in his response to 
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Dunbar’s invitation by stating that the meeting would be “the first step toward the 
realization of our long standing plan”. 255 I can present no data on what was discussed 
during the meeting since I was not able to locate the minutes of this gathering in the 
Archives (they may be missing altogether) but it is quite clear that the meeting was a 
success in terms of launching a new journal dedicated to publishing articles “in the 
field of psychosomatic medicine” as the rationale of the meeting was indicated in the 
letter of invitation.  
 
Then followed a period of intensive planning and preparing with Dunbar in charge to 
deal with the practicalities. On April 14th, 1938 Dunbar wrote to Dr Miles, the 
President of the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, to express her gratitude for the support 
of the Committee to sponsor a journal “devoted to ‘Psychosomatic Research’”. She 
also accepted a five-year appointment as associate editor of the journal. After 
defending the idea of linotype publication, she wrote how 
 
“A journal of this type would reach a most heterogeneous group of readers – 
internists, psychiatrists, neurologists, and a number of other medical 
specialists, such as dermatologists, paediatricians, nose and throat men who 
continuously have to deal with the psychological problems of their field; 
moreover psychologists and physiologists. If we only count on those 
individuals who are especially interested in the psychosomatic problems, this 
alone would represent a considerably large number of readers.”256 
 
Various titles were suggested for the forthcoming journal in the discussions between 
Dunbar and the Macy Foundation. Among those were titles such as Physiology of 
Emotions, Investigative Psychophysiology, A Journal of Psychiatry and Medicine, to 
mention a few. Eventually the title for the Journal was established as Psychosomatic 
Medicine, Experimental and Clinical Studies. (Published quarterly with the 
sponsorship of the Committee on Problems of Neurotic Behaviour Division of 
Anthropology and Psychology. National Research Council, Washington D.C.) The 
first number appeared in January 1939 with Flanders Dunbar as managing editor. The 
list of editors consisted of: Franz Alexander, Psychoanalysis; Dana W. Athcley, 
Internal Medicine; Stanley Cobb, Neurology; Hallowell Davis, Physiology; Flanders 
Dunbar, Psychiatry; Clark L. Hull, Psychology; Howard S. Liddell, Comparative 
Physiology; Grower F. Powers, Paediatrics; Theodore P. Wolfe, Review Editor.  
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On the back cover of the first issue, under the title Purpose, it was declared that  
 
“The aim of PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE, which has been initiated with 
the assistance of the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, is to encourage and bring 
together studies which make a contribution to the understanding of the 
organism as a whole, in somatic and psychic aspects. These materials are now 
usually separated widely in manner and place of publication because of 
differences in concept, approach and methods. The inauguration of this 
journal will provide a channel for the prompt and inexpensive publication of 
relevant investigations.” 
 
On the same page, following the title Scope we read that 
 
“The investigations published in this journal will deal primarily with 
phenomena observed concurrently from somatic and psychic angles rather 
that from either one alone. The scope therefore will include appropriate 
experimental studies of animal and human behavior, and well-controlled 
clinical studies of both children and adults. Pertinent examples are: 
investigation of experimental neuroses, of frustration, of physiological 
changes accompanying emotion, of vegetative and hormonal disturbances, 
and of psychiatric aspects of general and specific medical problems.” 
 
The articles in the first number fall into four groups, starting with an overview of the 
theme Psychological Aspects of Medicine by Franz Alexander, followed then by two 
themes The Hypothalamus – Review of some Recent Contributions and Symposium on 
Hypertension. The last part of the first number consisted of  Reviews, Abstracts and 
Correspondence. As to the articles, there are titles such as Hypothalamic Functions in 
Psychosomatic Interrelations, Some Cardiovascular Manifestations of the 
Experimental Neurosis in Sheep and Blood Pressure and Palmar Sweat Responses. 
Two articles were explicit in their adherence to the psychoanalytic theory, 
Psychoanalytic Study of a Case of Essential Hypertension and Blood Pressure and 
Inhibited Aggressions.  There were two other titles dealing with emotions and bodily 
reactions: Hostility in Cases of Essential Hypertension and Emotional Factors in 
Essential Hypertension. 
 
Seeing this diversity of articles and having the conceptual and methodological 
problems in the field acknowledged on the back cover of the Journal let us  examine 
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next, how the word psychosomatic was conceptualised by the advocates of 
psychosomatic medicine. We now have three sources at our disposal at this stage of 
our inquiry, Dunbar’s book, the material published in the first number of the Journal 
and the correspondence between the editors on what submitted articles should be 
rejected and on what grounds. After all, what is not published may also help us to 
understand the theoretical thinking behind the introduction of the concept 
psychosomatic into medicine. 
 
The concept psychosomatic defined 
 
Since Dunbar was one of the main advocates  in bringing the concept psychosomatic 
into the medical vocabulary let us see, first, how she justified the choice of the word 
in her 1935 book.    
 
Dunbar opened the Introduction in the first edition of Emotions and Bodily Changes 
by noting how  
  
“Scientific study of emotion and of the bodily changes that accompany 
diverse emotional experience marks a new era in medicine. We know now 
that many physiological processes, which are of profound significance for 
health, not only of the individual but also of the group, can be controlled by 
way of emotions. In this knowledge we may have the key to many problems 
in the prevention and treatment of illness, yet we have scarcely begun to  use 
what we know. We lack perspective concerning our knowledge in this field 
and are confused on the interrelationship of the psychic, including emotional, 
and  somatic processes in health and disease” 
 
Dunbar gave then an extensive account of the early 20th century medical literature 
addressing the question of the effects of mind on the body. It is noteworthy, that much 
of this literature was, at the time, written in German and there were problems, as 
Dunbar noted, in providing precise translations into English language owing to the 
lack of English equivalents for various German expressions.  
 
Throughout her book Dunbar used the word psychosomatic as a general concept 
without attempting to give it any precise definition as a scientific concept. It seems 
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that she was somewhat cautious with the term as a whole since she wrote in the 
Conclusion that  
 
“…the phrase ‘psychosomatic interrelationships’, conveys an emphasis we 
are outgrowing; it is inadequate to express the conviction that psyche and 
soma are not entities which interact but actually two aspects of a fundamental 
unity. Nevertheless, the phrase ‘psychosomatic interrelationships’ will 
probably persist in the literature because as yet no other is current which 
better expresses this unity considered in its psychic and somatic aspects”.257  
 
Dunbar justified not offering her own interpretations or definitions for the concepts 
used by noting, that “it must  be borne in mind that this work is essentially a 
bibliography…a minimum of critical comment has been given”.258 
 
Despite the conceptual ambiguity, Dunbar was convinced that this emerging field of 
research was worth pursuing, since 
 
“…the great bulk of material…demonstrates…that soma can be influenced 
through psyche in ways increasingly subject to our  control, and that 
appropriate application of such techniques as suggestion, hypnosis, and of 
psychoanalysis is of fundamental therapeutic significance – in the prevention 
of disease; in the early diagnosis and treatment of disease; in the cure of 
certain diseases where the physiological changes involved are reversible by 
this means; and as an adjuvant … where serious structural changes have taken 
place, even in fatal illness itself.”259 
 
Dunbar perceived that the basic theoretical problem in medicine resided in dualism in 
medical thinking. This dualism needed, in her opinion, to be resolved in order to be 
able to develop methodology to address the essential unity of a person: 
 
 “…the change from emphasis on a psychosomatic dichotomy to recognition 
of an underlying unity with the simultaneous reflection of the struggle to 
develop research methods directed toward this unity, our research methods 
thus far having been developed particularly for the handling of 
fragments…Why this is so and how  - that is, just what psychophysiological 
mechanisms are involved - is not yet clear; and the majority of formulations 
are guesses unsupported by facts or developed on the basis of a few facts, and 
by way of often questionable methodology.” 260 
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For Dunbar, the psychosomatic approach leads, eventually, to fundamental questions 
in medical theory, as she concluded her book:  
 
“At the outset, the field of psychosomatic interrelationships was presented as 
a borderline problem between the specialties.  It has been pointed out, 
however, that this is much more than a borderline problem: it is the kernel 
and focus of all medical knowledge and practice”.261  
 
In the first edition of her book Durbar perceived psychoanalysis as a therapeutic tool 
among other tools such as suggestion and hypnosis. Two years later, in the 
Memorandum to Meyer discussed earlier, she was explicit that the concept 
psychosomatic medicine denotes the integration of psychoanalysis to general 
medicine.  
 
According to the correspondence I was able to retrieve from the Archive, Dunbar did 
not make any further efforts whatsoever to address the theoretical or conceptual 
problems in psychosomatic medicine during the preparatory phase of the Journal in 
1938. Instead, she stood firm in her role of an editor concerning herself mainly with 
practical issues such as the intended size of the Journal, the quality of the paper, 
typesetting, layout and so forth. At that stage of development the conceptual worries 
seemed to fall on Alexander, who wrote in a letter to Dunbar in August 1938 that 
 
“If we want to reach both groups – the medico-somatic as well as the 
psychiatric psychological – our articles cannot be written in the slang of 
either one. We cope here with a difficulty no other journal has to cope with – 
namely, that we deal with a much more heterogeneous group of readers than 
any other scientific journal. Since one of our main purposes is to introduce 
into medical circles psychiatric interest, we must bear in mind above all that 
most  physicians do not understand our psychiatric or psychoanalytical slang. 
Neither are they familiar with our fundamental concepts. The editing of our 
contributions therefore will become an issue of vital importance.”262 
 
When the publication of the first issue of the Journal was approaching Alexander’s 
concerns were rising as he confided in another letter to Dunbar in October 1938: 
 
“I must confess that with the publication of the first issue approaching I am 
having stage fright. I realise more and more how much this journal will be in 
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the limelight and will be scrutinized most critically by psychiatrists, 
psychoanalysts as well as by organicists. Therefore, the editors have to face 
an extremely  difficult job and must be double careful to do good editorial job 
both in the selection of the articles, the style, and general attitude.”263 
 
An apparent consensus on the aim of the Journal was eventually found among the 
editors, however. The Introductory Statement264, opening the first issue and signed 
The Editors, summarised the general rationale of the Journal: “Briefly, psychosomatic 
medicine concerns itself with the psychological aspects of medicine”.  
 
The concept psychosomatic medicine was first further defined through negation:  
 
“Psychosomatic Medicine is not equivalent with what is understood by the 
term ‘psychiatry’”.  
 
And then: 
 
“While psychiatry’s principal interest is “the diseased mind”, the subject 
matter for psychosomatic medicine is to study the relationship between 
“psychological and physiological aspects of all normal and abnormal bodily 
functions and thus to integrate somatic therapy and psychotherapy”.  
 
The need and justification for this integration arose, for the editors, from the fact that 
there was “intensive and active work of this type going on in this and other countries” 
and that the medical profession had “awakened to the necessity to studying 
systematically what is commonly referred to as the ‘art of medicine’”.265 In short, the 
Journal’s aim was to “promote unity and progress in the rapidly expanding field”.266 
 
The Introductory Statement did not, however, address the conceptual problems in 
their approach any further. Instead, the editors dissociated themselves from theoretical 
issues by stating that the Journal was not “concerned with the metaphysics of the 
mind-body problem. Emphasis is put on the thesis “that there is no logical distinction 
between ‘mind and body’, mental and physical”. Furthermore, the editors wrote that 
“the division of medical disciplines into physiology, neurology, internal medicine, 
psychiatry and psychology may be convenient for academic administration, but 
biologically and philosophically these divisions have no validity”. 267 The aim of the 
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editors was to “adhere to a unitary conception of medicine as an experimental science, 
to bring scientific precision into the ‘art’”.268 
 
After the Introductory Statement there followed a review article by Franz Alexander 
entitled Psychological Aspects of Medicine, offering a broad theoretical account on 
what would follow. Alexander started his paper with an historical overview of the 
development of medicine to the conception of disease seated in cellular pathology, 
where disturbances of functional problems in the human body are seen as a 
consequence of structural changes in tissues and organs. Alexander claimed that there 
had been little room in this approach to any psychological analysis of patients’ 
problems beyond mere classification of mental symptoms into psychiatric disease 
categories as presented by Kraepelin. This was partly owing to the lack of proper 
instruments to penetrate man’s mind. Freud’s psychoanalysis had, however, changed 
the situation by offering a “psychological microscope” to study the structure and 
function of mental life and to correlate the findings to those revealed with optic 
microscopes and physiological measurements. Alexander wrote:  
 
“Our body, this complicated machine, carries out most complex and refined 
motor activity, under the influence of such psychological phenomena as ideas 
and wishes…The originating psychological situations can only be understood 
in terms of psychology, as total responses of the organism to its 
environment.”269 
 
Alexander expressed, however, some reservations concerning the conceptual basis of 
the Journal’s general approach. For him the notion psychosomatic medicine was “not 
most fortunate because it may imply a dichotomy between psyche and body (soma).” 
Alexander attempted to overcome this dichotomy by stating that if  “we understand 
psychic phenomena as nothing but the subjective aspect of certain bodily (brain) 
processes this dichotomy disappears”. 270 While this statement entailed significant 
ontological assumptions as also did the editor’s claim that “there is no logical 
distinction between ‘mind and body’”,  Alexander did not pursue the issue any 
further. Because of their theoretical importance, I shall return to these statements 
later.  
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Alexander asserted that the psychosomatic approach based on psychoanalysis did 
have a fundamental meaning for medical theory in terms of aetiological thinking. 
Following Freud’s idea of conversion it was apparent, for Alexander, that functional 
changes, such as repressed emotions, can lead to structural changes in the cellular 
level such as damage in the gastric mucosa. This idea reversed the conception 
prevalent in then current medical thinking where functional disturbances were seen as 
resulting from structural changes in the body. Alexander assumed that there may even 
be specific relations to be found between certain types of emotions and particular 
organic structures (echoing the idea that was present already in the Hippocratic 
treatises and repeated in St. Thomas’s doctrines, as noted in the above). For example, 
inhibited rage may be connected to the cardiovascular system, dependence to 
nutrition, sexual conflicts to the respiratory system and so on.271 Alexander concluded 
that this “psychological approach” offers a scientific basis to understanding better 
patient’s symptoms in relation to their emotional life.  
 
The rest of the articles in the first issue of the Journal did not attempt to address the 
conceptual issues in psychosomatic medicine beyond what is discussed above. 
Therefore, to shed light on what constitutes the “scientific basis” of the emerging field 
of psychosomatic medicine, we may next turn to the “the selection of the articles, the 
style, and general attitude”, as Alexander expressed it.  
 
From the correspondence preserved in the Archive we can distinguish three main 
arguments for the rejection of papers submitted to the editors of the Journal. A few 
examples may suffice to clarify the issue. I begin with rejection of papers submitted 
on the grounds of not properly addressing the main theme of the Journal, 
psychosomatic relationship. (The name of the reviewer is given in parentheses.) 
 
“It does not fit in however in the Psychosomatic Medicine. The 
psychodynamic background of the organic symptoms of the patient are not 
discussed at all.” (Alexander)272 
 
“…he offers the hypothesis that the skin symptom is the manifestation of the 
patient’s guilt feelings…Neither the skin symptoms nor the psychological 
condition of the patient are adequately described…The psychiatric 
descriptions are even poorer…There is no convincing evidence offered for 
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the explanation of the skin symptoms from guilt feelings…I suggest 
unconditional refusal.“ (Alexander) 273 
 
“I am uncertain about the Rosenberg paper. It is unconvincing to one 
experienced in hypertension and it is definitely unsophisticated from a 
medical point of view in several ways. It is a far cry from decreasing the 
blood pressure following a series of conversations and believing that one has 
the aetiology of hypertension.” (Atchley)274 
 
“Ranson’s paper is a beautiful presentation of the neurophysiology of the 
mechanism for regulating body temperature in the hypothalamus. It is too 
good not to publish, although I wondered while reading it whether there is 
any “psycho” to accompany the “somatic”. It could perfectly well appear in 
the Journal of neurophysiology…”(Davis) 275 
 
“…they look on this manuscript as reporting psychosomatics because both 
the psyche and the soma of the patient were simultaneously attacked. I do not 
think that their paper brings out anything about the physiology of the 
emotions or the relationships that we are really interested in.”(Cobb)276 
 
Another argument for declining to publish submitted papers in the Journal was based 
on conceptual obscurity: 
 
“…Schimmenti’s article, “Some Remarks on the Cause of  Essential 
Hypertension and its Prevention by Psychotherapy”… I consider utterly 
unsuitable for publication for the following reasons: It is a palaver written in 
somewhat amateurish psychoanalytic and physiological jargon consisting of 
an undigested mixture of psychoanalytic concepts with some general 
physiological statements without any reference to literature or independent 
observations.” (Alexander) 277 
 
“Many pages of this manuscript are devoted to theoretical discussion written 
in a difficult style. The concepts and vocabulary are unusual and can only be 
understood by studying other writings of the author. Without this background 
for some of the definitions, I believe the discussion is logically meaningless. I 
therefore believe that it should be recast in familiar current phraseology in 
order to be acceptable.”(Davis)278 
 
Yet another argument for rejecting submitted manuscripts rested on the lack of 
sufficient empirical data: 
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“Takat’s paper strikes me as the worst of the lot. It is without supporting data; 
it accepts the function of the hypothalamus and diencephalon as proven; it 
talks as if all “sympathectomised” patients were alike. In short, it is not a 
scientific paper, but a resumé suited to “Time” or “Newsweek”. (Cobb)279 
 
“This is a perfectly good theory and in the introduction and discussion the 
authors show that it offers a plausible explanation for the symptoms. They do 
not, however, give any evidence at all, and in a scientific paper, the evidence 
presented is the main point….the patient’s words are not put into the record, 
and we feel that is just what is needed as data…that is what psychiatry needs 
– more data and less opinions.” (Cobb)280 (underlining original) 
 
“Our policy is to publish data of scientific interest with the smallest possible 
amount of discussion…The part of the paper that would interest me (to be 
published) is that which presents data...(it has been presented) too briefly and 
only in generalizations from many cases. It leaves the reader unconvinced 
both because of paucity of data but because lack of control data. (Cobb) 281 
 
It seems, according to the material available, that it was specifically Cobb among the 
editors who was becoming frustrated at the scientific level of many of the manuscripts 
submitted for publication in the Journal. As he expressed it in a letter to Dunbar in 
August 1939:  
  
“The whole object in bringing ‘Psychosomatic Medicine’ into existence was 
(from my point of view) to give authors a chance to present evidence at 
length and express conclusions that could be checked by the reader. We hope 
to do this and thus combat the present tendency in psychiatric ‘literature’ to 
expound without producing evidence.”282  
 
Cobb’s worries were taken into serious consideration as revealed in a reply by Dunbar 
a couple of months later: 
 
“I was very glad to have a copy of your letter…I thought it was splendidly 
worded and [I] read it at the Meeting of the Board. There was a unanimous 
feeling that the general statements referring to our policy were so well 
expressed that they might well be incorporated in our…letter of refusal to 
authors of general articles that do not prove acceptable.”283 
 
We may now conclude, in light of the material presented above, that at the time of the 
founding of the Journal the concept psychosomatic had developed to a stage where it 
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was used in two distinct meanings. First, the new in this approach was 
methodological, that is, recombining psychoanalysis with studies on human 
physiology in order to find correlations between emotional states and bodily 
phenomena. These studies needed to be based on empirical research. Secondly, the 
concept was used in an ontological sense to denote the unity of a person to overcome 
the mind-body dualism in medical thinking. We shall return to these postulations later 
when exploring the subsequent development of the concept psychosomatic in 
medicine. But I pause here for a moment to reflect on the material I have presented so 
far to discuss the question of conceptual development in medicine in general.  
 
 99 
Chapter 6 - On the development of science 
 
 
During the formative phase of the concept psychosomatic in medicine in the 1930s,  
the philosophy of science was dominated by logical positivism, where the aim was to 
construct a set of formal logical methods for scientific inquiry by using the results of 
scientific research as a point of departure. This approach did not consider the process 
of scientific research itself as philosophically interesting and it was excluded from the 
inquiry. This attitude was challenged, among others, by Karl Popper, who suggested 
that if we are to look upon the theory of knowledge, we should not build it solely on 
examining the structure of facts obtained by scientific research. Instead, we need to 
look at the growth of knowledge, that is, how discoveries emerge and solve scientific 
problems.284 This criticism gained momentum when Thomas Kuhn published his 
widely acclaimed treatise The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962.285 Kuhn’s 
idea of the development of science through revolutionary paradigm shifts has been 
widely debated ever since. But I ask, for the purposes of this essay, whether Kuhn’s 
approach does indeed apply in the development of medicine.  
 
To summarise Kuhn’s position, a scientific discipline, such as physics, holds certain 
basic assumptions about its object of inquiry as given and scientific work consists of 
applying methods to examine the object(s) that belong to that particular scientific 
field.  If the research produces results that do not fit into prevailing theoretical 
framework, they may be discarded as anomalies or as simply erroneous. But if 
anomalous results accumulate, they eventually reach a point when they challenge the 
current theory. The theory then needs to be reformulated or replaced with a new one, 
as when Ptolemaic astronomy was replaced by Copernican theory on the order and 
movement of celestial bodies.  
 
When the theoretical change, or revolution as Kuhn calls it, has occurred, there 
follows again a period of normal science where new theory is tested with empirical 
research. Kuhn calls this process the mopping up phase, when researchers apply the 
new theory to anything they can think of, until new anomalies start to appear that lead 
to new ideas and revolutions. 286 
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While Kuhn’s theory has been widely appreciated, it has also been found to be 
problematic in many of its core assumptions. As Kuhn himself concedes, his approach 
leaves important questions uncovered such as the actual process (the conduct of the 
people who are involved with everyday scientific work) of scientific development.287 
His basic concept paradigm also remains somewhat ambiguous, since he gives 
various definitions for it in his book.288 More importantly, for the aims of this essay, 
he leaves medicine outside his theory altogether without giving a proper justification 
for so doing. As discussed earlier, he mentions medicine only in passing, equating it 
with crafts such as metallurgy and calendar making289 and with fields such as 
technology and law290 which he does not consider to be sciences since they derive 
their justification from external social need – an argument he does not, however, 
pursue any further.  
 
Not only did Kuhn not consider medicine a science in its own right, but also, it seems, 
the development of medicine does not fit into Kuhn’s model. In light of what has been 
evinced so far, it is apparent that the development of the concept of psychosomatic in 
medicine is not a consequence of drastic paradigm shifts resulting from anomalous 
findings amassed over a period of normal scientific enquiry. On the contrary, the issue 
of the mind-body relation has long been debated in medicine and the introduction of 
the concept psychosomatic into medical theory did not occur because of anomalous 
observations that did not fit into some previous theoretical model. The development 
of the concept psychosomatic followed quite another developmental route, where 
there were new theoretical, rather than empirical, openings to perennial questions.  
 
This observation is not confined to the development of the concept psychosomatic in 
medicine. For example, it has been received wisdom among physicians that there is 
something affecting the patient’s well being (or ill being) during the clinical 
encounter between physician and patient brought about the physician’s mere 
presence. But how could this phenomenon be explained? In the late 18th century 
Mesmer postulated, following the ideas within the rapidly developing field of physics, 
that there must be some mediating agent acting between the doctor and the patient 
causing this effect. As an explanation Mesmer suggested the possibility of magnetic 
fluid emanating from the physician to the patient. Since it was obvious that this effect 
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had to be based on a different kind of magnetism as that observed in iron particles, 
Mesmer proposed the concept animal magnetism to explain the phenomenon. This 
theoretical approach inspired a number of physicians to apply the new conceptual 
framework in their practice. It was only after decades of practising and debating 
shedding no light on the essence of these phenomena that Braid solved the problem 
by proposing a new conceptual approach to the issue as we discussed in Chapter 4. 
Braid’s solution was, thus, not based on new empirical and anomalous findings, but 
offered a new conceptual apparatus where the essence of the phenomenon was moved 
from what occurred between physician and  patient mediated by physical substance 
such as magnetic fluid to the properties of the patient’s nervous system induced by 
suggestion. The adoption of the concept nervous sleep and, eventually, hypnosis, into 
the medical vocabulary came, thus, because of the weaknesses in the previous 
conceptual system to explain the phenomenon.  
 
To  give another example in the development of medicine that does not quite fit into 
Kuhn’s idea of paradigm change through the amassing of anomalous findings in the 
course of empirical research, let us consider the case of tuberculosis. We find among 
the earliest written observations on human illness descriptions of the phenomenon of 
gradual wasting of the patient’s body accompanied by blood-stained sputum and 
increasing difficulties in breathing, a process that most often proved fatal. In the early 
medical writings these phenomena were grouped under a concept phthisis.  The 
underlying theoretical assumption held dyscrasia or disturbed composition of the 
blood to be an explanation for the condition. The treatment was targeted, in 
accordance with the theory, at restoring the properties of the patient’s blood through 
diet, exercise, venesection and enemas. The problem from a theoretical point of view 
was identifying what led to dyscrasia, whether the condition was contagious and, if 
so, what the mediating agent for the contagion might be.  
 
The idea that certain diseases can be acquired through contact with a sick person is as 
old as medicine itself. Different plagues have afflicted mankind since the dawn of 
history and it has been obvious even for an interested layman that there is some 
contagious element around when the illness tends to move from one person to another 
after close contact with the diseased. (This phenomenon has not concerned only 
humans, but also domestic animals as discussed, for example, in the 9th century AD 
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Arabic treatise Al-Bukhari, which advises against mixing diseased animals with 
healthy ones to prevent the spreading of disease.291) Hence, people avoided afflicted 
villages and towns and fled, if possible, when a plague arrived in the vicinity. Those 
who succumbed to a disease were restrained from physical contact with healthy ones, 
as in the case of leprosy. It has also been apparent that moving from one place to 
another is a means for spreading the disease. Therefore, authorities imposed 
restrictions on travel during outbrakes of plague as long as there were any authorities 
present having the power to issue and outforce such restrictions.  
 
It has also long been a common observation that not all of those who have been in 
contact with diseased individuals have fallen ill. There have been various 
explanations for this phenomenon, such as the use of protective chants and amulets or 
Divine grace, which has been deemed the ultimate cause for man’s fate in the world 
anyway. As Pepys wrote in his diary in May 1665, when the first cases of plague were 
seen in London: “Great fears of the sickness here in the city…God preserve us 
all!”.292  
  
Together with the apparent contagion of a disease from one afflicted person to another 
the question of the mediating agent has been discussed in medical literature since 
antiquity. For example, a Roman scholar Varro (116-27 BC) contemplated 
intermittent fevers in his treatise on farming Rerum rusticanum libri tres, and came to 
a conclusion that there must be “certain minute animals, invisible to the eye, [that] 
breed there [swampy land], reach the body by way of the mouth and nose and cause 
diseases”.293  
 
In 1546, more than a hundred years before Leeuwenhoek published his observations 
with a microscope on minute living creatures, Animalculae as he called them, a 
Veronese physician Girolamo Fracastoro (1483-1553) discussed the problem of 
transmission in his book De Contagione. He postulated that there were three ways for 
a disease to spread, direct contact, via infected objects or fomites and air. He 
presumed that there were certain imperceptible particles, seminaria, which could exist 
outside the body for long periods of time and still be infectious when coming into 
contact with a human being. When entering the body the seminaria generate offspring 
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similar to themselves until the person’s bodily humours were fully infected by 
them294.  
 
By the early decades of the 18th century the observation of microscopic phenomena 
had become commonplace and the issue was frequently debated in scientific 
periodicals. For example, by 1720 a number of studies had been published in 
Philosophical Transactions alone on Animalculae295 and by the end of the century 
hundreds of different creatures were differentiated and described in the scientific 
literature.296  
 
In 1722 an English physician, Benjamin Marten, contemplated the aetiology of 
phthisis, or consumption as the disease had become known, in his book A New Theory 
of Consumption, more especially of a Phthisis or Consumption of the Lungs. He 
concluded that the illness could be caused by "wonderfully minute living Creatures", 
which, once they had gained a foothold in the body, could generate the lesions and 
symptoms of the disease. He wrote how “For this Distemper as I have observed by 
Frequent Experience, does infect those that lie with the sick Person with a certain 
taint”. Marten concluded that there were also other diseases such as itch, leprosy and 
venereal Distemper that were more likely to spread in the same manner. Yet, as 
Marten noted, the role of contagion was fiercely contested in the medical circles of his 
time, since in many cases people did not fall ill despite in being close contact with the 
diseased.297  
 
Until the nineteenth century the theoretical development of the problem of 
consumption had consisted mainly of regrouping the various signs and symptoms of 
the ailment in order to extrapolate its essential features and to achieve better 
understanding of and treatment for it. Yet, these attempts did not challenge the 
underlying theoretical idea of the foul mixture of blood as the cause of the disease. 
For example, in 1685 an English physician Richard Morton published a book 
Phthisiologia: or a Treatise of Consumption where, while recognising the great 
clinical variety of the disease, he offered three key features for it: wasting of the 
whole body, a hectic fever, and an exulceration of the lungs.298 The latter observation 
was based on autopsy findings where certain nodules, tubercles were found in the 
lungs of diseased cadavers. According to the then prevailing theory Morton assumed 
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that these nodules were due to the dyscrasia of the blood, which produced fluids in the 
lungs that hardened into tubercles. Morton´s contribution consisted of redefining the 
concept consumption by localising the disease to the lungs and considering the 
tubercles to be a pathognomic sign for the condition.299  
 
The problem, however, was that different kinds of nodules were found in the lungs of 
cadavers. When the clinical pictures also varied greatly, how were the different 
nodules found in the autopsies to be connected with different signs and symptoms 
observed when the patients were still alive? The 18th century microscopic techniques 
did not provide much help in studying the details of the nodules, which for the 
examining eye looked fairly similar. There were also other problems to be solved. Did 
pneumonias, empyemas, catarrhs etc. develop into consumption or was it the other 
way around? Or did they have anything to do with each other in the first place?  
 
By the beginning of the 19th century the case had become quite indisputable that 
consumptive patients did, indeed as a rule, seem to have certain nodules in their lungs. 
But there were more problems to come. It appeared that similar nodules were found in 
autopsies in other organs of patients without consumptive symptoms. What were 
these nodules? Why did they emerge in various parts of the body? And what, if 
anything, had they to do with the fate of the consumptive patients? 
 
These questions called for better methods for differentiating the structure of these 
autopsy findings. Although the first microscopes were built in the 17th century, after 
more than a hundred years of development they were still rather crude. Even the best 
instruments provided more or less distorted and hazy images.300 Plant cells were 
readily observable, but human or other animal cells could not be discerned, since they 
are transparent and lack wall structures such as those in plant cells. In the early 
decades of the 19th century rapidly advancing technology provided much more 
accurate devices for microscopic studies. These, together with developing methods 
for sample preparation, offered new possibilities for research on the finest structures 
of the human body.  
 
While an Italian anatomist, Malpighi, had already characterised the varieties of human 
tissues by the end of the 17th century301, it was only in 1838 that a German physician, 
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Schwann, was able to proclaim that all animal tissues were constructed, ultimately, of 
different cells.302 The emerging cell theory in biology also gave new momentum to 
studies of the composition of the human body in health and illness. Then, only twenty 
years later, another German, Rudolf Virchow, was ready to maintain in his epoch-
making book Die Cellularpathologie, that life in all its forms is based on cells. It 
follows then, argued Virchow, that all human disease is, essentially, a disease of a 
cell.303   
 
In light of these theoretical and empirical developments the characterisation of 
consumption now needed to be reformulated with novel concepts. Microscopic post 
mortem studies had established, that the normal cellular structure is destroyed in 
consumptive patients’ lungs and replaced with caseous nodules, which showed signs 
of degeneration in the middle, eventually developing into empty cavities. With the 
diminishing lung tissue the patient’s ability to breathe declines. The expanding 
cavities destroy blood vessels, leading to haemorrhages, wasting and death. Since the 
diagnosis was now anchored to the presence of histologically typified tubercles in 
patients’ lungs, a new concept tuberculosis, was introduced into the medical 
vocabulary by a German physician J.L. Schoenlein in 1839.304  
 
While the new concept tuberculosis was now based on the characteristic pathological 
changes in pulmonary tissue, crucial questions remained to be answered. Why did 
these tubercles appear? Could they be transmitted from one person to another, as in 
some occasions seemed to be the case? And if so, what is it that is transmitted? 
 
In 1865 a French military surgeon, Jean-Antoine Villemin, stated in a lecture before 
the French Academy of Medicine that he had been able to transmit tuberculosis from 
one infected animal to another.305 Villemin had followed the idea of tuberculosis as a 
contagious disease and conducted a series of experiments where he injected material 
from human tubercles into different animals and saw that the disease did indeed 
develop in those animals. Although he could not detect what the contagious element 
consisted of, his studies suggested that consumption was, indeed, an infectious 
disease. 
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When Villemin conducted his studies he must have been well aware of the contagious 
nature of many illnesses as well as the contemporary theoretical problems in 
medicine, where aetiological agents such as foul air, or miasma, as a cause for many 
diseases were still debated.306 While the experiments Villemin designed did 
demonstrate the fact of contagion, they did not, however, reveal the nature of the 
mediating agent. Apparently, new conceptual and methodological solutions were 
needed to solve the problem. 
 
By the time Villemin entered the field, microscopic techniques had already made it 
possible to appreciate the richness of the microbial world for almost two hundred 
years. In the early decades of the19th century a great number of microscopic creatures 
were observed, named and classified and the question of their origin and role in the 
living world was becoming more and more acute within the emerging science of the 
living world, biology. One of the main theoretical debates among early 19th century 
biologists revolved around the question whether microbes generated spontaneously 
under suitable conditions or procreated from parent microbes only. To solve the 
dispute, series of rigorous experiments were designed in various rival laboratories.  
 
The significance of microbes for living processes in general and in certain diseases in 
particular was becoming apparent in the latter part of the 19th century. In 1878 Louis 
Pasteur was able to demonstrate how silk worms were afflicted by certain 
communicable protozoa (an observation already published in 1835 by Agostini 
Bassi307). By analogy, various diseases could be assumed to be caused by different 
micro-organisms. This was shown to be true in the following years when animal 
diseases such as chicken cholera and anthrax were shown to be caused by certain 
bacteria. Then, in 1882 a German physician, Robert Koch, announced in a lecture 
before the Berlin Physiological Society, that he had found a certain bacteria 
associated with tuberculosis as a rule, thus named Mycobacterium tuberculosis.308  
 
These and many other studies proved that microbes could spread through the air (as 
Varro had assumed in the first century BC) and that under appropriate conditions they 
might reproduce and multiply to vast numbers from parent microbes (as Fracastoro 
had postulated in the 16th century) and cause various diseases (as Marten had 
considered in the early 18th century). Eventually, the relocation of phthisis from foul 
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blood to  cellular changes owing to the infection by Mycobacterium and casted into 
concept tuberculosis, opened up paths for a new understanding of the nature and 
cause of this age-old scourge and offered new prospects for its prevention and cure.  
 
The idea of the contagious nature of phthisis and the idea of a mediating agent was, 
thus, not established by observing anomalies in the course of the disease while 
applying current research methods, such as when calculating the anomalies in the 
movement of celestial bodies in relation to Ptolemaic theory. On the contrary, the 
conceptual transformation of phthisis into tuberculosis and from dyscrasia of the 
blood to bacterial infection matured through attempts to answer the perennial 
questions: what happens in the human body in the course of illness? Is the affliction 
contagious? And if so, how is the contagion mediated? 
 
While the theory of infectious disease is now well established in medicine, it is still, 
to use Kuhn’s expression, in its mopping up phase. That is, it is constantly being 
tested and expanded when we are asking whether most, if not all, diseases from 
artheriosclerosis and rheumatoid arthritis to dementia and schizophrenia, could be 
caused by micro-organisms. But the infection theory has also had problems right from 
the beginning since it is well known that there are many occasions when a person 
carries a pathogenic micro-organism in his or her body without any apparent 
symptoms or signs of the disease. These observations have called for explanations for 
the mechanisms of how a particular micro-organism can cause a certain disease while 
another, even of an identical strain, seems to be harmless, even when found in vast 
quantities in a human body. Why is this so? Alongside the birth of the concept 
infectious disease the problem of asymptomatic germ carriers led to the development 
of the concept immunity and the field of immunology, which has successfully 
addressed many of the problems of infection and disease, but which has not 
challenged the idea that in order to have, say,  tuberculosis, there needs to be, by 
definition, a mycobacterium found in the afflicted person’s body. Even in cases where 
no micro-organisms can be isolated and identified, as, for example, in some middle 
ear inflammations, we assume that there is, of necessity, some sort of an organism 
present, but we just cannot make it perceptile with our present methods. This is 
analogous to a situation where an astronomer observes a slight distraction in a 
movement of a celestial body without any apparent cause. S/he assumes, according to 
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the theory, that there must be another object causing this disturbance, even though it 
cannot be observed with current techniques. This line of reasoning has led both 
medicine and astronomy to discover micro-organisms and celestial bodies in places 
where they were supposed to be found, as dictated by the theory. At least, so far. 
 
It seems, then, that, in light of the examples above, scientific development in 
medicine does not follow Kuhn’s model of scientific revolutions caused by 
discovering anomalies. We need, therefore, to look elsewhere to find better theoretical 
tools to understand the nature of the development of medicine.  
 
Science as a socio-historical endeavour 
 
Kuhn expresses in the Preface to the second edition of his book his indebtedness to 
Ludwig Fleck (1896-1961) for the premise that science is done by people acting in a 
certain historical time and place and that it is dependent on them both for methods and 
for ways of thinking.309 What had Fleck, then, to say to inspire Kuhn in developing 
his theory? 
 
Ludwig Fleck spent his formative years in Lvov, then Poland, and received a degree 
in medicine at the local university in 1922. During the years to follow he 
concentrated, amidst his clinical work, on bacteriological and serological studies and 
published widely on various issues in medicine and also on scientific methodology. 
After working as a researcher in Vienna in the heyday of the Vienna Circle in 1927, 
he returned to Lvov, where he wrote a monograph Enstehung und Entwicklung einer 
wissenschaftlichen Tatsache (Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact), which, 
for reason of anti-Semitism, was not published in his home country but in Switzerland 
in 1935. After the second World War Fleck immigrated to Israel where he died in 
1961.  
 
Fleck’s treatise remained little known to the Anglophone scientific world for decades 
until the English translation appeared in 1979. In his Foreword to Fleck’s English 
edition Kuhn recounts how he had come across Fleck’s work as early as in 1949, after 
having stumbled on a footnote referring to it in another book.310 It was Fleck, says 
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Kuhn, who made him realize the fundamental importance of a sociological dimension 
when writing on the development of science.  
 
In his book Fleck discusses the development of a scientific fact by using the discovery 
of the so-called Wasserman reaction (a diagnostic tool for syphilis) as a case in point. 
Fleck’s main thesis is that whatever ideas are developed and cast in the form of a 
scientific fact, their developmental process originates from a “socio-cogitative 
foundation” of the time and place of the inquiry. Scientific facts are, thus, not 
spontaneously created through someone observing something, but are developed 
through the collective work of scientists working in a certain period of time, in a 
certain place and in a certain intellectual climate. Whatever ideas emerge in the 
above, they are determined and shaped by their predecessors, or protoideas as Fleck 
calls them.311 Following our examples on the development of medical theories and 
concepts as presented in this essay, it seems that medicine is indeed rich in protoideas 
developing into what we hold today to be scientific facts. (We may discern similar 
processes in other sciences as well, but it is beyond the scope of this essay to expand 
the discussion to examples from other scientific disciplines.) 
 
Fleck maintains that the development of scientific concepts from the early to modern 
period cannot be described in terms of formal logic due to the sheer fact that the 
meanings of concepts have changed in the course of time. A scientific concept cannot, 
thus, be attained without the consideration of a particular historical connection, that is, 
to discover its operative socio-cogitative forces and development. To indicate “a 
community of persons mutually exchanging ideas or maintaining intellectual 
interaction” Fleck introduces the concept thought collective. It provides “the special 
‘carrier’ for the historical development of any field of thought, as well as for the given 
stock of knowledge and level of culture”. 312 
 
A thought collective should not, however, be understood as a fixed group or social 
class:  
 
“A thought collective exists whenever two or more persons are actually 
exchanging thoughts…If a large group exists long enough, the thought style 
becomes fixed and formal in structure. Practical performance then dominates 
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over creative mood, which is reduced to a certain fixed level that is 
disciplined, uniform, and discreet. This is the situation in which 
contemporary science finds itself as a specific, thought-collective 
structure.”313  
 
Here Fleck shares the same understanding of the social development of scientific 
thinking as Vygotsky and Ilyenkov. Scientific ideas cast into concepts are formed, 
accepted and used among a certain group of people in a particular historical period of 
time. This process cannot be attributed to any single mind but to a group of minds 
having continuous discussions and debates at a certain historical moment. For 
example, while the word psychosomatic had occasionally appeared in the medical 
literature much earlier, it was only in the late 1930s when a medical thought-
collective strong enough was formed to launch a journal devoted to the field that was 
to be called psychosomatic medicine. This was a process that obviously could not 
possibly have taken place, say, a hundred years earlier, owing to the mere fact of a 
lack of a conceptual system such as that provided by psychoanalysis and a thought-
collective supporting it, although there were occasional voices to be heard calling for 
psychology to be brought into medicine. The same process can be seen in the 
development of the concept of infectious disease. The idea of living particles causing 
diseases had been there for ages but only through the development of microscopes 
(precipitated largely by the needs of biologists and physicians) was it possible for 
there to arise a thought-collective strong enough to establish the concept of infectious 
disease into medical theory. 
 
With the concept of thought style Fleck refers to  
 
“the entirety of intellectual preparedness or readiness for one particular way 
of seeing and acting and no other…readiness for directed perception, with 
corresponding mental and objective assimilation of what has been so 
perceived…It constrains the  individual by determining what can be thought 
in no other way.”314 
 
With this approach Fleck concurs, again, with Vygotsky’s and Ilyenkov’s position as 
presented above. That is, there are no such things as pure observations. We invariably 
perceive the world from a certain position that has been largely determined by the 
language we have adopted through being raised in a certain community at a certain 
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time. This also applies to scientific thinking. As the extracts from the letters of 
rejection by the editors of the Journal show, if the author does not address the object 
of study from a certain point of view with an appropriate and clearly stated conceptual 
vocabulary, there is no room for that article in that particular journal. This can be seen 
in any other scientific journal. Each and every one of them is intended to address the 
phenomena under scientific inquiry from a certain theoretical point of view. Even so-
called general scientific journals have their own explicit, or at least implicit, ideas on 
the scientific way of addressing problems of interest and also on the concepts to be 
used. These change over time and, as Fleck remarks, whole eras of science may be 
ruled by these thought constraints until new thought-styles are created. One may 
observe this by simply browsing the first issues of Philosophical Transactions in the 
late 17th century and comparing them with the latest copies of Science. Even now, the 
thought style in the latter contains vestiges of the historical developments and 
elements from previous styles.315  
 
For Kuhn, Fleck’s basic concepts thought collective and thought style seem to consist 
of what he calls a normal science and what Fleck considers a classic stage of a 
science, when only those facts are recognised which conform to it. Then there follows 
a period of complications, that is, when the exceptions begin to emerge.316 For Fleck, 
however, the emergence of exceptions seems not to be a result of logical problem 
solving or rigorous experimentation but is rather a question of epistemology and 
cognition. Fleck writes, that   
  
“one of the most important tasks in comparative epistemology is to find out 
how conceptions and hazy ideas pass from one thought style to another, how 
they emerge as spontaneously generated pre-ideas, and how they are 
preserved as enduring, rigid structures owing to a kind of harmony of 
illusions. It is only by such a comparison and investigation of the relevant 
interrelations that we  can begin to understand our own era.”317  
 
Fleck continues how  
 
“in comparative epistemology, cognition must not be construed as only a dual 
relationship between the knowing subject and the object to be known. The 
existing fund of  knowledge must be a third partner in this relation as a basic 
factor of all new knowledge…interaction exists between that which is known 
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and the act of cognition. What is already known influences the particular 
method of cognition… Cognition is therefore not an individual  process of 
any theoretical ‘particular consciousness’. Rather it is the result of a social 
activity, since the existing stock of knowledge exceeds the range available to  
any one individual. The statement, ‘Someone recognizes something’, whether 
it be a relation, a fact, or an object, is therefore incomplete.”318   
 
We may note here, that in the above Fleck concurs not only with Vygotsky and 
Ilyenkov regarding the idea that a concept can be understood only in relation to other 
concepts, but also with C.S Peirce (1839-1914) and his triadic idea of a sign as a 
carrier of meaning. Peirce proposed a definition of sign, where a sign is composed of 
three components, a representamen, an object and an interpretant. The representamen 
is the material form of a sign, which refers to an object, just as red in a traffic light 
indicates the imperative to stop. The interpretant refers to the meaning a sign acquires 
when evaluated against a pre-existing system of signs, in this case traffic rules and 
regulations.319 Every sign is, thus, devoid of meaning until interpreted by subsequent 
thought, an interpretant. In fact, a sign is no sign at all without it. Red in a traffic light 
has no meaning to a person who has no idea of the way modern traffic is organised. 
For him or her it is merely a post with a red light. It conveys no meaning, i.e. it does 
not refer to anything outside of itself. Similarly, for most of our contemporaries the 
word dyscrasia is just a strange word but for those familiar with Galenic medicine it 
signifies a whole theory for the aetiology of disease, not to mention early physicians 
who practised their craft according to that theory. To give a commonplace clinical 
example of the necessity of an interpretant for sign formation in our contemporary 
medicine, let us consider the interpretation of a chest x-ray picture. Where a layman 
sees just random shades of grey, a radiologist may discern signs indicating a 
possibility of, say, a case of pneumonia. To form this interpretation the radiologist 
weighs his or he knowledge on the patient’s condition against his or her pre-existing 
knowledge of the various ways in which pneumonia may present itself in a chest x-
ray. (This also exemplifies the fact that the interpretation of the patient’s signs and 
symptoms in medicine is not based on passive observation but is an active and 
continuous process following the history and course of the patient’s illness in relation 
to the theory guiding the physician’s thinking). 
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Scientific development is not, then, merely a process of observing something and 
constructing theories on the basis of those observations. Before we can make any 
scientific observations, we must have an idea of what makes an observation a 
scientific observation, what is it that we are about to observe, what methods we are 
about to apply and how we are about to present our findings and conclusions. These 
are all based on language and during that process various psychological, historical and 
sociological factors affect the way the research plan will be structured and worded.320 
Hence in order to understand the birth and development of scientific concepts, we 
need to examine all three factors involved in cognition, the individual, the collective, 
and the object under consideration.  
 
It follows, that even though the collective is composed of individuals, not only the 
principal ideas but also all the formative stages of concepts are the result of the 
collective, not individual effort. Yet, as noted earlier, the idea of individual geniuses 
inventing new ideas with their serendipitous minds acting independently of the time 
and place of their efforts is tempting. This is exemplified in Lionel Trilling, who 
writes in the Introduction to Ernest Jones’ biography of Freud that  
 
“…the basic account of the history of psycho-analysis is the account of  how 
it grew in Freud’s own mind, For Freud developed its concepts all by 
himself.”321  
 
Marmer points out322, however, that the basic structure of Freud’s theory can be seen 
as deriving from Herman Helmholtz, (1821-1894) one of the most prominent 
physiologists of his time, who had drawn on Newton’s energy laws when he was 
attempting to explain physiological processes on the grounds of the theory of 
conservation of force. Helmholz formulated a physiological constancy principle 
according to which various forms of physical energy within the living organism can 
be converted into one another with neither a gain nor loss in the process. While the 
energy remains quantitatively constant in this process, it may undergo various 
qualitative transformations.323 Helmholz’s ideas were mediated to Freud by his 
teacher Brücke, who had studied together with Helmholz in 1840s under Johannes 
Müller, who was one of the founding fathers of German physiology. (Freud’s debt to 
Helmholz can readily be seen in the quotations presented in Chapter 6 where Freud 
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formulates his theory of conversion.) Another influential figure behind Freud’s 
thinking was Theodort Meynert (1833-1892), the director of the Psychiatric clinic 
associated with the University Vienna, who had directed Freud’s interest to 
neuroanatomy and its behavioural consequences. Marmer also notes, that Freud had 
derived his interest in the relation between mental structure and function from the 
work of the neurologist Hughlings Jackson. Freud’s method of free association can be 
seen as an application of Jackson’s idea of dynamic associationism and Freud’s 
concept regression can be traced to Jackson’s idea of the maintenance of early 
memories in the brain. Freud’s theory of psychological stages of development can, in 
turn, be traced to Jackson’s evolutionary theories of brain development. The concept 
unconscious, one of Freud’s fundamental concepts in his theory, also has its own and 
long pre-Freudian history.324 Finally, it was Charcot whose work on hysteria and the 
use of hypnosis opened for Freud the path to join his creativity with that of Breuer, a 
path that eventually led to the development of psychoanalytic theory. 
 
To return to Fleck, he considers cognition in general to be the most socially 
conditioned activity of man. Scientific knowledge is, therefore, a social creation and 
the structure of the language scientists use presents a compelling philosophy 
characteristic of that particular scientific community. For Fleck, as for Vygotsky, 
even a single word in a scientific text may represent a complex theory.325  
 
Furthermore, Fleck writes (again in a similar vein to Vygotsky and Ilyenkov) how the 
entire fund of knowledge, as well as the intellectual interaction within the collective, 
are both present in every single act of cognition. In fact, without social conditioning 
any cognition is impossible. The very act of thinking is a social activity that cannot be 
completely localized within the confines of the individual. Scientific activity is not 
merely the summation of individual work but, rather, additive in the emergence of a 
special form of human conduct, as the playing of an orchestra.326 Therefore, Fleck 
maintains, any epistemological theory that does not take this social dependence of all 
cognition into account is inadequate. Indeed, for Fleck the very word cognition 
acquires meaning only in connection with a thought collective.327 
 
To summarise the position of this essay thus far, the problem of the genesis and 
development of a medical concept is insoluble from an individualistic point of view. 
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Conceptual development in medicine must be regarded as a social process. This 
process has no fixed beginning, it is continuous and open-ended. Concepts exist and 
are used in the collective and they are subject to constant revisions. The 
understanding of the object of inquiry for a particular scientific activity and its actual 
performance in research can be resolved into historical sequences of ideas cast into 
concepts belonging to the collective.328 The true creator of a new idea is, thus, not an 
individual but the thought-collective acting in a certain historical situation.329  
 
While Fleck’s approach to the development of science seems more comprehensive 
than Kuhn’s in the way it treats the social nature of scientific process, it leaves the 
question of the nature and role of scientific concepts within that process rather 
unexplored. Now that I have depicted the formative process and the introduction of 
the concept psychosomatic into medical discussion, let us next examine how the 
concept was subsequently treated as a tool for developing medical theory.  
I will delineate the discussion to follow into two periods, starting with the first 
twenty-five years of the Journal and other relevant literature published during that 
period and then trace the fate of the concept psychosomatic to the present day. This 
solution is chosen, first, because by 1964 the main proponents of the concept 
psychosomatic had died (Flanders Dunbar died in 1959 and Franz Alexander and 
Felix Deutsch, who had concentrated on developing the concept conversion during 
the last phase of his theoretical work330, both died in 1964) and were thus no longer 
contributing new openings in the development and the use of the concept. Second, in 
1964 Kaufman and Heiman published the first comprehensive attempt to look back at 
the development of the concept psychosomatic in medicine in their book Evolution of 
Psychosomatic Concepts. Anorexia nervosa: A paradigm331, which will serve as the 
turning point to what follows. 
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Chapter 7 - Psychosomatic theory in the making  
 
Kaufman and Heiman in their 1964 book offer a series of reprinted articles, which 
they consider illustrative of the development of the contemporary understanding of 
what the concept psychosomatic denotes. The editors were members of the Mount 
Sinai Seminar Group, a gathering of physicians at the Institute of Psychiatry at the 
Mount Sinai Hospital, New York, discussing the problems in psychosomatic theory 
using anorexia nervosa as a case in point. The book includes among others papers by 
Freud, Deutsch and Alexander which we have already discussed and also articles 
addressing the problem of anorexia nervosa starting with William Gull’s classic 
accounts of the syndrome in the latter half of the 19th century. I shall return to the 
authors’ conclusions later, but first consider a brief statement in their Introduction 
illustrating the state of the art in the discussions concerning the concept 
psychosomatic in the early 1960s. The editors write, that “in spite of the tremendous 
volume of reports and work that was been done [in the field of psychosomatic 
medicine], or perhaps because of it, there exists a state of confusion which is related 
to many factors”.332 The editors do not, however, analyse the nature of and the 
reasons for this confusion any more profoundly. Since there seemed to be a state of 
theoretical disarray worth mentioning after twenty five years of intensive research in 
the field of psychosomatic medicine let us now attempt to trace what that confusion 
consisted of and what might have been the factors contributing to it in the light of the 
early developments in psychosomatic writing.  
 
To start with, note that the object of the journal Psychosomatic Medicine was, 
according to the Introductory Statement in its first number, to “study in their 
interrelation the psychological and physiological aspects of all normal and abnormal 
bodily functions and thus to integrate somatic therapy and psychotherapy”. 
Methodologically “The pathological phenomena that belong to these different fields 
should be studied from both the physiological and the psychological point of view”.333 
The editors’ theoretical orientation was “to adhere to a unitary conception of medicine 
as an experimental science, to introduce scientific precision into the ‘art’” 
Furthermore, “... medicine is a biological science and…its facts are derived from the 
study of animals as well as of patients.”334 Medicine should, thus, be seen as an 
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empirical biological science where both physiological and psychological studies need 
to be integrated to usher in  a “new era” in medicine, constituting what the editors 
chose to call psychosomatic medicine and what was simultaneously “both a special 
field and an integral part of every medical specialty”.335  
 
It seems that the launching of the Journal was received with some enthusiasm within 
medical circles. In 1943 Ruth Potter, the Executive Secretary to the Journal, wrote to 
Felix Deutsch that the number of subscriptions had more than doubled in four years. 
A steady stream of manuscripts were also submitted to the editors; in 1944 the 
acceptance rate for papers to be published was one in eight.336  
 
Inspired by the favourable reception of the Journal, Dunbar suggested in an editorial 
board meeting in 1942 that a society should be established to take over the 
sponsorship of the Journal. The board of editors and the advisory board could form 
the core of the society and it could be enlarged by “inviting to membership those 
interested physicians and scientists”.  Eventually a letter of invitation was sent to 
“celebrate the inaugural meeting  of the American Society for Research in 
Psychosomatic Problems”. The meeting was held on December 18th in 1942 at the 
Waldorf  in New York City. The membership of the Society was formed on an 
invitation-only basis for those who had demonstrated “a constructive effort in the 
study of psychosomatic medicine” and its presidents were to be chosen to serve for 
one year at a time. In 1944 the sponsorship of the Journal was handed over to the 
Society. 337  
 
During its early years the Journal attracted many authors on their way to international 
fame such as Abraham Maslow338, Thomas Szasz339, Margaret Mead340, Milton H 
Erickson341, Georg Engel342, Benjamin Spock343, Donald Hebb344 and Gregory 
Bateson345, to name a few.  Several established psychoanalysts also contributed to the 
Journal, such as Sandor Rado writing a critical comment on the concept of 
bisexuality346, Helen Deutsch reflecting her psychoanalytic observations347, Otto 
Fenichel discussing the psychopathology of coughing348 and Gotthard Booth using 
Rorschach’s method to examine the relation of organ function and perception of 
form.349 
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Reading through the first volumes of the Journal it appears that the editors were able 
to steer its content as established in the Introductory Statement. There was a strong 
emphasis on empirical studies, as the editors had stressed, and the balance between 
empirical physiological and psychological studies was roughly maintained. There 
were also articles dealing with purely neurophysiological topics such as The 
Hypothalamus: A Review of the Experimental Data 350, The Measurement of 
Individual Differences in Autonomic Balance351 and An Experimental Study of the 
Functions of the frontal Lobes in Man352. It is noteworthy, however, that the concept 
psychosomatic does not appear in any of these or many other papers of the kind. Nor 
do we find the concept in articles dealing with psychophysiological issues such as 
Blood Pressure and Palmar Sweat (Galvanic) Responses of Psychotic Patients before 
and after Insulin and Metrazol Therapy: A Physiological Study of “Resistant” and 
Cooperative Attitudes353 and Electroencephalographic Studies on Three Cases of 
Frontal Lobotomy.354 All these studies lacked theoretical discussions on what the 
concept psychosomatic might imply. There were, however, a few attempts at 
theoretical clarification and development in the first issues of the Journal.  
 
Formulating fundamentals 
 
Three years after the launching of the Journal we read in the editorial of the first 
number of the 1942 volume that “There is a rapidly growing interest in the field of 
Psychosomatic Medicine, and work both in experiment and in development of theory 
and concepts continues unabated.”355 The theoretical discussions concerning “the 
development of theory and concepts” were not so explicit, however, in the material so 
far published in the Journal. In fact, the only paper dealing directly with theoretical 
and conceptual problems embedded in the concept psychosomatic until 1942 was 
Alexander’s article in the first number of the Journal to which reference has already 
been made.  
 
In 1943 Alexander developed his conceptual thinking further in a paper published in 
the Journal entitled Fundamental Concepts of Psychosomatic Research: 
Psychogenesis, Conversion, Specificity356. In his article Alexander returned to the 
definition of what he saw as the basic concepts in psychosomatic thinking. He 
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reminded the readers that in founding the Journal, the editors felt that “in the first 
issue some clear statement should be made about this confusing philosophical [psyche 
versus soma] issue to discourage authors from writing ‘endless discussions on this 
point’”. He then regretted that the Journal was still receiving manuscripts with some 
apologetic attempts to explain that “one should not speak about psychogenesis but of 
the coexistence of certain psychological factors with certain physical symptoms”. 
Alexander held that the question of psychogenesis should be clarified, “stating 
explicitly what is meant by it”. Alexander then wrote that the concept of 
psychogenesis was to be seen as referring to the “physiological processes consisting 
of general excitations in the nervous system which can be studied by psychological 
methods because they are perceived subjectively in the form of emotions, ideas or 
wishes”. It is noteworthy, that when discussing the concept of psychogenesis 
Alexander describes it with purely physiological terms. For Alexander the concept of 
psychogenesis does not, thus, refer to some immaterial psyche affecting the body, but 
to an excited state of a nervous system. This excitation can be studied both with 
physiological and psychological methods to reveal its nature and origins. 
Psychological methods are just another means by which one and same process can be 
studied from different angles. Alexander, however, refrains from reflecting the 
theoretical problems inherent in his position any further. (These problems  will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.) 
 
Since there were no other theoretical openings apart from Alexander’s in the Journal 
in its early years, let us see how the issue was dealt with in books on psychosomatic 
medicine that started to appear in the early 1940s. In 1943 Dunbar published a book 
titled Psychosomatic Diagnosis357, which was a compilation of studies performed 
over a decade at the Cornell Medical Centre in New York City. Dunbar wrote that the 
overall background theory for her studies was organicism, which had emerged in 
biological sciences in the early decades of the twentieth century. This approach 
emphasized, as Dunbar expressed it, “an equilibrium within the organism and of the 
organism in its environment…It has given rise to the term psychosomatic medicine in 
accordance with which psychic and somatic represent two angles of observation from 
which the organismal unit should be studied, two pictures which then should be 
superimposed or viewed stereoscopically”.358 (Dunbar probably coined this metaphor 
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from the View-Master children’s toy which was first introduced in the New York 
World’s Fair in 1939).  For Dunbar this conceptual change replaced the clinical focus 
in medicine from pathological anatomy to functional thinking, where the question is 
not whether a certain illness is due to either physical or psychological factors but, 
rather, to what extent it is physical and psychological.359  
 
In 1943 another book on psychosomatic medicine appeared under the title 
“Psychosomatic Medicine – The Clinical Application of Psychopathology to General 
Medical Problems”360 by Edward Weiss and O. Spurgeon English, who were at the 
time professors of clinical medicine and psychiatry, respectively, at the Temple 
University Medical School in Philadelphia.  
 
The authors open their book with a case history of a young woman who had 
developed a severe and mysterious cluster of symptoms, which the junior physician 
attending (Weiss) had not been able to diagnose or cure. After being bedridden for her 
symptoms for months the patient’s family decided to consult an elderly practitioner 
who had taken care of the patient when she had been a child. The senior physician 
soon realised that the young woman had developed her symptoms once she had been 
informed that her only brother, to whom she had been very close, had decided to 
marry. Once the physician told the patient this she recovered rapidly. A lesson to 
learn for the then junior physician Weiss was that there is more to being ill than just 
the disease.361 
 
As for their theoretical basis the authors wrote, that “no work on psychosomatic 
medicine could have been attempted without the biologically orientated psychology 
of Freud”.362 The authors foresaw that “with this latest development in research all 
medicine tends to become psychosomatic medicine…future textbooks of medicine 
will have to embody this approach”. 363 (Concluding from the fact that the book was 
reprinted four times within a year from its first edition the authors’ optimism was not 
unwarranted.) The authors saw that medicine was entering a new theoretical phase, 
departing from Virchow’s idea that all disease is, ultimately, a disease of a cell. The 
line of reasoning in Virchow’s approach was that cellular disease leads to structural 
alterations in tissues, which cause to physiological or functional disturbances within 
the body. An attempt was  made to reverse this idea in early twentieth century 
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medicine, owing to the formulation of organicistic theory in biology and rapidly 
developing methods and findings in physiology. According to this new line of 
thinking, functional disturbances in a body may lead to cellular disease and, 
eventually, to structural alterations within the body. The problem was, however, what 
causes the functional disturbances. The authors formulated their approach  
 
Psychological disturbance -> Functional impairment -> Cellular disease -> 
Structural alterations”. 364 
 
It follows, according to the authors, that a medical practitioner can no longer focus 
only on the presence or absence of organic disease and in the case of the latter content 
him or herself with assuring the patient that there is nothing really wrong with him or 
her, or to say that whatever symptoms the patient may have, they are merely 
“functional” - even when the symptoms the patient had were most debilitating. The 
approach of “diagnosis by exclusion” of organic impairments needed to be replaced 
with a new diagnostic thinking, where medical history, physical examination and 
laboratory studies were combined with personality studies to draw a fuller picture of 
what is the matter with the patient.  
 
In clinical practice this approach meant, as the authors put it: “If symptoms exist 
without a physical basis or, if physical disease fails to explain the symptoms 
completely, look for their meaning from the standpoint of behavior.”365 (italics 
original) The authors do not, however, explain what they exactly mean by behaviour 
in this context and it seems to fall on observing the clues the patient offers during 
clinical interview. But it is not to be sensitive only to the patient’s behaviour but also 
to the language s/he uses when describing his or her symptoms. The authors write that 
when the patient says, for example, that s/he cannot swallow, that may hold symbolic 
significance denoting his or her life situation where there is something that s/he 
“cannot swallow”.366 A symptom such as this is a an indication that there may, 
following a Freudian approach, be tension of emotional origin which does not find an 
outlet by word or action but pushes its way out through some organ or organ system. 
This the authors call “organ language”, or “symbolism of symptoms”.367 
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In 1948 Alexander published, together with his close associate Thomas Morton 
French of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute, a compendium entitled Studies in 
Psychosomatic Medicine. An Approach to the Cause and Treatment of Vegetative 
Disturbances368, which is a collection of papers published previously in the Journal 
and in psychoanalytic and psychiatric periodicals. In the Introduction the authors 
presented the fundamental theoretical postulates of their approach: 
 
1. “The disturbances of the vegetative functions are the result not of one but 
of a variety of etiological factors, Roughly, two categories of factors can be 
differentiated: organic and psychological. The vulnerability of an organ is 
determined by its hereditary constitution and by the environmental influences 
to which it has been exposed. 
2. Organic factors must be studied and treated by somatic methods and 
emotional factors by psychological methods. 
3. The relative importance of these two sets of factors varies from case to 
case within the same disease entity.  
4. The attempt to single out certain diseases as psychosomatic is erroneus and 
futile. Every disease is psychosomatic because both psychological and 
somatic factors have a part in its cause and influence its course…We use the 
expression ‘psychosomatic’ exclusively as a methodological concept; it is a 
type of approach in medicine: a simultaneous study and treatment of 
psychological and somatic factors in their mutual interrelation. (Italics 
original) 
5. The emotional constellations which contribute to the disturbances of the 
vegetative organs are for the most part specific. It cannot be said that any 
emotion disturbs the function of any organ, but rather that there is an intimate 
affinity between certain emotional states and certain vegetative functions…to 
establish [this] requires…systematic investigations with the help of 
psychoanalytic technique.” 369 
 
As for operational concepts Alexander and Morton divided the influence of 
psychological processes upon the functions of the body into three categories: 1) 
voluntary behaviour which is motivated by goals, 2) expressive innervations which 
discharge phenomena such as weeping, blushing, laughing and which are directed 
solely to relieve and express specific emotional tensions which are not motivated by 
any utilitarian goals as in the case of voluntary behavior, 3) vegetative responses to 
emotional states which are to meet conditions to which the organism is exposed, for 
example, fear that leads to fight or flight.370 
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Disturbances in voluntary behaviour and expressive innervations, such as 
psychoneuroses, behaviour disorders and psychoses, fall into the field of psychiatry, 
whereas the failure in the harmony between emotional states and vegetative responses 
belongs to the borderline between psychiatry and other medical specialities. The focus 
of the book is on these latter phenomena. Alexander writes: “Many vegetative 
disturbances are the result of chronic emotional conflict situations.  If these 
disturbances last long enough they may lead to gross morphological changes (a peptic 
ulcer, irreversible hypertension etc.) in the affected organs.”371 
 
Next year Alexander published another book Psychosomatic Medicine - Its Principles 
and Applications372 which was, in Alexander’s words, “an outgrowth of an earlier 
publication, The Medical Value of Psychoanalysis373, published in 1936. The aim of 
the book was “to describe the basic concepts on which the psychosomatic approach in 
medicine is founded and to present the existing knowledge concerning the influence 
of psychological factors upon the functions of the body and their disturbances”.374 For 
Alexander the basic postulate in this approach is that the psychological processes 
influencing physiological processes must be subjected to the same detailed scrutiny as 
is done in studies on physiological processes. It is not, therefore, enough to refer to 
emotions with general terms only, e.g. anxiety, but to reveal the actual content of the 
emotion with the methods of dynamic psychology and correlate them with 
physiological responses. 375 Furthermore, psychological processes are not, for 
Alexander, any different from other bodily processes. They are physiological 
processes and differ from other bodily phenomena only in that they can be 
subjectively perceived and communicated with other people.376 The psychosomatic 
point of view for Alexander in medicine was, in short, that the human organism is an 
“integrated mechanism”.377  
 
While it was Alexander who seemed to dominate the theoretical thinking of 
psychosomatic medicine within medical circles in the 1940s (to the extent of being 
invited onto a committee that developed the first edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders378) it seems to be Dunbar who sold the idea to 
the general public with her book Mind and Body: Psychosomatic Medicine379 
published in 1947. The book was written in accessible and entertaining language to 
explain to laymen what psychosomatic medicine is all about and immediately became 
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a bestseller. After all, the USA was at the time recovering from the war and many if 
not most Americans were intimately familiar with bodily manifestations of various 
emotional strains, shocks and tensions. Dunbar’s book went through several editions 
and even came out posthumously in an enlarged edition.380 The popularity of 
Dunbar’s book produced spin-offs such as Your Child’s Mind and Body – A Practical 
Guide for Parents381, Your Preteenager’s Mind and Body382 and Your Teenager’s 
Mind and Body383. Owing to its fame among the lay audience we may assume that it 
was Dunbar’s views that shaped the popular American image of what psychosomatic 
medicine was all about and which eventually spread to Europe in the wake of other 
post-war American cultural influence. This makes Dunbar’s book worth examining a 
little more closely even though it makes no pretence of being a work of science.  
 
Dunbar opens her book with catchy lines: “This is a  book about how people become 
patients. It is also a book about how they may get over being patients - when they do - 
and even how they can keep from becoming patients again.”384 There follows a series 
of chapters with poetic titles such as Delayed-Action Mines of Childhood, The 
Hygiene of a Quiet Mind and Half in  Love with …Death, with which Dunbar joins the 
long tradition of American popular writing on health and well-being - a tradition 
which is today probably more flourishing then ever. There is, however, a clear 
theoretical rationale (faithful to Freudian theory) behind her novelistic style, which 
she expresses in the quotation below summarising the basic assumptions underlying 
the psychosomatic thinking in 1940s American medicine: 
 
“This source [of disease] lies in the emotions of the individual, and in some 
obstacle to the efficient operation of those emotions…whose exposition was 
perhaps the greatest work of Sigmund Freud. It may be compared with the 
generally understood laws of physics relating to energy.  
  
In the physical world, we know, no energy is ever lost. It may, however, go 
into other forms than man intended. It may be expressed in terms of heat or 
light or motion or chemical change. Thus a given unit of energy may become 
heat which in turn generates steam which runs an engine which operates 
machinery, and so on to the end of time. If blocked at any point – say at the 
point of generating steam – the unit of energy will not cease to exist; it will 
cause an explosion. 
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In the same way, what we might call emotional energy is never lost. It, too, 
can express itself in a variety of ways, and in some which man does not 
intend and may not even perceive. 
  
But, as Freud was the first to point out in explicit terms, if usual channels of 
emotional discharge are blocked, it will be diverted into others which will 
turn it into a destructive and constricting force. Furthermore, Freud found, the 
amount of emotional energy, the force of its drive, will remain equal to the 
strength of the emotional impulse which originated it. 
  
When the normal channels of emotion are blocked, we call it a repression. 
The emotion, turned from its logical course, will not be expressed, but will 
operate along new lines within the individual’s personality and probably 
without his knowledge. Freud’s great contribution was in explaining this 
process. He traced the emotion along its hidden paths, showing that if it could 
be brought to the surface and given an outlet in speech or action, it served its 
purpose, while it remained buried but still active in the individual’s mind, it 
could be harmful even to his body. Later investigation shows that it creates an 
unbalance in the autonomous nervous system.  
  
Since then we have learned that it can be more harmful than most of Freud’s 
early admirers realized, although Freud himself recognized the implications 
of his discoveries in the physical as well as the emotional aspects of the 
human organism. The repressed emotional energy may very well transform 
itself into symptoms of physical illness.  
  
Everyone has experienced in himself the changes of temperature or the 
rapidly altered operation of the sweat glands which result from a strong 
emotional stimulus. Most of us do not feel so acutely the chemical changes 
within ourselves under the same circumstances. Enough of these experiences, 
however, if they are turned out of their normal channels of action and talk, 
can add up to an internal physical change of the kind called an illness.  
  
A neglected machine gets to the point where it is no longer an efficient 
transformer of energy. Such a machine may soon be beyond repair. The 
human emotional system can lose its efficiency in transforming emotional 
energy into desirable uses. If neglected or abused for too long, it too can 
suffer  beyond repair.”385 
 
Dunbar’s language is tempting in its everyday tone and in its common sense logic. 
There are deeper layers to be discerned, however. For Dunbar the origin of illness 
resides in childhood. An infant is a Lockean tabula rasa “…as sensitive as an 
unexposed photographic plate – and just as capable of discrimination…He begins to 
be able to incorporate the experience of others into his own body of knowledge.”386 
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As a consequence even “the youngest infant can be infected with fear or anger or 
disgust or horror even more easily than with measles…They appear in little, homely 
ways long before they develop into major tragedies.”387 In the aftermath of the World 
War II Dunbar chooses to use a metaphor “delayed-action mines of childhood” when 
discussing the effects of negative childhood experiences to one’s health in later life: 
  
“…the harvest of childhood’s experiences may be repeated years later and 
turn out to be the fundamental or contributing cause of an illness which has 
no surface connection with the patient’s past. These are the delayed-action 
mines  of childhood, planted either in the shock of some single incident or in 
the steady friction of a conflict between mind and environment. Once these 
mines  have been planted, they may become covered over with a thick, hard 
crust of oblivion, but they never cease to be dangerous unless the fuses can be 
drawn.”388 
 
And the fuses can be drawn: 
 
“Somewhere along the line emotional energy has been diverted from its 
proper channel in the patient. The way out…at this point consists in finding 
the obstacle which blocked adequate expression of the patient’s emotions. In 
so doing, the physician removes the cause of the bodily ailment as well. This, 
in brief, is the aim and purpose of psychosomatic treatment.”389 
 
While popularising the Freudian concepts Dunbar nourishes the still thriving idea 
among the general public that “the mother is to blame”, as, for example, in the case of 
asthma: 
 
“There is a special pattern of mother-child relationship which seems quite 
constant in asthma cases, and also seems to be related to the nature of the 
disease…Asthma may be substituted to weeping…the child is not sure of his 
place in the mother’s life.” 390 
 
Furthermore, adding sex to the problem:  
 
“…one of their [asthmatics’] most common difficulties is a sexual problem, 
often very closely related to the maternal…Their usual fear is that any 
expression of their [sexual] curiosity or any attempt to gratify the temptation 
will cause them to lose the maternal care of affection. As a rule, the mother 
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has contributed to this by completely avoiding talk of sex with the child or 
else making it appear shameful or evil or at best somewhat dirty.” 391 
 
Another strong message to deliver for the general audience was, again a still 
flourishing idea, that in cases where there is no manifest organic pathology to be 
found explaining a patient’s symptoms, “it is all in the mind”. Dunbar uses fresh 
experiences in military medicine to prove a point when she writes how 
 
“The anxieties of some of these young officers affected the nerves in much 
the same way as a power dive. The result was a lack of oxygen for the retina, 
and a failure of vision... There is apparently some connection between the 
senses and the emotion which stems from the fact that all experience is 
gained through the senses. This connection is a factor in the selection of one 
of the senses when a bodily disorder seems necessary for the relief of the 
mind…The cause of the headache was in the mind, not in the eye..”392 
 
We may summarise, at this point, that there seemed to be genuine enthusiasm within 
American medicine in the 1940s to explore the mind-body problem under the concept 
of psychosomatic medicine. It is noteworthy, however, that there seemed to be little 
or no critical discussion of the theoretical formulations in the first wave of 
psychosomatic writing. If there were any - and there must have been - they did not 
find their way to the Journal in that decade. After all, the basic theoretical problem in 
psychosomatic medicine, dualism vs. monism, could not have been thrown away with 
statements such as those presented by Dunbar in the book quoted above: 
 
“The psychosomatic techniques of modern medicine help guide them toward 
the achievement of sound minds in sound bodies by recognising the fact that 
a human being consists of mind and body, now and forever, one and 
indivisible”. 393(italics original) 
 
To write in one sentence “mind and body” and to claim that they are “one and 
indivisible” is, to say the least, problematic. However, before moving to the critique 
of these formulations, a critique that was raising its head from the very outset of 
planning the Journal but which found its way into its pages only in the1950s, we 
make brief excursion to see how the concept psychosomatic was received abroad after 
its introduction to US medical circles. 
 
 128 
A concept goes abroad 
 
Psychosomatic as a concept was not confined to the USA since the psychosomatic 
approach in medicine also attracted attention in post-war Western Europe and Japan 
and also in many of the then-communist East European countries.  
 
In Britain, a Scottish physician, James Halliday, had already published an article in 
the British Medical Journal in 1938 entitled The rising incidence of psychosomatic 
illness394. Halliday had been inspired by Dunbar’s 1935 book while working as an 
intern on surgical and internal wards in Britain. He developed his ideas on 
psychosomatic medicine further in 1943 an article Principles of etiology published in 
the British Journal of Medicine and Psychiatry 395. In the same year he published 
another paper in the Lancet entitled The concept of psychosomatic affection396 and 
two years later he also made an appearance in the Journal with an article The 
Incidence of Psychosomatic Affections in Britain397. However, it was only after the 
World War II that psychosomatic medicine gained a foothold in Western Europe to 
the extent that there was enough momentum to arrange the first European meeting, 
held at Maudsley Hospital, London, in April 1955. In the following year the UK 
based Society of Psychosomatic Research was established together with the Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research with Dr. Denis Leigh as its Editor-in-Chief. The journal 
attracted writers from many European countries and also from the USA. In the 
editorial of the first number of the journal we read familiar lines:  
 
“Psychosomatic medicine has as its objective the understanding of man, 
neither as an exclusively physical nor as an exclusive psychic being, but as an 
integrated totality. The term psychosomatic medicine is not altogether 
satisfactory, as it connotes a duality of body and mind rather than a body-
mind  unity. As yet, no satisfactory alternative term has been generally 
accepted to denote the modern conception of the field of psychosomatic 
medicine as comprising both body-mind unity and the organism-environment 
continuum…  The paucity of factual knowledge concerning the interaction 
between psyche and soma in health and disease is the more conspicuous now 
because, as a  result of the intensive work of the past half-century, our 
knowledge in both the psychic and somatic field has grown and deepened so 
considerably…The conviction that a suitable methodology is the first 
prerequisite for further advances in psychosomatic medicine in its present 
stage of development, is one of the main reasons why the editors have started 
this new journal and  named it a journal of research”.398 
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Following the outline above, the Journal filled its pages exclusively with research 
reports. (The only exception was Georg Engel’s visiting lecture in London on 
conceptual problems in psychosomatic medicine published in 1967399).  
 
As we have seen in the foregoing, the early development of what was to become 
psychosomatic medicine has its intellectual roots in German medical and psychiatric 
thinking. In the 1930s many eminent German physicians, psychiatrists and 
psychoanalysts, of whom a considerable number had a Jewish background, fled the 
Nazi regime and emigrated to the USA bringing with them the intellectual seeds that 
ripened into what was to be American psychosomatic medicine. There developed, 
however, a psychosomatic strand of medicine of its own in the post-war Federal 
Republic of Germany. It seems, however, that the concept psychosomatic was coined 
for German medicine as a return mail from the USA after the war. The subsequent 
German approach to the psychosomatic issues built on the idea of consultation-liaison 
psychiatry (i.e. psychiatrists consultating general medical and surgical patients with 
psychological problems) that had developed in the USA. In 1950s the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Psychotherapie und Tiefenpsychologie (German Society for 
Psychotherapy and In-Depth Psychology) was renamed as the Deutschen Gesellschaft 
für Psychotherapie, -Psychosomatik und Tiefenpsychologie (German Society for 
Psychotherapy, Psychosomatics and In-Depth Psychology).400 In 1974 the Deutsches 
Kollegium für Psychosomatische Medizin (German College of Psychosomatic 
Medicine) was established and it still publishes the journal Psychotherapie, 
Psychosomatik, Medizinische Psychologie. As the title suggests, the focus is on 
psychotherapy rather than on psychophysiological studies. This is apparent in the 
German psychosomatic literature as a whole, where the theoretical rationale has 
retained its psychoanalytic basis.401 For example, the 2009 edition of 
Psychosomatische Medizin by Klussmann402 uses psychoanalytic concepts as its 
background theory when discussing consultation-liaison issues in general medicine.  
 
Psychosomatic medicine also gained a foothold in post-war Japan as a part of 
American cultural export. In Japan, too, the approach developed towards the 
consultation-liaison stream of psychosomatic thinking. The Japanese Society of 
Psychosomatic Medicine was established in 1959 and the first chair in the discipline 
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was established at the University of Kyushu in 1963 under the concept Shinryou-
naika meaning, literally, psychotherapeutic internal medicine.403 
 
Owing to the political tensions of the Soviet era, psychoanalysis was not officially in 
favour in any of the post-war Eastern European countries under communist regimes 
(even though the translation of Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams into Russian in 1904 
had been the first translation of Freud into any foreign language and was thus well 
known among Russian psychologists and psychiatrists). The situation became 
temporarily more relaxed in the Soviet block during the Khrushcev’s regime (1953-
1964) and several research projects were conducted in the USSR and other Soviet 
countries in the 1950s under the concept of corticovisceral physiology. 
 
In 1964 an International Symposium on Corticovisceral Physiology, Pathology and 
Therapy was held in East Berlin together with Western researchers, among them E. 
Wittkower from Canada. In his presentation he stated that the difference between the 
Soviet and American approaches to psychosomatic studies was that when the latter 
ask why-questions on psychosomatic phenomena, the corticovisceral research 
presents how-questions on the mediating mechanisms between the brain and the rest 
of the body. Furthermore, while the Soviet approach was implemented mainly in 
laboratories experimenting with animals, American psychosomatists concentrated on 
humans in clinical settings. Yet, for Wittkower, clinical studies could be as scientific 
as laboratory experiments: why “listening to a patient should be less scientific than 
looking at him and recording biological reactions”.404  
 
To the best of my knowledge the first book written on psychosomatic medicine in any 
Scandinavian language appeared in Swedish in 1953 under the title Psykosomatisk 
medicin.405 The author, a Danish psychiatrist, Paul J. Reiter, presented his book as an 
introduction to the subject and followed rather faithfully the psychoanalytic 
conception of what the concept psychosomatic implied. The first appearance of the 
term psychosomatic in Finnish medical discussions I have been able to trace is in an 
entry in the minutes of a meeting held in the Duodecim medical society in Helsinki on 
20th April in 1950, where a panel discussion was conducted under the title 
Psykosomaattinen yhteys (the psychosomatic connection). Next year the term was 
 131 
mentioned in a review article on chronic gastritis presenting the idea of anxiety as a 
possible cause for changes in the gastric mucosa.406 
 
Despite the increasing international exchange of ideas between the researchers within 
the field of psychosomatic medicine, the theoretical momentum stayed firmly within 
the American medical community and especially the Society and the Journal. We now 
return to the USA and examine the criticism emerging on the conceptual foundations 
of psychosomatic medicine.  
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Chapter 8 - Fundamentals questioned 
 
Introducing the concept psychosomatic into medicine was not received with 
unqualified enthusiasism and even the early advocates of the concept were aware of 
the problems inherent in it. As Alexander wrote in his introductory essay in the first 
number of the Journal, the notion psychosomatic medicine “is not most fortunate 
because it may imply a dichotomy between psyche and body (soma).” He then 
attempted to overcome this dichotomy by suggesting that if  “we understand psychic 
phenomena as nothing but the subjective aspect of certain bodily (brain) processes 
this dichotomy disappears”. 407 Prior to its publication Alexander’s paper was 
reviewed by Howard Liddell who pointed out that one cannot escape the mind-body 
problem by simply denying it. 408 Stanley Cobb had, in turn, reviewed the editorial for 
the same number of the Journal. He wrote in a pencil the word “awkward” in the 
margin of the manuscript (stored in the Archive) indicating the sentence  “Emphasis is 
put on the thesis that there is no logical distinction between “mind and body”, 
physical and mental”.409 When the editors stated that the Journal was not “concerned 
with the metaphysics of the mind-body problem”, it seems that Liddel and Cobb were 
more sensitive to ontological issues in the psychosomatic approach in medicine.  
 
Since no papers were published in the first volumes of the Journal on any 
“metaphysical questions” we may try gain a glimpse of the debates taking place 
behind the scenes through some preserved correspondence between the editors of the 
Journal. In a letter to Dunbar of December 27, 1940, on rejecting a submitted 
manuscript The Use of Psychological Tests in the Evaluation of Intellectual Function 
Following Head Injury, Cobb addresses the conceptual ambiguities in using the term 
psychosomatic in medicine: 
 
“…if we accept this, we are making a precedent of accepting all 
psychological papers that have anything to do with a lesion of the brain. That 
in my mind is not the meaning of ‘psychosomatic medicine’. At the meeting 
of the new society the other morning it was interesting to hear the varied use 
of the word ‘psychosomatic’. I believe that we ought to define exactly how 
we mean to use it. It is apparently used by some to mean only the skeletal and 
muscular system, whereas others use it to mean the former plus all the 
viscera. I do not know of anybody who looks on the brain as an organ to 
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which is applied to word ‘somatic’…’Organic impairment of intellectual 
function’ is simply misuse of words. An impairment of function may be due 
to a lesion of the organ, but the impairment of the function cannot be 
‘organic’. We must keep this sort of confused thinking out of our journal 
especially.”410 (underlinings original) 
 
Alexander, in turn, seemed not to worry too much about theoretical controversies, as 
he expressed in a letter to Dunbar in November 21, 1942 
 
“…I think that the merit of our Psychosomatic Society and Journal is that it 
has a great integrative effect. It includes representatives of different schools 
of thought and methods who are interested in the same problem – that of 
psychosomatic medicine.”  
 
To give yet another glimpse of the debates behind the scenes we may quote a 
memorandum of a discussion between Dr. Dana W. Atchley and Miss Ruth Potter 
dated February 16, 1944 where the former is recorded as saying that 
 
“…the term “Psychosomatic Medicine” has been used as a stimulative phrase 
and that it has no justification in itself…psychosomatic medicine actually is 
internal medicine…to speak of PM as if it were a branch of IM just doesn’t 
go. PM is a term used as propaganda for the purpose of stimulating 
interest…many people have worked for years and years from the PM 
approach but they have never given it a fancy name…the problem is a great 
one and should be handled carefully.”411 
 
Reading the early issues of the Journal it is obvious, however, that whatever 
theoretical debates there were concerning the development of theory and concepts of 
psychosomatic medicine, they did not reach its pages. The published papers did 
concern themselves with presenting empirical studies where physiological 
measurements of various bodily processes were correlated with psychological 
evaluations. As a background to this correlative approach we may note that by the 
1940s physiology had made remarkable progress in developing methods to measure 
changes in many bodily processes such as electric activity in the heart muscle 
(electrocardiogram), brain (electroencephalogram) and skin (galvanic skin responses). 
Measuring clinical variables such as blood pressure and body temperature was 
everyday routine. Rapidly expanding knowledge of hormonal processes also offered a 
whole new approach to understanding the human body in health and illness. A 
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common denominator for all these was that they shared the same theoretical and 
methodological basis in physiology, which was, in turn, based on chemistry, 
biochemistry and physics. While the soma could be approached in a theoretically and 
methodologically coherent way the problem resided in exploring the psyche. 
 
Three psychologies 
 
Psychology as a science had developed in the latter half of the 19th century, emerging 
in Germany first as psychophysiology, where the object of inquiry was to find ways to 
analyse and correlate mental processes such as perception with the workings of the 
nervous system. That line of inquiry led to the quest to create a sound conceptual and 
methodological apparatus to evaluate subjective responses in relation to physical 
phenomena observed in the brain or peripheral nerves. As Franz Alexander had been 
trained in Europe, first as a physician and then as a psychiatrist during the formative 
years of psychology as an independent discipline, he was well informed about that 
world, as seen in a review he wrote on an article submitted to the Journal in 1938: 
 
“The  question of the possibility and desirability of translating psychological 
phenomena into the language of brain physiology was a characteristic point 
of discussion in nineteenth century German philosophy. It  seems to us that 
recently the answer to this question has crystallized itself in the belief that the 
psychological content (personal emotional relationships and intellectual 
processes) will always be better understood in the language of psychology, 
even when they are more precisely correlated to brain processes. It is difficult 
to imagine that the intricate logical procedures which lead to the solution of a 
chess puzzle will ever be more adequately described in terms of physical 
chemistry or neuropsychology than in terms of those logical steps which lead 
to the solution. The same is true for the description of the intricate emotional 
processes which take place when a person laughs, hearing an anecdote, or 
weeps in the theatre…the importance and desirability of correlating 
psychological with neurophysiological processes, is obvious.”412 
 
At the time of the writing the above the problem of correlating “psychological with 
neurophysiological processes” lay in how to gain knowledge of psychological 
phenomena to have something to correlate with physiological processes. Part of that 
problem was that in the 1930s American psychology was dominated by three rival 
and seemingly incompatible psychological schools, psychoanalysis, behaviourism and 
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animal psychology. The first had its own distinct theory and vocabulary, the second 
denied the possibility of gaining any direct knowledge of the psyche and 
concentrated, therefore, on observing behaviour, and the third attempted to gain 
understanding on the workings of the mind by experimenting with animals. The 
question was, how are these to be reconciled and brought under the heading 
psychosomatic in a theoretically productive way. Or should some of these approaches 
perhaps be chosen to substantiate psychosomatic research on the part of the psyche, as 
done by Alexander and Dunbar in their attempt to apply psychoanalysis as the tool to 
understand man’s mind in relation to body? 
 
A quest for conceptual clarity 
 
Despite the ambiguities in addressing man’s psyche in psychosomatic relation there 
were only a few attempts in the Journal during its early years to address this basic 
conceptual problem in psychosomatic theory. The conceptual diversity in medicine in 
general was discussed by Caughey in an article titled Cardiovascular Neurosis - 
Review in the second number of the first volume of the Journal. Caughey listed 
concepts that were commonly used in medicine to denote patients’ cardiac 
complaints, while there was no organic pathology to be found in their hearts or 
vessels. Among these we find terms such as cardiac psychoneurosis, irritable heart, 
disordered action of the heart, effort syndrome, neurocirculatory asthenia, all referring 
to more or less the same phenomena. (One may add to Caughey’s list concepts such 
as Da Costa syndrome, neurocirculatory dystonia and soldier’s heart, all of which still 
occur in the medical literature of our day.) For Caughey the question was whether 
these terms could be grouped under and dealt with one concept cardiovascular 
neurosis. The advantage of this solution would be, Caughey argued, that it 
emphasised the “dual nature of the problem, the cardiovascular component related to 
clinical medicine, and the neurosis component beyond the scope of a purely 
physiological analysis.”413  
 
Although the concept emotion held a central role in psychosomatic theorizing, there 
was only a single attempt in the Journal during its first decade to ascertain what was 
actually meant by the concept in psychosomatic theory or, for that matter, in medicine 
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in general. In 1945 Nina Bull, a then Research Associate in Psychiatry at Columbia 
University New York, took the “time-honoured partition” of dividing emotion into 
feeling (affect) and expression (behaviour) as her starting point in an article published 
in the Journal. 414 She argued that the “misconceptions and incomplete conceptions of 
emotion are not all due…to the vagueness with which the term ‘expression’ [of 
emotion] has been used, both by psychologists and people generally”.  Rather, the 
problem was a matter of how the sequence from emotion to its expression can be 
conceptualised to offer a concrete basis for examining how inner conflicts may lead to 
psychosomatic symptoms. Bull’s paper did not, however, lead to any further 
discussions on this fundamental question for psychosomatic medicine on the pages of 
the Journal.  
 
In 1941 Lawrence Kubie of the Department of Neuropsychiatry, Mount Sinai 
Hospital, New York, published an article in the Journal discussing  the ambiguous use 
of the concept anxiety in medical literature.415 Kubie wrote how in the everyday use 
the term anxiety denotes an emotional state irrespective of the circumstances that 
evoke it. In psychoanalytic theory the concept anxiety was used, however, in at least 
three different meanings, a symptom, a basic psychic force and a disease process. 
Kubie found this broad usage of the concept as confusing and distorting as if the 
concept fever were used in many different meanings in medicine.  
 
The problem in using ill-defined concepts in psychosomatic theory was discussed by 
Paul in his paper Implications of General Semantics for Psychosomatic Medicine, 
published in the Journal in 1945.416 Paul wrote how “psychosomatic medicine lacks 
psychosomatic terms. In reporting psychosomatic phenomena, there is the problem of 
‘how to say it’”. He then offered a solution whereby general semantics may help 
psychosomatic researchers to find and analyse a proper theoretical vocabulary to 
address their object of inquiry in a theoretically coherent manner. In the same number 
of the Journal Squier suggested that one might try to solve the conceptual problems in 
using the term psychosomatic medicine by replacing it with the term integral 
medicine. This conceptual replacement, Squier asserted, might help physicians to rid 
themselves of the dichotomising thinking that is burdening the term psychosomatic.417 
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None of the few openings described above developed into any full-scale debates on 
conceptual issues in psychosomatic medicine in the Journal in its early years. In 1947, 
however, after stormy internal conflicts between the Society and the Journal as to how 
to divide finances and gain control, Dunbar was voted out of her post as editor-in-
chief and her involvement with the Journal ceased. (The events and reasons leading to 
this coup are discussed in detail by Levenson418 and need not concern us in this 
essay.) Carl Binger, then an Associate Professor in Clinical Psychiatry at Cornell 
Medical College, New York City, was appointed as the new Editor-in-Chief. In the 
March-April 1948 number an editorial note outlined the future policy of the Journal: 
  
“In general, the Editors have little patience with rehashes of an obviously 
popular and propagandistic nature. The ‘patient as a whole’ theme has been 
sung long enough. Criteria for selection of manuscripts have emphasized 
originality, tightness of argument, careful documentation of facts, evidence, 
and sound logical inference…In our view the content of psychosomatic 
medicine should be greatly widened. We should try to go beyond the ulcer, 
hypertension, asthma round. We should try to get away from too exclusive an 
emphasis on etiology and so-called psychogenesis. Anything that relates 
physiological and psychological phenomena seems to us germane. Well 
documented observations of the association of phenomena in these two 
realms would appear to be a rich source of information and might contain 
guides for initiating new investigations.”419 (italics original)  
 
As the foregoing demonstrates, the Journal clung to the policy of avoiding theoretical 
manuscripts and in the issues to follow there appeared practically no papers dealing 
with conceptual issues. The main trends in the papers published so far had been 
building the psychosomatic theory on the basis of psychoanalytic observations and 
correlating physiological measures with psychological test results without any more 
profound theoretical concerns. The Freudian approach had, in turn, divided into two 
main approaches, Dunbar’s emphasis on the connection of certain personality traits 
with certain diseases and Alexander’s argument that the connection is not in the 
structure of the personality but in specific emotions regardless of the overall 
personality.  
 
In 1950 Lhamon and Saul came to the defence of the latter approach in a short paper 
A Note on Psychosomatic Correlations.420 They noted how the research conducted 
before the advent of psychoanalysis had been  able to observe correlations between 
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emotional tensions and organic symptoms. In those studies the focus had been on 
constitutional and hereditary factors such as pyknic build disposed to hypertension 
and manic-depressive illness, whereas asthenic build was seen as prone to 
tuberculosis and schizophrenia. Among those early writers personality was seen as an 
entity and organic symptoms were correlated with the whole personality or 
personality profile. It was Freud, the authors argued, who was able to shed light on 
the deeper structure and function of man’s mind and offer tools to differentiate 
between the different layers and workings of the psyche. In light of Freud’s theory it 
is not the personality type which correlates with certain organic symptoms, such as 
duodenal ulcers, but a specific emotional force such as a frustrated longing for love 
which acts as a stimulus to the stomach. If that tension goes long enough unsolved, a 
disease ensues. Such a situation may occur in any individual regardless of the 
personality profile. Therefore, the shift of emphasis in psychosomatic studies is from 
the personality as an entity to specific emotions which may disturb the normal 
physiological functioning to the extent of causing structural changes in the body. The 
authors held that  recognising specific emotional functions would help to narrow the 
gap between physiological and psychological data.  
 
Dunbar’s idea of a specific personality as a cause of illnesses was, thus, rejected in 
favour of Alexander’s theory. While Dunbar’s ideas became immensely popular 
among the public through her books, there was no room in the Journal for further 
development of her theoretical postulates and she made no more contributions.  (The 
enlarged fourth edition of her 1935 book in 1954 was reprinted in 1976 in the series 
of Classics in Psychiatry. Dunbar died in 1959. ) 
 
Despite the editorial policy of focusing on empirical studies relating psychological 
and physiological phenomena “germane” to the Journal, occasional papers started to 
appear questioning the psychosomatic thinking of the time. In 1952 two articles were 
published in the same number of the Journal discussing conceptual problems in 
psychosomatic medicine. John Benjamin acknowledged in his article Directions and 
Problems in Psychiatric Research421 that there was increasing exchange of ideas 
between those involved in scientific research and those specialising in the philosophy 
of science. This did not concern only those working in the mature sciences such as 
physics but also those in newer sciences such as biology and psychology. For 
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Benjamin it was not necessary for a scientist to be concerned with the problems of 
philosophy. That is, one may pursue sound scientific research without reflecting on 
the formal philosophical background of one’s work. Yet, Benjamin noted, every 
scientist faces philosophical issues, such as the basic assumptions in the research 
programme, their meaning and logic. This is especially the case in psychiatric and 
psychological research owing to their interest in the total personality with its wide-
ranging biological, social, anthropological etc. dimensions. 
 
Following the tradition of American pragmatism, Benjamin claimed that a scientific 
concept is to be judged primarily by its usefulness. This led to the question, whether 
the concept total personality was useful as applied in psychosomatic research. From 
the point of view of applied medical science it had proven its value by helping to 
emphasise the emotional and physical factors in all illness in medical practice as well 
as in medical education. Benjamin concluded that whatever problems there had been 
with the concept of total personality, they had arisen not because the concept itself 
had been “fuzzy” but from its fuzzy usage in the medical literature. To clarify the 
situation Benjamin proposed an approach based on the newly inaugurated general 
systems theory. (Bertalanffy had published An Outline for General Systems Theory in 
the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science two years prior to Benjamin’s 
paper.422)   
 
Benjamin postulated that different levels of integrated organizations had emerged in 
the course of evolution. The properties of those layers cannot be fully understood or 
explained in terms of their parts alone since their structural organization affects the 
way they function. It follows that each organization must be studied by methods 
appropriate to it, and to it only, and not to any organizational levels below it. For 
example, in social psychology the behaviour of groups cannot be reduced to the sum 
of the behaviour of individual members. Yet, the study of an individual’s 
psychological function is incomplete without considering the individual as a part of 
the group in which s/he functions. Therefore, the “person-as-a-whole” must also be 
studied as a “person-as-a-part”.  
 
Benjamin acknowledged that we cannot hope to explain or understand a person or a 
patient “fully”. Our explanations depend, inevitably, on the explanatory system we 
 140 
choose to use. In psychiatry one might assume, for example, that all mental diseases 
are diseases of the brain. One might alternatively assume that mental derangements 
are psychogenic and that they can be explained by reducing them to psychological 
processes. Benjamin held, however, that it is absurd to try to reduce clinical problems 
to any single cause, since there are endless chains of events and conditions where one 
may try to pinpoint the cause for the rest that follows. Such points are always 
arbitrary. Therefore, we cannot speak of psychogenesis in medicine as if it could fully 
explain the illness under investigation. Instead, we need to accept the idea of multiple 
causation when attempting to understand the problems of health and illness. This does 
not mean, however, that psychic events could not affect a patient’s condition. The 
total personality concept can be used to deal with the psychological level of 
organization independently and to construct a non-reductionistic science of 
psychology. It also justifies efforts to study the interactions of psychological level 
with other levels of reality. 
 
Benjamin’s paper was subtitled as Special Article and included no bibliography, 
indicating that it was a requested article. Benjamin’s opening was not, however, a 
random event. At time of the publication of his paper the ideas promoted by Benjamin 
were much discussed in the USA. For example, the Josiah M. Macy Foundation had 
initiated and financed a series of conferences 1946-1953423 to develop new 
foundations for a general science of the human mind. The meetings were held on an 
invitation-only basis for leading American scientists active in fields of inquiry 
relevant to that initiative. Among those attending were the anthropologists Gregory 
Bateson and Margaret Mead and the psychiatrists Kurt Lewin and Lawrence Kubie, 
all of whom also published in the Journal. Benjamin is not mentioned in the list of 
participants of the conferences but his writing suggests, that he was well versed in the 
general development in the field.  
 
Following Benjamin’s article in the same number of the Journal Abraham Wikler 
discussed the problem of a monistic vs. dualistic approach in psychiatric theory424. 
For Wikler, the then current approach in psychiatry to mental disorders was dualistic 
in essence even though it was often argued that mind and body were not separable but 
form a single unit. This ambiguity in psychiatric theory formation resided, for Wikler, 
in poorly defined basic concepts such as psychic, functional and organic. In an 
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attempt to clarify the issue Wikler offered an approach to a monistic concept of the 
mind-body problem based on Spinoza’s philosophy, where the universe is seen as an 
indivisible whole, substance, which possesses an infinite number of attributes. Man, 
like other objects in the universe, is another mode of  those attributes. Concepts such 
as mind and body are frames of references used by Man. From the point of view of 
Spinoza’s theory these concepts do not imply dualism since the unity of Substance is 
retained.  
 
The implication for psychiatry in this approach is, for Wikler, that no frame of 
reference dealing with attributes is any more fundamental than any other and, this 
being so, they are not reducible to each other. It follows that using concepts derived 
from one theoretical system to evaluate data obtained by using another frame of 
reference, will only lead to confusion. For example, data derived from Rorschach 
testing cannot be claimed to define a person as schizophrenic since the definition of 
schizophrenia is clinical and based on another frame of reference. An EEG reading 
cannot be interpreted as epileptic since the concept epilepsy is derived from a set of 
clinical findings apart from any laboratory measurements. Likewise, one cannot test 
the validity of, say, psychoanalytic concepts such as id or ego by biochemical 
methods. The truth or validity of any theory is to be evaluated only by its degree of 
internal consistency and its capability to predict the future course of events.  
 
Wikler concurred with Benjamin when he wrote that when determining the aetiology 
of any medical condition it is futile to try to find the cause for any of them since there 
is no objective point in any chain of events that we could name as The Cause without 
omitting other factors influencing the process, whether within the organism or in its 
environment in the course of time. Therefore, we cannot say that any illness is 
psychogenic. Wikler emphasized, that if we choose to speak of psychosomatic 
illnesses it should be made clear that the term does not imply any reference to the 
aetiology of that particular condition. To call a condition psychic or  physiological is 
only to use a certain theoretical frame of reference to address a phenomenon. Wikler 
comes to the conclusion that treatment in psychiatry must be pragmatic since there are 
many frames of reference within which a condition can be described and none of 
them can empty the attributes of a phenomenon into its own conceptual framework. 
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Therefore, a multiple choice of treatments needs to be applied to restore the function 
of the organism to be able to perform in its environment. 
 
Two years later, in 1954, Georg Engel drew attention in the Journal to the fact that 
while many if not most of those active in the field of psychosomatic medicine were 
ready to affirm that “all diseases are psychosomatic”, that seemed not to be reflected 
in the selection of diseases actually examined and papers published from the 
psychosomatic point of view.425 Furthermore, in many of the papers published the 
term psychosomatic was equated with the term psychogenic. Those committed to 
discussing diseases of alleged psychogenic origin omitted cases presenting gross 
organic pathology such as malignant tumours. With the latter the interest was on a 
reverse process: the influence of cancer upon the patients’ psyche. Engel observed 
further, how the psychosomatic field had followed certain theoretical approaches in 
physiology, most notably Cannon’s emergency theory, Pavlov’s conditioned reflex 
physiology and the general adaptation syndrome proposed by Selye. On the 
psychological side psychosomatists had drawn heavily on Freudian concepts and 
ideas when addressing the psychological phenomena observed in the patients 
investigated. The problem in the contemporary state of research resided, for Engel, in 
the fact that there was no physiological theory as yet to be linked to fundamental 
psychological concepts such as mother-infant symbiotic unit, object relations, grief, 
separation etc. It followed, that there was much physiological speculation to be found 
in the literature published thus far with only few facts or theoretically fruitful 
approaches to follow.  
 
In the early 1950’s critical voices were also raised in the books published on 
psychosomatic issues. In 1953 Roy Grinker, a Director of the Institute for 
Psychosomatic Research and Training in Chicago, published a critical review on then 
prevailing ideas on psychosomatic medicine entitled Psychosomatic Research.426 In 
his book he acknowledged how the term psychosomatic medicine had become a part 
of the vocabulary for physicians and spread to the laity within a decade. (He assumed 
that this rapid acceptance of psychosomatic concepts was partly owing to the dire 
experiences for millions of men and women in the World War II). He then noted, that 
“little as we may now wish to preserve the word ‘psychosomatic’, which calls 
attention to, rather than denying, mind-body dichotomy, wide usage forces us to 
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preserve it as a symbol of contemporary concepts pertaining to transactions among 
psychological systems.” For Grinker the term psychosomatic denoted a conceptual 
approach to the relationship between psychology and physiology rather than to any 
new physiological or physiological theories. 
 
Grinker’s main criticism of the contemporary psychosomatic studies was aimed partly 
at their often poor experimental quality. He noted how, for example, in Dunbar’s 
studies the material on which she had drawn her conclusions was not properly 
checked against a large group of healthier subjects or against sufferers from other 
psychosomatic syndromes.427 On the other hand, many of the studies published had 
derived from the specialist interest of the researchers and the correlative studies were 
made without any coherent theoretical background assumptions. Grinker noted how 
“the theoretical formulations have arisen secondarily and therefore do not give the 
researcher or his readers a sense of completeness or adequacy…What is 
criticizable…is the failure of the investigators, working especially with unitary 
comprehensive concepts called psychosomatic, to identify their position and purposes 
as observers in relation to defined objects of study.”428 
 
Grinker concluded that it might have been better to use the term behavioral science 
from the very dawn of the field of inquiry, instead of coining the term psychosomatic 
to denote a comprehensive approach to medical problems. On the whole, as Grinker 
wrote in the second edition of his book in 1961, “psychosomatic correlations in 
specific  diseases were premature, and…greater knowledge concerning the general 
laws of psychophysiology should first be acquired from observations and 
experiments.”429 
 
To give yet another example of the critical discussion emerging within the field of 
psychosomatic medicine in the early 1950s, let us consider a book Recent 
Developments in Psychosomatic Medicine430 by Wittkower and Cleghorn, both 
professors of psychiatry at the McGill University, Canada. In their book the authors 
attempted to present a state-of-the-art summary of the activities in the field as they 
saw it. In the Foreword Ewen Cameron, Chairman of Psychiatry at the McGill wrote: 
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“Psychosomatic medicine is now being structuralized; it is old enough to 
have a history and to show signs of organization, so that some men can work 
on basic concepts, others on experimental techniques, and still others can pass 
from particular topics to general ones such as the specificity of 
psychosomatic process. As it comes of age and attains maturity and validity, 
psychosomatic medicine is becoming incorporated into the general body of 
medical knowledge available, as is our storehouse of facts concerning 
bacteriology and endocrinology, to all the other disciplines of medicine.”431 
 
Accepting the commercial need for a positive tone in the Foreword of any book, there 
seems to be genuine optimism in the quotation above on the possibilities offered by 
psychosomatic approach to general medical theory. The editors of the compendium 
were more cautious, however, with the conceptual problems in psychosomatic 
medicine. In the opening chapter of the book they give an overview of then recent 
theoretical developments in the field and write, that they  
 
“have come to the conclusion that most of the present-day theories are made 
up of permutations and combinations of a relatively small number of basic 
concepts, and that many of the apparently conflicting statements of various 
investigators can be reconciled whenever the reviewer is able to take up a 
position of observation sufficiently wide to enable him to examine the 
theoretical formulations of each school against a background of concepts 
common to all. However, it is apparent that there still remain a number of 
irreconcilable areas where the frame of reference utilized by one group of 
investigators remains far from identical with that used by others.432 
 
After reviewing the various theoretical positions of those active in the field, the 
authors divided them into two distinct groups, first, those who regarded each specific 
mind-body unit as permanently structured and capable of only reflex responses after 
been triggered into action by some stimulus and, second, those who maintained that 
all mind-body relationships are in a constant state of dynamic flux. In between these 
two fall those who borrowed from the first  when explaining the relationship of the 
psychological symbol system to autonomic vegetative system in cases of organ 
neuroses or other psychosomatic disorders while using the dynamic approach of the 
second group to explain the clinical phenomena in cases such as conversion 
hysteria.433 The authors concluded that no theoretician had been able to formulate the 
body-mind relationship to their day in terms that would be satisfactory to all. This was 
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inevitably hindering the building of any unitary theory in the field of psychosomatic 
medicine. 
 
Fundamentals falling  
 
Following the theoretical discussions within psychosomatic medicine toward the end 
of the 1950s, it is apparent that Alexander’s theoretical formulations based on 
Freudian concepts of repression and conversion were steadily losing ground. This 
development needs to be seen as part of wider doubts emerging within American 
psychiatry concerning psychoanalytic theory, especially concerning its scientific 
validity and therapeutic effectiveness.434 For example, in 1956 Mendelson, Hirsch and 
Webber, of the Department of Psychiatry in the Dalhousie University, Canada, wrote 
another special article for the Journal joining those criticising current concepts used in 
psychosomatic theory435. They started by noting the central role of theoretical models 
in any scientific work in providing a conceptual framework for a scientist in his or her 
research activities. Theories and models are fruitful if they enable us to comprehend 
or predict or modify events. If the findings produced by research do not fit into the 
theory, the theory needs to be reformulated, as Freud did when adjusting his theory 
according to emerging new clinical observations.  
 
Without mentioning Alexander directly, the authors noted that there is a danger that a 
scientific theory becomes a dogma and the sole aim of the research is to support the 
accepted theory. That can be seen to happen, according to the authors, in the field of 
psychosomatic medicine: “…it is beginning to appear that there has too long existed 
among psychosomatic writers an attitude that more closely resembles the devout 
believer’s than the sceptical scientist’s.” After voicing their concern the authors took 
up the task of evaluating the basic concepts in psychosomatic literature. They 
concluded that while there had been many theoretical openings within the field of 
psychosomatic medicine, they had produced only new terms without a sound 
empirical and theoretical basis. The main flaws in the studies published were, first, a 
tendency to selection bias in clinical and physiological data to support a given point, 
second, frequent confusion between phenomenological description and aetiology. 
Third, there was a tendency to believe that there should be only one theory to explain 
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the aetiology of psychosomatic illnesses. There were also questionable theoretical 
assumptions such as considering parasympathetic hyperactivity synonymous with 
psychosomatic illness, or unproven claims such as psychoses and psychosomatic 
illnesses having a definite relationship.  
 
In the following year, 1957, Arthur Mirsky was more explicit in his presidential 
address, when elected president of the Society. He wrote that there was no evidence 
whatsoever to support the idea that a long-lasting emotional conflict, as claimed by 
Alexander, should lead to any disease. He concluded that more scientific data was 
needed to replace dogma and more empirical observations were needed to replace 
“fanciful abstractions” in psychosomatic writing. Only then would psychosomatic 
medicine attain its goal and maturate “into a truly comprehensive medicine”. 436 
 
The following year, in 1958, Brown joined the critics by presenting a view of a 
clinical psychologist to the psychosomatic research.437 He lamented that “at the 
present time one has the impression that psychosomatic research has bogged down, 
fallen into a rut, turned toward the more substantial ‘physical’ bases of human 
behavior and slightly away from the intangibles of psychodynamics”. One reason for 
this was the disappointment with the idea of specificity, that is, that there should be 
clear connections between certain psychological elements to certain diseases or 
symptoms:  
 
“We collected Rorschach protocols of a group of patients with duodenal ulcer 
and like little Jack Horner, pulled out a plum of a ‘pattern’ with our thumb. 
The plum turned sour and shrivelled when carefully controlled studies were 
made and a variety of relationships were found to be statistically 
insignificant, or disconcertingly significant only within the particular context 
of the experiment.”  
 
For Brown, there was a need to accept the complexity of the human organism and 
abandon the hope of finding point-to-point connections between symptoms and 
personality especially when there is an urgent need to clarify even the basic concepts 
in psychology and psychiatry. 
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In 1961 Jurgen Ruesch of the University of California, San Francisco Medical School, 
broadened the overall perspective of psychosomatic theorizing by discussing the 
contribution of the behavioural sciences to psychosomatic medicine in a paper 
published in the Journal. 438 He noted how continental Europeans, being aware of the 
failures of the scientific methods, had disassociated themselves from the “dictates of 
physical science and adhered to the tradition of ‘Geisteswissenschaften’ and ‘sciences 
morales et politiques’”. An offshot of this development was more intuitive and 
holistic approaches to various types of existential philosophies and therapies. 
Americans, in turn, believed that “ten brains think better than one” and adhered to 
teamwork and to the “unity of science” principle. Following the latter, American 
psychosomatic medicine had relied, as we have seen, upon interdisciplinary 
methodology. There is an inherent problem in the latter approach, however. Whatever 
data are accumulated in interdisciplinary studies they are expressed in different 
conceptual vocabulary not translatable to another theoretical system. Even though the 
same words are used on occasion they may refer to totally different entities. This 
leads to conceptual difficulties when attempting to write a metatheory to merge  the 
concepts and findings of different subdisciplines. Furthermore, when dealing with 
clinical studies, one is observing living people and their behaviour. In those studies 
the observer is always part of the system observed. Therefore, no universal and causal 
general laws can be contrived even in principle. Instead, they need to be expressed as 
(Ruesch draws here on Dewey and Bentley) transactions, that is, processes that are 
not causally related. The relationships of the human organism, whether to itself, to 
others or to its environment, can thus only be understood and interpreted. In 
consequence, writes Ruesch, “interdisciplinary researchers have to be content with the 
establishment of transactional relations which help in the understanding and 
interpretation of man and nature.” 
 
Finally, in 1962 Franz Alexander responded to his critics in a long article published in 
the Journal (a paper originally presented at the International Congress for 
Psychotherapy in Vienna, Austria, in 1961)439. He started by acknowledging the need 
for collaboration between medical specialities when examining and treating patients 
with psychosomatic problems, (illustrating the observation made by Ruesch on the 
American ideal of teamwork). Alexander writes, that  
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“ideal collaboration between medical specialists and psychiatrists would 
require on the part of the organicists an understanding of the psychological 
components of chronic diseases, and on the part of the psychiatrists, an 
understanding of their organic implications. Mutual respect for each others’ 
contributions, which is so essential in teamwork, can only accrue from mutual 
understanding”.  
 
Alexander then observed that such mutual understanding and respect existed in only a 
few sporadic medical centres, but the fact that there were even those few was, for 
Alexander, an indication of significant progress in modern medicine. After giving an 
overview of the different approaches to the mind-body issue in the history of 
medicine, Alexander clarified his theoretical position with regard to psychosomatic 
medicine. He distanced himself from the idea of monocausal aetiology or the 
specificity of aetiology of diseases in favour of multicausal explanations. In his early 
studies he had identified seven psychodynamic patterns in seven diseases, duodenal 
ulcer, ulcerative colitis, asthma, essential hypertension, rheumatoid arthritis, 
thyrotoxicosis and neurodermatitis. It was then shown that similar psychodynamic 
patterns could be demonstrated in patients with no sign of those diseases. Alexander 
had then modified his theory accordingly by postulating that those who actually had 
any one of those diseases had, in addition to their psychodynamic pattern, a specific 
organic vulnerability acquired in early life or which is genetically transmitted and that 
will develop to organic disturbances under the influence of specific emotional stress 
situations. This specific organ vulnerability Alexander had chosen to call the X factor. 
With these conceptual reformulations Alexander was, thus, attempting to save his 
original idea of psychogenicity and the specificity of aetiology. Alexander also 
modified his definition of the concept of neurosis from indicating overall 
psychological pathology to denoting phenomena occuring in certain contexts but not 
necessarily in all of man’s activities. Neurosis is thus not an absolute attribute of a 
person but it has meaning only when the life situation a person operates in is 
considered. This relativistic view of neurosis broadens therapeutic perspectives: 
“How can the discrepancy between personality structure and environment best be 
reconciled, by changing the person or by changing his environment.” The abstraction 
individual person also needs to be re-evaluated since a person can only be understood 
within the cultural field in which s/he develops and operates. To gain a 
comprehensive understanding of man we need to integrate the physiological, 
 149 
psychological and sociological approaches. Man is to be addressed simultaneously as 
a biological organism, a personality and as a member of a social system. For 
Alexander, “neglecting any of these three parameters results in a distorted and 
operationally unsatisfactory personality theory and therapy”. With these sentences 
Alexander was anticipating Engel and the formation of the biopsychosocial theory of 
medicine. This article was to be Alexander’s last contribution to psychosomatic 
theory. He died two years later at the age of 73.  
 
What was, then, the theoretical state of psychosomatic medicine at the time of 
Alexander’s death, after twenty five years of research under the concept 
psychosomatic and amidst the increasing number of critical voices heard from the 
scientific community on the use of the concept? In the next number of the Journal 
following Alexander’s paper Binger concluded in his farewell editorial, after having 
served as editor-in-chief of the Journal for fifteen years, that  
 
“Psychosomatic medicine has not yet developed a unifying theoretical 
foundation. It is, at its best, a forum where men of different interests and 
training can meet with full recognition of the principle of multiple causality 
and without claiming special, proprietary or hierarchical rights. The vitality 
and viability of this journal will depend upon such a continuing combined 
effort to understand man in sickness and in health.” 
 
We can get an idea of just how diverse and varied were the directions of development 
in psychosomatic theory - corresponding to those “different interests” - by returning 
to Kaufman and Heiman’s 1964 book referred to in the previous chapter. The editors 
had chosen to present anorexia nervosa as a paradigm to illustrate the development of 
psychosomatic theory in medicine. As the last chapter of their book they had chosen a 
reprint of Jules H.Masserman’s case study of a woman with severe anorexia, 
originally published in The Psychoanalytic Quarterly in 1941440, exemplifying the 
psychosomatic approach to the problem as Kaufman and Heiman saw it. After having 
analysed the patient with a Freudian approach Masserman had come to a conclusion 
that the patient’s organic dysfunctions 
  
“are shown to be somatic manifestations of a highly complex personality 
disorder arising from severe early emotional conflicts, especially in the oral 
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sphere. The most important specific  psychodynamism of the vomiting 
appears to be a symbolic rejection and restitution of the father’s phallus, 
orally  incorporated in an attempt to render exclusive her basic passive 
dependence on the mother; however, the symptom also expresses as 
aggressive attack on the thwarting parents, masochistic expiation and other 
psychic over- determinants.” 
 
In their concluding remarks Kaufman and Heiman stated that their choice of anorexia 
nervosa as a paradigm was “a happy one”, since it presented the “integration and 
interrelationship of all the facets of psyche and soma”. Yet, only a few paragraphs  
earlier they had written that “there [is no] universal agreement even on the tools of 
research in this field” and that they were still “in a period of collecting data and 
correlating new observations”. They then continued their discussion by using 
concepts such as energy changes, defensive manoeuvers, homeostasis and 
adaptational balance, concepts that were derived from different psychoanalytic, 
psychological and physiological theories and used together in the very manner the 
critical voices quoted above had warned against. That is, uncritical mixing of 
concepts from different theoretical backgrounds can lead only to theoretical 
confusion. How was this theoretical disarray solved, if it was, in psychosomatic 
thinking? To explore the theoretical debates that followed, let us make a leap forward 
for another twenty-five years to the 50th anniversary issue of the Journal, which 
published Dr. Stanford Friedman’s inaugural presentation when elected as a president 
of the Society in 1988. 
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Chapter 9 - “…the very term psychosomatic has lost its meaning” 
 
In his presentation Friedman estimated the current status of psychosomatic medicine 
as a field of scientific inquiry and declared that the “very term psychosomatic had lost 
its meaning”.441 (italics original) Given from such an important podium, Friedman’s 
statement is odd enough to warrant  closer examination and it may serve as our next 
point of departure in the quest to follow the life cycle of the concept psychosomatic in 
medical thinking. What, then, could Friedman possibly have meant when he 
denounced the very concept he had stood up to defend as the president of a scientific 
society? And how could the term psychosomatic have lost its meaning when it was 
recently given an entry of its own in the Oxford English Dictionary, the Society 
bearing the name psychosomatic was having its annual meeting as usual and several 
journals and books with the word psychosomatic in their titles had been published 
around the globe? Surely, despite the theoretical disarray of the field in the early 
1960s, the term psychosomatic must have had a meaning at the time of Friedman’s 
speech. A verbatim quote may shed light. Friedman writes: 
 
“When I joined this society in 1962, the society’s identity was clear. The 
organization represented the merger of mind and body, of behavior and 
disease, and of psychiatry and medicine. In particular, there was a scientific 
focus on the interactions of biologic and psychosocial factors in the etiology 
of disease…The American Psychosomatic Society was indeed a scientific 
organization…its goals were unique, with essentially no overlap with the 
objectives of other professional groups.” (italics original) 
 
Friedman wrote further that the problem with the psychosomatic approach of the day 
in medicine lay partly in its marginalization. Many of the issues the early researchers 
in the field had tackled had developed into subdisciplines with their own scientific 
societies and journals, concentrating on issues such as sleep, neurotransmitters, 
biofeedback, behavioural medicine, health psychology and so forth. What, then, was 
left for psychosomatic medicine to justify its existence as a scientific field of inquiry 
in its own right? Friedman tried to protect its boundaries by quoting the Society’s 
Mission Statement, announced the previous year, that the essence of psychosomatic 
medicine was: 
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“To promote and advance the scientific understanding of the 
interrelationships among biological, psychological, behavioral, and social 
factors in human health and disease, and the integration of the fields of 
science that separately examine each, and to foster the application of this 
understanding to education and improved health care.” 
 
It seems that for Friedman, and for the Society as a whole, the concept psychosomatic 
had become an umbrella term to embrace a vast field of medical enquiry and to 
attempt to integrate various approaches to human health and illness under a general 
concept. But, still, how and in what sense could the meaning of the term 
psychosomatic have been lost as Friedman claimed? He gives no definite answer to 
this in his presentation. I must therefore assume that, for Friedman, the term 
psychosomatic had lost its meaning not as a word but as a scientific concept. To 
support this assumption, I return to the 1960s to follow the development of the 
concept psychosomatic in medicine that led to Friedman’s pessimistic conclusion. 
 
As already noted, there were two recurring themes in the early discussions on the 
concept of psychosomatic in medicine. While the word psychosomatic was offered by 
the proponents of the Journal to specifically denote the problem of the relation 
between emotions and bodily changes examined from the psychoanalytic viewpoint, 
the thought-collective - to use Fleck’s expression - that developed around that 
particular vein of medical inquiry was not able to maintain consensus on the 
theoretical content of the concept in the years to follow. It was eventually used to 
denote at least three different approaches to the mind-body issue in medicine. 
Psychosomatic was seen, first, as a field of research on the relation of emotions and 
bodily phenomena. Within that definition two methodological approaches to the 
problem under study developed, those using psychoanalysis as a tool to examine 
psychological processes in relation to physiological processes in one’s body, and 
those distancing themselves from psychoanalytic methods in favour of other 
psychological tools for their inquiries. Second, the concept psychosomatic was used 
as an adjective denoting the idea of psychosomatic illness. Again, two approaches 
developed, that of holding certain diseases as psychosomatic in essence (such as the 
famous “Chicago seven”: asthma, duodenal ulcer, essential hypertension, rheumatoid 
arthritis, thyrotoxicosis, ulcerative colitis and deurodermatitis) differentiated from 
those that were not, and second, that of seeing all illnesses (including even trauma in 
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some cases) as psychosomatic, emphasizing that there is always a psychological 
component present in all forms of human illness and injury. 
 
The third use of the concept was aetiological, referring to the psychological cause of 
an illness in contrast to natural or accidental causes that have no psychological 
determinants whatsoever, even though psychological phenomena may be present and 
influence the ensuing illness processes. 
 
As noted, the divergent use of the concept of psychosomatic was a constant problem 
for those writing on theoretical issues in psychosomatic medicine. Yet, in the 1960s 
there was still a strong sense among those active in the field of psychosomatic 
research that it had a sound scientific basis despite its conceptual ambiguities. For 
example, in 1966 Wittkower and Lipowski wrote that in the previous five years 
psychosomatic medicine had “continued to flourish as a science”.442 They supported 
their claim with the fact that there had been a marked shift away from mere clinical 
observations toward experimental laboratory research and verification, revision or 
rejection of the theoretical concepts formulated and used in the course of research. 
This emerging  new line of research was increasingly conducted by psychologists 
who tried to isolate objectively measurable personality variables and to evaluate them 
in relation to concomitant physiological phenomena. In the course of that 
development basic scientists had come to the fore leaving psychiatric clinicians, 
especially psychoanalysts, in the background. The authors predicted that 
psychosomatic medicine would be dominated more and more by psychophysiological 
research carried out by physiological psychologists, neurophysiologists, biochemists 
and “laboratory minded psychiatrists”. They also estimated that the particularly 
promising future areas of research would be conducted in laboratories “by means of 
meaningful sensory stimuli and by varying the total sensory input”. While 
experimental laboratory research would provide the basis for psychosomatic inquiry, 
which was particularly required was to explore how “symbolic processes result in 
somatic changes and how somatic processes result in symbolic consequences”. But 
what was also needed was, as Wittkower and Lipowski concluded their paper, “the 
application of the concepts of the philosophy of sciences to psychosomatic 
theorising”. 
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With those last two observations we are led back to the central problems in 
psychosomatic theory, the mind-body problem and conceptual clarity and coherence 
respectively.  
 
In search of conceptual coherence 
 
After the abandonment of Dunbar’s and Alexander’s original formulations in the 
1950s there seems to have been relatively little development on the theoretical level 
within psychosomatic medicine during the decade to follow. This is noteworthy, 
given that by the end of the 1960s, there had been hundreds of studies published in the 
Journal since its inauguration. As Edwards and Hill observe in the Journal in 1967: 
“Theoretical formulations of the physiological characteristics of an emotional 
response appear to have remained unchanged for perhaps the last half-century. None 
of the formulations is articulated with enough operational clarity to identify precisely 
their stance…”443 The authors derive, however, three empirical observations from the 
studies published so far. First, it had become obvious that the bodily manifestation of 
fear is different than of anger, for example. Second, the effect of an emotion on a 
bodily process seems to depend more on the quantity than the quality of the emotion 
causing the observed physiological change in the body, as Cannon had demonstrated. 
Third, there seems to be an “idiosyncrasy of visceral patterns”, a characteristic 
individual response to a particular emotional situation. There was, however, still a 
lack of a theory of emotions, which could weave these empirical observations into a 
comprehensive theoretical system. Yet, to promote and publish theoretical discussions 
in the Journal was not ranked high on the Society’s agenda in the 1960s, as seen in a 
call for papers for the 27th Annual Meeting of the American Psychosomatic Society in 
1969, there was no reference to theoretical issues whatsoever: 
  
“It is essential for the Society to maintain a broad interdisciplinary 
representation within the basic central nervous system sciences, autonomic 
and endocrine regulatory physiology, as well as psychiatry, internal medicine, 
and related clinical sciences. It is clear that a balance of such diverse, 
interdependent approaches, both clinical and experimental, is uniquely 
required for the study of the central integrative mechanisms underlying 
psychosomatic disorders.444  
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The problem was not only in the lack of theoretical coherence, however, but also in 
the methodological complexity to study mind-body phenomena. David Kissen 
observed in a paper presented to the Society for Psychosomatic Research in London in 
1968, that the object of inquiry in psychosomatic medicine, the relation of emotions to 
bodily changes, holds such an enormous amount of variables to consider that while 
even “in the very material world of physics and chemistry, replication and 
confirmation can be difficult, how much more so is this likely in clinical 
psychosomatic research”.445 Kissen noted that “the results of scientific experiments 
are acceptable only when replicable or reproducible with constancy”. The problem 
with psychosomatic studies was, however, that “both psychological and personality 
data elicited in the course of carefully planned and controlled objective studies may 
be difficult to replicate with consistency sufficient to satisfy rigid scientific criteria. 
Doubt may then be cast on the validity of the findings.” The solution was, for Kissen, 
to accept the situation as unavoidable and accept that “the validity of a particular 
study may be quite acceptable within the context of that study.” While an individual 
measurement may be open to criticism in terms of validity, that may be overcome 
using several methods of measurement to cover the personality aspects or 
psychosocial factors from many different angles in relation to a disease under inquiry. 
Then “the complementarity of the several measures add considerably to validity”. 
(Italics original) Kissen does not, however, address the problem of conceptual 
consistency of the background theory in psychosomatic medicine but sees the 
problem residing solely in the complexity of the phenomena and methodology. 
 
Another theme in the discussions published in the Journal in the late 60s and early 70s 
was the alleged stagnation of psychosomatic medicine. It seemed to those involved 
that despite the steady stream of empirical studies conducted and published in the 
field they were not able to offer medicine any new theoretical or practical tools. For 
example, John W. Mason of the Department of Neuroendocrinology, Walter Reed 
Army Institute of Research, shared Kissen’s concern discussed above in his 
presidential address to the Society in 1970, and asked: “Why has progress in our field 
been so limited? Is it just that, like all biologic research, psychosomatic research is 
incredibly complex and one must inevitably expect a slow rate of progress?”446 As 
appropriate for a physician practising in a military hospital, Mason suggested that the 
way forward is to design sound “strategy, tactics, methods or the sheer magnitude of 
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the efforts employed”. He then concentrated on “the logic behind strategy in 
psychosomatic research” and compressed the traditional approach in psychosomatic 
research into a formula  
 
life situations -> emotions -> bodily disease  
 
Mason called the above a “physiologic black box approach”. That is, if the patient’s 
problem is considered to be psychologic, then the appropriate solution is to bring a 
psychiatrist to the bedside leaving the mediating physiological mechanisms 
untouched. Now that the recent advances in the field of endocrinology had brought a 
new understanding of the mediating processes between emotions and bodily reactions, 
the physiological black box can and should be opened as an integral part of research 
strategy. Acknowledging that the approach in the natural sciences is analytic, that is, 
dissecting the phenomenon under inquiry into its smallest components, Mason held 
that the psychosomatic field represented an attempt at an integrative approach, to 
understand the human organism as a whole in its functions. The formula above 
needed, then, to be restructured as  
 
life situations -> emotions/defences -> endocrine systems/autonomic nervous 
system -> cellular functions/body units -> bodily disease.  
 
As illustrated in this revised formula, emotions were not, for Mason, the only 
mechanism relevant to psychological studies in psychosomatic research, but also 
physiological mechanisms and psychological defences need be taken into account. 
Here Mason adopted a Freudian concept without making any further reference to 
psychoanalysis, however. He treated defence as a general psychological concept and 
defined it as the “full range of mechanisms preventing, minimising, or counteracting 
emotional arousal”.  
 
Now that the rapidly developing research in human physiology was offering new 
means to understand mediating processes in the human organism, the problem of slow 
progress in psychosomatic research resided not so much in physiology but in the on-
going disparity of psychological approaches. Mason writes: 
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“…the behavioral field represents a house divided against itself in  a most 
irrational manner. Psychoanalytic theory in psychiatry, learning theory in 
clinical psychology, and conditioning theory in experimental psychology all 
proceed largely in separate worlds, each largely ignoring the insight provided 
by the other and, in fact, often assuming a competitive or defensive stance 
against each other”. 
 
The solution was, for Mason, not to monopolize any one of those psychological 
theories but to “to use them all cooperatively and benefit from the combined strength” 
since “we must use all the valid conceptual and methodological approaches we have 
for all they are worth…”  
 
Mason suggested that the way to proceed in psychosomatic studies would be to 
conduct intensive longitudinal studies on individual patients and to coordinate many 
different psychologic perspectives and methods together with physiological, notably 
endocrinological, approaches. The latter could provide to a “behaviorist” (sic) “an 
index of when physiologic homeostasis is disrupted”.  Mason concluded, that from 
the scientific standpoint “the development of rational sciences of integrative 
physiology and integrative medicine seems to me to be our best hope in the long 
run…” 
 
In 1972 a serious attempt was made to clear up the theoretical confusion within the 
field of psychosomatic medicine for good, when Lipowski, who was at the time a 
professor of psychiatry at the Dartmourth Medical School, USA, arranged a 
symposium at his University to evaluate the state of psychosomatic medicine. In that 
meeting it was realised that there was not a single book available reflecting  
 
“the current state of psychosomatic medicine in all its important aspects, and 
that as a result, misconception about the field were  perpetuated, the gap 
between research and clinical practice was still unbridged, and a grasp of the 
field as a whole was hard to attain.”447  
 
To “remedy the situation” Lipowski and his co-workers assumed the task of editing a 
compendium to offer a comprehensive account of psychosomatic medicine as 
perceived in the early 1970s. The book was eventually published in 1977 and entitled 
Psychosomatic Medicine. Current Trends and Clinical Applications, consisting of 50 
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papers, many of which had previously been published as journal articles. Apart from 
theoretical accounts there were articles on psychophysiological problems, mediating 
mechanisms, clinical issues, epidemiological questions and animal studies.  
 
In the Introduction Lipowski observed that “many workers of the field view the 
concept psychosomatic disorders as misleading, scientifically sterile, and obsolete”.448 
Yet, for Lipowski, “psychosomatic medicine is of necessity multidisciplinary” and, 
therefore,  dependent on the “collaboration of representatives from a wide range of 
scientific disciplines, methodological approaches, and theoretical viewpoints”. The 
task of psychosomatic medicine was, for Lipowski, to work as an “integrator – to 
keep the field coherent in the face of an information avalanche”.449 How this 
integration was to be achieved on the theoretical level, Lipowski did not, however, 
examine any more deeply. In the epilogue of the book Sidney Cobb raised the concern 
of the lack of “sound metatheory plus reliable and valid measures” within the field of 
psychosomatic medicine.450 This had led to the “vague use of certain words that are 
central to our discipline”. He continued by noting, that “the dictionary is full of words 
with more than one meaning, and linguistic parallelism is everywhere. What is 
distressing is to find scientific papers in which vague words are used without 
definition.” (my italics). Cobb did not offer a solution to the problem, however, but 
briefly discussed the contents of some basic concepts used in psychosomatic literature 
as he saw them. 
 
In the same year of the publication of the compendium Lipowski published an article  
in the American Journal of Psychiatry451 entitled Psychosomatic Medicine in the 
Seventies discussing the state-of-the-art of psychosomatic medicine in the US. He 
opened his account by stating that 
 
“Psychosomatic medicine as a scientific discipline and an approach to 
medical practice has staged a spectacular comeback. After  seeming to be 
dormant, it is not extinct, for almost two decades, it is once more in the 
mainstream of contemporary medicine and thought.” 
 
Whether the comeback was spectacular or not, is not our task to evaluate here. What 
interests us is Lipowski’s note that the 
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“confusion about the current state of psychosomatic medicine is widespread. 
Semantic ambiguities abound and impede meaningful communication… 
critics complain that psychosomatic medicine is an undefinable, 
overinclusive, and scientifically useless concept.”  
 
He then observed that the current psychosomatic theory had been  
 
“influenced by general systems and information theories, the doctrine of 
multicausatility of somatic functions and behavior,  notions of 
psychophysiological response specificity and activation, the theory of operant 
conditioning and self-control of visceral functions, the hypothesis of object 
loss as an antecedent of disease, and by the concepts of psychosocial stress, 
cognitive appraisal and meaning, individual susceptibility to disease, 
adaptation, coping, and feedback”.  
 
With the help of these, he wrote, psychosomatic medicine “is far more diversified, 
scientifically rigorous, methodologically resourceful, and therapeutically relevant than 
ever before”. As psychosomatic medicine attempted to study and formulate 
explanatory hypotheses about the relationships between psychological, biological and 
social phenomena, it was justified, for Lipowski, to considered it as a science in its 
own right. The ultimate goal for psychosomatic medicine was to formulate 
hypotheses based on “neutral models superordinated to the conceptual systems of 
psychology and biology”, as Lipowski borrowed Bertalanffy’s expression. This 
approach was necessary, since otherwise “the gap between the mass of accruing data 
and our ability to evaluate and relate them to one another will grow steadily”.  
 
Seven years later, in 1984, Lipowski returned to the issue of the meaning of the 
concept of psychosomatic in another paper published in the Journal entitled What 
Does the Word “psychosomatic” Really Mean? A Historical and Semantic Inquiry.452 
He started with an observation that the conceptual confusion within psychosomatic 
medicine persisted despite efforts to clarify the issue. The situation seemed to be 
getting even worse with the various connotations given to the term psychosomatic in 
contemporary discussions. After offering a historical account of the development and 
the use of the concept psychosomatic in medicine Lipowski came to the conclusion 
that 
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“There is an inherent problem with the link-up of the words ‘psychosomatic’ 
and ‘medicine’, since they belong, at least in part, to two distinct levels of 
abstraction and discourse. Medicine is concerned with the issues of health and 
disease. ‘Psychosomatic’, however, has a broader and more abstract 
connotation, one that  touches on the problem of mind and body, and hence 
pertains to the views on the nature of man. When by somebody’s whim those 
two words became linked, confusion and ambiguity that perplex us to this day 
resulted. “ 
 
Lipowski suggested that to resolve the ambiguities in the use of the concept  
psychosomatic in medicine one needed to “clarify the meaning of its key terms, to 
delineate its scope, and to chart its development over time”.  
 
With the above, Lipowski made two observations of importance in terms of this 
essay. First, he acknowledged the difficulties that ensue in scientific discussions from 
the adoption and amalgamation of concepts derived from disparate theoretical 
backgrounds. Second, the mind-body problem persisted as acute as ever in the attempt 
to understand the relationship between subjective experiences and objectively 
measurable bodily phenomena. It seems, then, that these two issues were the two 
main elements of the confusion Lipowski and others writing on theoretical problems 
in psychosomatic medicine were forced to face and acknowledge again and again.  
 
Dualism revisited 
 
As seen in the foregoing, the early users of the concept psychosomatic were openly 
opposed to any “metaphysical speculations” on the mind-body problem. While they 
were determined to avoid any philosophical reflections on their position, they were, 
nevertheless, explicit in offering a monistic approach to the problem by stating that 
mind and body are the same and that there was “no logical distinction” between the 
two. For example, Stanley Cobb, when appointed the president of the Society in 1957, 
453 announced that there was “no basic difference between physical and psychological 
phenomena”. Cobb held that if a series of phenomena are initiated by a symbolic 
stimulus, such as the spoken word, the stimuli and its consequences are all physical, 
depending on molecular changes in the body, especially in the brain. Mind is a 
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function of the brain as contraction is a function of a muscle and circulation is the 
movement of blood in the vascular system. Yet, Cobb asserted, even if we could build 
a computer with the same complexity as the brain, it could not function the way the 
brain does, that is, it could not feel emotions or make aesthetic or ethical judgements. 
Cobb did not, however, go any further into analysing why this should be so. He 
contented himself with noting that the brain is living whereas a computer is not. As 
for the psychosomatic endeavour as a whole, Cobb believed that its aim is to correlate 
findings from any field of medicine with psychological observations. He concluded 
that there was no need in medicine to look for specific causes for diseases but to 
conceive of health and disease as reactions of the human organism to the internal or 
external environment. Cobb was convinced that medicine of his time had accepted 
this “holistic” and “ecological” approach as a basis of its theoretical structure. 
 
Unfortunately, the material I was able to retrieve from the Archives does not 
explicitly explain why Dunbar, Alexander and those following their approaches 
wished to adopt such a stern attitude of not reflecting upon their position on mind-
body problem or to keep that discussion out of the Journal altogether. I need, 
therefore, to do some interpretative work on this issue.  
 
The basic divide in the mind-body problem in psychosomatic writing seems not to 
reside in the question of the nature of the interaction between the two but between 
monism and dualism. The dualistic approach implies that we assume two distinct 
entities, mind and body acting on each other.  That approach has two problems 
needing an explanation to satisfy any psychosomatic theory. First, if we consider 
mind to be a non-material entity, what is it, where is it and where does it come from? 
And second, how is the reciprocal effect between mind and body executed and 
mediated? Both of those questions fall outside of the realm of natural sciences since 
natural sciences deal only with bodily, material that is, phenomena by definition. It 
seems, then, that if one wishes to keep the problem of emotions and bodily changes 
within the realm of natural sciences, one cannot postulate a non-material mind but one 
has to address mind as a material entity similar to the rest of the body with “no logical 
distinction between the two”. The dualistic position is, thus, unacceptable compelling 
a monistic approach to the problem. However, in terms of natural scientific 
explanation the monistic position is also problematic. First, if mind and body were 
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truly the same, as the early advocates of psychosomatic theory claimed, why should 
there be a need for two different methodological approaches, psychological and 
physiological? Furthermore, if psychological phenomena are defined, as Alexander 
chose to do, as subjective perceptions of physiological events taking place within the 
body, one is postulating a subjective observer distinct from what is to be observed. 
What, then, distinguishes the observer from the observed, if we are dealing with one 
and the same phenomenon? None of the authors discussed thus far attempted to dig 
any deeper into that problem in the Journal or in their books.  
 
A common answer to the problems embedded within the monistic approach has been 
to maintain that psychological and physiological are the same “as two sides of a 
coin”, as Graham, for example, expressed it in the Journal454. That explanation is 
plausible, indeed, if we examine a coin as a mere physical object; we can measure its 
weight, dimensions, mass and composition without any conceptual or methodological 
ambiguities when we use the concepts and methods of physics and chemistry for our 
measurements. But as soon as we attempt to define what makes that small, round and 
flat piece of metal a coin we realise that the concepts and methods of physics and 
chemistry cannot give us answers at all. In order for a piece of metal to be a coin it 
needs to have exchange value, which removes us from the realms of physics and 
chemistry because they do not deal with exchange values, or economic systems, or 
people’s  behaviour when trading commodities or fancying numismatics. The value of 
a coin (numismatic valuations excluded) is expressed in the configurations printed on 
both sides of it. We can, of course, build a topographical description of those 
configurations using physico-mathematical methods. These, however, can offer only 
numerical and graphic presentations of the shapes on the surfaces but nothing more. 
Once we acknowledge, that tails expresses the value of a coin with a numerical 
symbol and heads the country issuing the coin with a cultural-historical symbol such 
as a silhoutte of a sovereign, natural sciences can offer no conceptual or 
methodological tools to examine those facts any further. We need, therefore, to rely 
on social sciences and humanities if we wish to gain scientific understanding of the 
economic system in which that particular piece of metal was adopted as a medium of 
exchange at that particular historical time and place. Thus, to claim that mind and 
body are essentially the same as two sides of a coin cannot be sustained any more 
than claiming that a piece of metal, a silhouette of Queen Elisabeth II and an 
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engraving 10 p on the edges of that particular object are all essentially the same. They 
are the same in the sense that they are all constituents of a coin within a certain 
economic system, but they are not the same in their essence.  
 
It seems that in denying dualism, the authors of psychosomatic literature were, in fact, 
denying only substance dualism while clinging, although implicitly, to what is called 
property dualism. 455 The first postulates psyche and soma as distinct substances and 
calls forth the question of the nature of the psyche as a non-material entity and also 
the question of its interaction with the body. According to the latter, psyche and soma 
are not different substances but they may be discerned as two phenomena occurring 
within the one and same object, as a coin having two sides with different figures.  
Their properties cannot be discerned within a single conceptual system alone and 
there is, therefore, a logical difference between the two, contrary to what Alexander 
and his followers sought to maintain. On the other hand, a great part of the 
psychosomatic research as published in the Journal can be seen as representing a 
functionalistic approach to the mind-body problem. That is, the focus is on examining 
and describing physiological pathways and functions from the brain to the rest of the 
body in different emotional states without postulating a psyche as an independent 
entity affecting the process.456 The psyche is left to what psychological test patterns 
reveal when correlating the results thus obtained with physiological measurements. 
The core problem, however, in both property dualistic and functionalistic positions 
remains. What is the nature of the subject observing his or her emotions and their 
physiological manifestations and reporting them to the researchers? None of the 
authors within the early psychosomatic literature attempted to address this 
fundamental question. 
 
I would maintain that clinging to the monistic position in psychosomatic writing 
while using either a property dualistic or functionalistic approach without reflecting 
upon the theoretical problems inherent in both of them fed the conceptual ambiguities 
and general frustration among those active in the field. That problem was not 
analysed in the Journal, but following the decline of psychoanalysis as the guiding 
theory in psychosomatic writing novel attempts to solve the mind-body problem in 
psychosomatic medicine started to emerge.  
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In 1964 Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901-1972) published a paper in the Journal where 
he approached the mind-body problem as an empirical problem.457 Because of the 
impact Bertalanffy had on the subsequent development in psychosomatic theorizing, 
we may examine his thinking at some length here.  
 
Bertalanffy was an Austrian born biologist who, at the time of publishing in the 
Journal, was serving as a professor of theoretical biology at the University of Alberta, 
Departments of Psychology and Zoology. Bertalanffy’s approach was based on his 
studies and ideas he had developed in biology since the late 1920s, known in the 
1950s as General Systems Theory. In short, the basic tenets of the theory derive from 
the observations made in biology, where biological systems are seen as open in the 
sense that there is a constant exchange of matter and energy between an organism and 
its environment.  It follows that organisms cannot be explained by reduction to 
chemical or physical theories because the latter are formulated studying events in 
closed systems where there is little or no interaction with their environment. 
Furthermore, an organism can be approached as a system of its own containing a 
number of subsystems. One can discern in those systems similar structures and 
functions. Bertalanffy chose to call such similarities isomorphisms. General systems 
theory attempts to identify and analyse isomorphisms in different systems, be they 
organisms, social systems or technological devices. The ultimate aim for the theory is, 
as Bertalanffy expressed it in his 1969 book, to bring “scientific interpretation and 
theory where previously there was none, and higher generality than that in the special 
sciences”.458 
 
In his 1964 paper Bertalanffy noted that although the question of mind-body problem 
belongs, traditionally, to the domain of philosophy and is discussed in terms of 
epistemology and metaphysics, it may also be approached as an empirical problem 
utilising the knowledge gained in modern biology, psychology, psychiatry, 
anthropology, linguistics etc. For Bertalanffy, psychosomatic is merely an expression 
for the mind-body problem in medicine. Yet, the attempts to solve the problem within 
contemporary psychological theories had not been successful since they held “an 
obsolete belief in the dualism of body and mind”. 
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Bertalanffy took the view, that the problem had been cut in two in psychosomatic 
writing, matter-mind and brain-consciousness relations. Since all awareness is 
dependent on our bodies, and especially the brain, we may approach the problem as 
the relation between brain and consciousness. When studying the brain with natural 
scientific methods we speak of molecules, chemical reactions, electric currents and so 
on. We then pose the question, how do these events turn into subjective experiences? 
Conversely, how do subjective experiences, such as emotions, transform into bodily 
processes? The solution is not, for Bertalanffy, to claim that we approach a person as 
a psychophysical whole since within that statement there lingers Cartesian dualism. 
Instead of seeking a solution in traditional approaches, such as psychophysical 
parallelism,  psychophysical interaction or identity theory, Bertalanffy states that the 
whole dualistic conception of man is in itself a result of long historical development. 
He claimed that the Cartesian conceptualisation of mind and matter, res extensa and 
res cogitans, does not hold in light of 20th century developments in physics, biology 
and behavioural sciences. What they offer are “conceptual constructs representing 
certain aspects of reality” and they cannot be reduced into one another, that is, 
concepts of psychology cannot be reduced into those of neurology, for example. 
Instead, when speaking of mental phenomena, we may discern and analyse 
isomorphism between the constructs of psychology and neurology. This does not 
mean that one should attempt to see similarity between psychological processes and 
brain physiology, nor to presuppose a resemblance between these two. What is 
needed, instead, is the “unification of physiological and psychological theory in 
constructs which are generalized with respect to both, and in this sense are neutral 
with respects to physics and psychology” and “superordinated” to both. Theoretical 
formulations such as these were already taking place in new fields of study such as 
cybernetics, information theory, general systems theory and game theory. Those 
formulations were “neither physical nor psychological, but are applicable to both 
fields…within which both physical and neurophysiological constructs appear as 
specifications”.  
 
Bertalanffy’s theory had a great impact among those writing on psychosomatic issues, 
as will be discussed soon.  Meanwhile, in the 1970s the Journal still published few 
theoretical articles. Rose, for example, estimated in his analysis of the contents of the 
Journal from 1969 to 1980 that out of a total 536 articles only 36 could be considered  
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theoretical texts.459 Of these we find only a couple addressing the mind-body issue in 
psychosomatic theory.  For example, Weiner in his presidential address to the Society 
in 1972460 addressed the problem of transduction of experience by the brain, claiming 
that the main question in psychosomatic medicine was “how is a psychological 
experience translated by the brain into a physiologic event?...Or, to put it another 
way, how does a nonmaterial process such as the emotional response to a stressful 
situation produce material changes, such as the elevation of urinary catecholamine 
levels or an increase in heart rate?” He did not, however, attempt to answer any of 
these questions. Instead, he moved on to present a detailed description of the then 
current knowledge on how the brain interacted with the rest of the body. 
 
In 1977 Albert Silverman, a psychiatrist at the University of Michican, touched upon 
the mind-body question in his presidential address to the Society.461 He had observed 
that “many physicians feel uncomfortable in the presence of psychological 
phenomena, and even more uncomfortable in the presence of psychosomatic 
phenomena”.  There was, however,  “plenty of good, direct clinical and experimental 
evidence that psychological factors can influence the precipitation, the modulation, 
the exacerbation, and the outcomes of disease”. The problem resided, for Silverman, 
in the fact that a “fair amount of American medicine still seems in general not to want 
to join psyche and soma in any meaningful way”. What a meaningful way would 
consist of, Silverman does not tell, however. He formulated, instead, three major 
objects of inquiry for psychosomatic research: 1) “how does the brain transduce 
psychosocial input into neurophysiological data?” 2) “how do these data in turn lead 
to a behavioral response?” and 3) “ what are the relationships between brain and 
peripheral physiology?”. While the last one of these questions “never leads to 
psychological distress among scientists”, the first two are the kind that are “difficult 
to fathom, and among many otherwise phlegmatic medical scientists, also a cause for 
distress.”  
 
It is noteworthy in Silverman’s analysis, that he tried to overcome the problem of 
mind by using the expression psychosocial input. This input transfers, somehow, into 
behavioural response. How that transfer is mediated was “a cause for distress”, as 
Silverman put it, for scientists in the natural scientific realm. The problem of the 
black box, thus, persisted, as irritating as ever. But once we move from the mind-body 
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problem to the question of how the brain is connected to and acts with the rest of the 
body we physicians seem to feel we are on terra firma again. Why should this be so? 
The answer could well be in the latter case that we have a sound conceptual and 
methodological apparatus to address anatomic structures and physiological pathways, 
while we do not have such apparatus to tackle the mind in the mind-body problem, 
which remains there yet to be faced, whether we like it or not.  
 
The mind-body problem in psychosomatic medicine was not merely a philosophical 
one, however, but it penetrated to the very core of medical thinking, the diagnostic 
classification we use in our attempts to categorise the multiplicity of phenomena we 
encounter in our everyday surgeries. In the next number of the Journal  following 
Silverman’s paper Lipp, Looney and Spitzer suggested that in order to reduce the 
conceptual ambiguity of psychosomatic disorders, one needs to rephrase the category 
of psychophysiological disorders as used in the prevailing psychiatric diagnostic 
system Second Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM II).462 The 
authors observed that in its at that time form one got an impression that there was, 
first, a class of diseases that are qualitatively different from other diseases. Second, it 
promoted an idea of single causation of a disease, that is, “a single psychological 
deficit while ignoring other relevant social intrapsychic and biological factors”. And 
third, the DSM II referred only to causation while neglecting to describe how 
“psychological factors might either prolong or exacerbate a physical condition that 
had already been in existence”. In a letter of response published right below Lipp et 
al.’s paper, Donald Oken stressed that any “linguistic systems (including nosologies) 
significantly shape the very conceptual processes they also express”.463 For Oken the  
term psychosomatic disease in “not only a redundancy but, by implying that 
nonpsychosomatic disease could exist, is dangerously misleading.” One should speak 
only of psychological phenomena and avoid the use of the term psychic “since it 
suggests the supernatural – which our critics are all too prone to ascribe to our subject 
matter. It should be exorcised!”  
 
In 1986 Bernard Engel recalled in his presidential address to the Society how the 
early psychosomatic medicine was based on psychoanalytic theory, which was, in 
turn, built on the idea that mental functions are separate from bodily functions. 464 It 
turned out, Engel claimed, that the psychoanalytic conceptualisations were faulty. The 
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contribution of that phase of development in psychosomatic medicine was, however, 
that physiology came to be seen as an integral part of behaviour, which made it 
possible for psychosomatic medicine to become a part of medicine. Engel maintained 
that the psychosomatic practice of the day was trying to move away from dualistic 
thinking and become more eclectic in its approach. Yet, Engel noted, there was still a 
strong tendency, especially among psychiatrists practising psychosomatic medicine, 
to rely on psychoanalytic concepts and, therefore, to resort to mentalism even when 
addressing pathophysiological or pathopsychological processes. Engel noted that 
attempts had been made to resolve the inherent dualism in psychosomatic thinking by 
replacing the concept psychosomatic medicine with the concept behavioural 
medicine. This attempt had been, however, “a complete failure” because 
 
“instead of psychic cause of somatic disorders, we are told that disease is the 
result of an interaction between biologic (qua, organic) factors and behavioral 
(qua, mental) factors. Since interaction can occur between independently 
operating variables, biobehaviorism is simply a synonym for mind-body 
dualism”. 
 
There were no novel attempts in the Journal to solve the mind-body problem or the 
prevailing conceptual ambiguities within psychosomatic medicine toward the late 
1980s. We may then conclude, in light of the above, that Friedman’s lament for the 
loss of the meaning of the  term psychosomatic in medicine was not based on the fact 
that the word itself had fallen into the obscurity and referred to only as a historical 
curiosity similar to terms such as dyscrasia, melancholia or phlegm. On the contrary, 
the term psychosomatic was perhaps better known than ever among medical 
profession as well as among the laity at the time of Friedman’s speech. The problem 
was that owing to the unsolved theoretical ambiguities and its varied use in medical 
literature the word psychosomatic could no longer serve as a scientific concept, that 
is, as a tool for scientific thinking.  
 
Was that the end of the story? Not quite, since there were no signs that the Journal or 
the Society were about to be closed as remnants of times past. The Journal continued 
to publish papers on psychosomatic issues and the Society held its annual meetings as 
ever. There were, however, no noticeable attempts to resolve the controversies around 
the concept psychosomatic in the Journal during the years to follow. The papers 
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published concentrated mainly on empirical studies comparing psychological and 
physiological responses in various settings, as had long been the case. The discussion 
on the fate of psychosomatic medicine as a field of research in its own right 
continued, however. For example, in November 2000, Theodore M. Brown, a 
historian of medicine at the University of Rochester, gave a presentation to the New 
York Academy of Medicine titled The Rise and Fall of American Psychosomatic 
Medicine. In his paper he analysed the historical development of psychosomatic 
medicine from its very beginning to the end of the Millenium. He came to the 
conclusion that 
 
“American psychosomatic medicine as a research field with a clear focus, 
optimistic outlook, and strong sense of clinical mission is gone!”465 (italics 
original) 
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Chapter 10 - “Praise Be to Psychosomatic Medicine” 
 
Considering the activity around psychosomatic medicine at the turn of the millenium, 
Brown’s conclusion on the demise of the field seems somewhat premature. In 1999, 
just one year before Brown’s paper, Herbert Weiner had written an editorial to the 
Journal bearing the laudatory title Praise Be to Psychosomatic Medicine to celebrate 
the Journal’s 60th anniversary466. Weiner wrote how gratifying, and also somewhat 
surprising, it was to note that the field of psychosomatic medicine had survived and 
developed to that mature age. The strength of  psychosomatic medicine resided, in 
Weiner’s opinion, in its integrative approach while assuming that “the Humpty-
Dumpty of biomedicine will have been put together again”. For Weiner the 
integrative concepts and principles of psychosomatic medicine had become 
increasingly sophisticated during those six decades, concepts that would be needed 
“not only for theoretical reasons but to ensure the best patient care”. 
 
How, then, in light of Weiner’s enthusiasm and considering the fact that there were 
perhaps more articles published in various scientific journals relating to the subject 
during the 1990s than ever before could Brown claim that the whole field was dead 
and gone? Was Brown simply wrong in his analysis? This is precisely what Dennis H. 
Novack claimed when he responded to Brown’s paper in his presidential address to 
the Society in 2003:  
 
“Of course, we who belong to the APS know that Professor Brown’s 
conclusions could not be more wrong. The field of psychosomatic medicine is 
vibrant, exciting and young. With each annual meeting, and with each new 
issue of Psychosomatic Medicine (and other related journals), we learn of 
important new research that advances our understanding of how 
mind/brain/body and social context interact in health and in illness…I have 
been an active member of the American Psychosomatic Society since 1977. I 
have never experienced a more exciting time than the present in  the variety 
and quality of the research presented at our meetings. There has never been a 
more propitious time for influencing the next generation of physician 
scientists and practitioners than now.”467 
 
“Exciting, young, vibrant”. Not quite what Brown was claiming in burying the whole 
field. But only a decade prior to Brown’s conclusion was Friedman’s lament that the 
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very term psychosomatic had lost its meaning. How are we to understand this 
contradiction? To try to clarify the issue and to understand better why Friedman and 
Brown arrived at their pessimistic conclusions, I trace  the fate of the concept 
psychosomatic in the midst of various new concepts flooding into the medical 
literature.  
 
Concepts crowding in  
 
In 1977 Lipowski wrote in the article discussed earlier: 
 
“…general systems and information theories, the doctrine of multicausality of 
somatic functions and behavior, notions of psychophysiological response 
specificity and activation, the theory of operant conditioning and self-control 
of visceral functions, the hypothesis of object loss as an antecedent of disease, 
and by the concepts of psychosocial stress, cognitive appraisal and meaning, 
individual susceptibility to disease, adaptation, coping, and feedback”. 468 
(italics mine) 
 
This short paragraph offers an impressive list of diverse theoretical concepts derived 
from different theoretical backgrounds used in the late 1970s to deal with the mind-
body problem in medicine. By applying these concepts psychosomatic medicine was, 
for Lipowski, “far more diversified, scientifically rigorous, methodologically 
resourceful, and therapeutically relevant than ever before”. Let us now take a closer 
look at three of the new concepts introduced into the medical vocabulary in the 1970s 
because of their importance for the subsequent development of psychosomatic 
medicine, biopsychosocial, psychoneuroimmunology and behavioural medicine.    
 
Biopsychosocial model  
 
In 1977 George Engel published an article in Science titled The Need for a New 
Medical Model: A Challenge for Biomedicine where he offered the concept 
biopsychosocial as a general approach for the problems of health and illness in 
medicine.469  
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Engel had joined the Rochester Medical School in 1944 and acquired an interest in 
the rapidly developing field of psychosomatic medicine. His first contribution to the 
Journal was in 1943 in the form of a book review470 and his first scientific 
contribution in the Journal was a series of studies on syncope co-authored with John 
Romano in 1945471. He subsequently wrote more than twenty papers for the Journal 
and published dozens of other scientific articles elsewhere. He also served as a 
president of the Society In 1957. 
 
Engel justified his conceptual initiative in Science by writing that  “all medicine is in 
crisis…since ‘disease’ is defined in terms of somatic parameters”. It follows, for 
Engel, that because of the purely somatic definition of disease “physicians need not 
be concerned with psychosocial issues which lie outside medicine’s responsibility and 
authority”. Yet, the clinical data on an illness “requires a scientifically rational 
approach to behavioral and psychological data, for these are the terms in which most 
clinical phenomena are reported by patients”.  
 
Engel based his idea on Bertalanffy’s general systems theory, which provided him 
with “a conceptual approach suitable not only for the proposed biopsychosocial 
concept of disease but also for studying disease and medical care as interrelated 
processes”. Engel postulated that with this approach it would be possible to analyse 
patients on different levels of organisation “as molecules, cells, organs, the organism, 
the person, the family, the society, or the biosphere”. This would treat “related events 
collectively as systems manifesting functions and properties on the specific level of 
the whole”. It would be possible, then, to discern isomorphisms between different 
systems “manifesting functions and properties on the specific level of the whole” and 
to develop “fundamental laws and principles that operate commonly at all levels of 
organization”. That approach would provide a “blueprint for research, a framework 
for teaching, and a design for action in the real world of health care”. 
 
Why did Engel introduce another concept, biopsychosocial, into medical theory 
instead of resorting to the concept psychosomatic with which he had been strongly 
affiliated for so long? The question is more perplexing, when we consider that 
Lipowski’s definition of the concept psychosomatic, which was published in the 
American Journal of Psychiatry in the same year as Engel’s paper, is almost 
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indistinguishable from Engel’s definition of the concept biopsychosocial. 
Psychosomatic medicine was, for Lipowski, “a scientific discipline concerned with 
the study of the relationships of biological, psychological, and social determinants of 
health and disease...current psychosomatic theory has been influenced by general 
systems and information theories” etc.472 (Italics original) Engel’s answer was that  
 
“Psychosomatic medicine – the term itself a vestige of dualism – became the 
medium whereby the gap between the two parallel but independent ideologies 
of medicine, the biological and psychological, was to be bridged. Its progress 
has been slow and halting, not only because of the extreme complexities 
intrinsic to the field itself, but also because of unremitting pressures, from 
within as well from without, to conform to scientific methodologies basically 
mechanistic in conception and inappropriate for many of the problems under 
study”.  
 
The time was thus ripe, Engel felt, to introduce the concept biopsychosocial to replace 
the concept psychosomatic because of the latter’s narrow focus on the relationship 
between psychological and bodily issues only. With his new concept Engel was not 
only broadening the scope of medical inquiry to include social in medical theory on a 
conceptual level, but to bring the whole battery of concepts and methods of the social 
sciences into medical research. On the other hand, suggesting general systems theory 
as a basic theoretical apparatus for the endeavour helped to avoid the mind-body 
problem and to focus, instead, on finding isomorphisms between different  “layers” of 
reality and, by doing so, hoping to gain deeper understanding of man and his or her 
illness.  
 
Biopsychosocial as an approach was not, of course, solely Engel’s invention. When 
the psychoanalytic basis of psychosomatic medicine was falling, articles broadening 
psychosomatic theory toward social and cultural issues appeared in the Journal. This 
development was part of the general development in the rapidly developing post-war 
American social sciences, where medicine was discovered as a field worth exploring 
as a social phenomenon both from the viewpoint of an individual and the society as a 
whole. The first signs of this development were seen in the Journal in the late 1940s 
when it started publishing articles such as Anthropology and Psychosomatics.473 As of 
the 1950s there followed papers discussing the relation of life events, conditions and 
cultural contexts to somatic symptoms and diseases.474 475 476 477 478 479 
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The concept biopsychosocial was rapidly adopted into medical discussion. At the time 
of writing this essay in autumn 2009, Pub Med had more than 2200 entries since 
1980, while the term psychosomatic has some 6300 entries for the same period. I also 
note here, that the concept found its way into the Finnish medical literature in the 
early 1990s in the form biopsykososiaalinen480 and that the Japanese Society of 
Psychosomatic Medicine launched an online journal BioPsychoSocial Medicine as an 
official journal for their society in 2007.481 
 
 Biopsychosocial was not, however, a solitary intruder to the field of psychosomatic 
medicine claiming its territory. Other new concepts were finding their way into the 
medical vocabulary attempting to reconceptualise the psychosomatic approach.  
 
Psychoneuroimmunology 
 
In 1980 Robert Ader presented in his presidential address to the Society that “…all 
disease are psychosomatic in the sense that they are ultimately subject to the 
regulatory influence of the brain as the sensor and interpreter of the psychosocial and 
physical environment.” 482 After that somewhat trivial observation with regard to 
psychosomatic theorizing, Ader noted that  “in contrast to the commonly held 
notion…that the immune system is an autonomous defence mechanism, it can be 
argued that, like any other physiological system functioning in the interest of 
homeostasis, the immune system is sensitive to CNS activity. As such, the immune 
system stands as potential mediator of psychosomatic phenomena.” What Ader was 
referring to was the acute debate in medical research as to whether the immune 
system acted independently of the central nervous system or whether it was regulated 
by it. Ader favoured the latter explanation, since “there is now evidence that 
neuroendocrine factors can act to regulate or modulate immune reactions. These, then, 
can provide a link whereby psychosocial factors can be understood to play a role in 
influencing immune responses and processes of disease”. If such were the case, it was 
time to cast that observation into a new medical concept psychoneuroimmunology. 
Although this new field of scientific inquiry was still in its infancy and it “had not 
provided any definitive answers: it offers data for your consideration – and 
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possibilities…” Ader assumed, that psychoneuroimmunology would most likely 
develop into a research field of its own.  
 
The formative process of this new field of inquiry dates back to the 1960s. In 1968 
Mason had published a review article in the Journal on psychoendocrine research, 
where the focus was on the observable changes in endocrine functions in various 
emotional states. This rapidly expanding field of inquiry was organized into an 
International Society of Psychoneuroendocrinology in 1969.483  
 
Meanwhile, another new field or research was developing, labelled as 
psychoimmunology and concerned with whether man’s emotions could have an effect 
on the immune system. Now that it had been demonstrated that these two seemingly 
separate systems were, in fact, acting jointly, it created another new field of enquiry 
calling for concepts of its own. Eventually, the PsychoNeuroimmunology Research 
Society was established in 1993. The aim of the society was to “bring together 
researchers in a number of scientific and medical disciplines including psychology, 
neurosciences, immunology, pharmacology, psychiatry, behavioral medicine, 
infectious diseases, endocrinology and rheumatology, who are interested in 
interactions between the nervous system and the immune system, and the relationship 
between behavior and health.” 484 It is noteworthy that while offering to act as an 
integrative society between various fields of inquiry (as psychosomatic medicine 
does), the statement does not mention the relationship between mind and body but 
that of “behavior and health.” 
 
Behavioral medicine 
 
Behaviour as a concept appeared in the Journal in its very first issues underlining the 
strong position of behaviourism within American psychology. After the decline of the 
psychoanalytic approach as a background theory for psychosomatic studies, there was 
a theoretical vacuum to be filled and behaviourism was there to fill that gap. The aim 
of the behaviouristic approach was to identify certain behavioural patterns in patients 
that could be associated with certain somatic diseases. Behavioural studies gained a 
prominent role in the Journal during the decades to follow. For example, in 1964 
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Keith, Lown and Stare published a paper on studies on behaviour in relation to 
coronary heart disease.485 The patients were examined by scaling their behavioural 
patterns without prior knowledge of the diseases (coronary heart disease, peptic ulcer 
and a control group). The main finding was that patients with coronary heart disease 
were more closely associated with what the authors called Behavioral Pattern A,  a 
classification derived from the Friedman and Rosenman study Association of specific 
overt behavior pattern with blood and cardiovascular findings published in the 
JAMA in 1959.486 The idea of so-called A and B-type behaviour in association with 
cardiovascular problems became immensely popular in the late 1970s and several 
articles discussing the topic were published in the Journal amounting to over one 
hundred papers on the issue to date.  
 
In 1971 Beck published an article in Behavioral Science titled Minimal requirements 
for a biobehavioral paradigm.487 Although Beck did not mention Bertalanffy, he 
grounded his approach on the “general systemic paradigm”. That paradigm could 
offer, Beck claimed, an opportunity to integrate fields such as evolutionary biology, 
neurophysiology, psychological learning theory and small group transactions in 
psychotherapy. The focus was on analysing behaviour and communicative patterns in 
relation to physiological phenomena ranging from group phenomena to an 
individual’s physiological processes with systems theory providing a general 
framework for this two-way analysis.  
 
The concept biobehavioral found its way into the Journal in 1972 in an editorial, 
where Weiner presented the new editorial board. He wrote that “in…general areas of 
research in behavioral biology great advances are being and will  continue to be made, 
and will provide a rational basis for our understanding of complex disease states of 
unknown etiology and pathogenesis”. 
 
The concept of behavioral medicine was properly introduced in the Journal when in 
1977 Schwarz and Weiss published a paper titled What is Behavioral Medicine? 488. 
The authors explained the concept by noting that  “…the evolution of the field of 
behavioral medicine…has drawn heavily on theories of learning…animal 
physiological psychology and human psychophysiology, and…from research in social 
and clinical psychology”.  While, for the authors, psychosomatic medicine had 
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“traditionally emphasized etiology and pathogenesis of physical disease”, behavioural 
medicine  “tended to be more directly concerned with behavioral approaches to the 
treatment and prevention of physical disease.” The authors noted, however, that there 
was still “little agreement regarding the definition and scope of behavioral medicine”. 
In an attempt to bring clarity to the issue they quoted the definition of the field as 
agreed upon at the Yale Conference on Behavioral Medicine that had taken place in 
1977. In the Yale statement behavioral medicine was seen as “the field concerned 
with the development of behavioral-science knowledge and techniques relevant to the 
understanding of physical health and illness and the application of this knowledge and 
these techniques to diagnosis, prevention, treatment and rehabilitation.” Despite its 
theoretical ambiguities behavioral medicine as a concept was adopted widely and 
resulted in the establishing of the Society of Behavioral Medicine and the Journal of 
Behavioral Medicine. The concept biobehavioral, however, was scarcely mentioned 
in the Journal for almost three decades before it moved center stage in psychosomatic 
medicine. 
 
Psychosomatic outmaneuvered 
 
By the end of the 1990s a whole variety of concepts can be found addressing the 
psychosomatic issue in medicine in articles published in the Journal, such as 
psychophysiology489, psychobiology490, psychoendocrinology491, 
psychoneuroendocrinology492, psychoimmunology493, psychoneuroimmunology494, 
biopsychosocial495, behavioral medicine496 and biobehavioral497. Having all these new 
concepts claiming ground within the field of psychosomatic medicine, we may ask if 
there was any room left for the concept of psychosomatic in addressing the issue of 
“emotions and bodily changes” in medicine at the turn of the millenium, and if there 
was, what was its scope? 
 
In 2001 Waldstein and co-workers published a paper in the Journal entitled Teaching 
Psychosomatic (Biopsychosocial) medicine in United States Medical Schools: Survey 
Findings.”498 It is noteworthy, first, that the title treated psychosomatic and 
biopsychosocial as interchangeable concepts. In the survey itself a questionnaire was 
sent to 118 US medical schools, of which 54 responded. Among those only every fifth 
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reported that their schools used the concept of psychosomatic medicine in their 
curriculum. As for the rest, the concepts behavioral medicine and biopsychosocial 
medicine were used more frequently. The authors concluded that 
 
“Further incorporation of psychosomatic medicine in US medical school 
curricula is critical to the continued transition of medical field from a 
traditional biomedical model toward a biopsychosocial model with an 
increased emphasis on prevention and holistic evaluation and treatment of 
individuals. A biopsychosocial model can offer a scientific approach to the 
‘art of medicine’ by emphasizing the importance of communication and the 
systematic consideration of psychosocial factors pertinent to patients’ health 
status, psychosomatic medicine could be considered the basic and clinical 
science of healing.”. 
 
Here, again, for the authors the concept of psychosomatic medicine is interchangeable 
with the concept of biopsychosocial medicine despite the fact that the latter denotes, 
according to Engel’s own definition, a substantially broader approach in medical 
research and treatment. This trend in treating the concept psychosomatic as 
interchangeable with other concepts can be seen in several papers published in the 
Journal since 2000. Finally, in January 2009, the first editorial for the 71st volume of 
the Journal acknowledged the problem of the ambiguous use of the term 
psychosomatic in medical and lay use:  
 
“The term ‘psychosomatic’ has acquired a variety of meanings, and some of 
them quite negative. For example, a 1994 survey of newspapers in the United 
States and the United Kingdom found that, out of 215 articles in which the 
word ’psychosomatic’ was mentioned 34% used it in a stigmatizing, 
pejorative manner; it  often connotated a symptom or condition that was 
considered to be imaginary, unimportant, malingered, or due to a character 
flaw.”499 
 
The authors felt, after having acknowledged the burdens the concept psychosomatic 
had gained during the previous 79 years, that the time was ripe to resolve this 
perennial problem of conceptual ambiguity in psychosomatic medicine once and for 
all. They suggested that the title of the Journal Psychosomatic Medicine needed to 
have a subtitle Journal of Biobehavioral Medicine. As for the definition for the latter, 
the authors resorted to Merriam-Webster’s Medical Dictionary and the American 
Heritage Medical Dictionary, which define the concept biobehavioral as “relating to, 
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or involving the interaction of behavior and biological processes” and “relating to the 
interrelationships among psychosocial, behavioral, and biological processes, as in the 
progression or treatment of a disease”, respectively.  
 
The authors write that biobehavioral was “the best available adjective” since it covers 
“some of the best research we have been publishing, and the kind of articles we want 
to attract.” Furthermore, the concept “tends to connote a focus on observable or 
measurable independent variables, on surrogate (e.g., transient arrhytmia) or hard 
(e.g., myocardial infarction) medical outcomes, and on behavioral (e.g., non-
adherence) or biological (e.g., inflammatory) mediators”. The editorial emphasized, 
that this decision had been made after long consideration and the final decision was 
left in the hands of the Society. But perhaps, the authors felt, “some day in the not-
too-distant future, this journal may no longer be called Psychosomatic Medicine. It 
may eventually become Biobehavioral Medicine, or perhaps The Journal of 
Biobehavioral Medicine.” (italics original) 
 
The long-standing conceptual problem in psychosomatic medicine, a monistic vs. 
dualistic approach to the mind-body issue, was finally solved with one swift stroke, 
eliminating the psyche from the equation and replacing it with the concept of 
behaviour. Since the conceptual shift in the Journal is still under way, we cannot at 
the present tell whether it will be the final farewell to the die-hard concept of 
psychosomatic in medicine as a scientific concept. It is obvious, however, that today 
the concept of psychosomatic does not hold the position in the scientific debates in 
medicine it used to have a half century ago. 
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Chapter 11 - From scientific concept to everyday word 
 
Having now followed the life-cycle of the concept psychosomatic in medical theory 
and research, let us now ask if the concept of psychosomatic serves as an example of 
conceptual development in medicine and if there is a developmental pattern to be 
discerned in the description above. 
 
To answer the first question, whether the concept of psychosomatic stands as a token 
of conceptual development in medicine, we need to consider whether psychosomatic 
is, or was, indeed a scientific concept. This leads to the question of what do we 
actually mean by science.  
 
Reading contemporary treatises on the philosophy of science shows that there is no 
agreement among writers as to what, ultimately, constitutes a science.500 501 Bishop, 
for example, has listed eight different understandings of what science comprises:502 1) 
a mode of human activity to gain control over our environment and differentiated by 
practical crafts by being more systematic and reflective in its approach, 2) a body of 
theoretical knowledge providing understanding and explanations on why things are 
the way they are, 3) searching for universal laws that can be expressed in 
mathematical equations to discover, explain and predict natural phenomena. 4) as a 
particular set of procedures for exploring, testing and confirming hypotheses about 
nature, 5) a special way of knowing and justifying knowledge claims, 6) defined 
according its content, that is, science has a special ontology in its every particular 
field, 7) characterized by rigour, objectivity and precision in its methods and 
theoretical formulations contrasted with our everyday conceptions of nature and its 
phenomena, 8) science is what we consider to be science. 
 
Despite these different, although somewhat overlapping definitions of science, we 
like to think that there must be consensus on some general principles that apply to all 
scientific fields regardless of their objects of inquiry and theoretical and 
methodological differences. For example, there is a consensus that science must be 
open, that is, the methods and results of a particular study need to be available to the 
whole scientific community. But there are research centres, e.g. within the military 
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and the big pharma, who surely consider themselves to be doing science but who are 
rather selective in disclosing their findings to outsiders. Another generally agreed 
requirement for science is that science is critical. But that again requires openness to 
have all the data accessible to be criticised and, as just noted, that is not self-evident. 
And even when the data is there readily available, we need mutual trust to accept that 
the data is correct and the basic procedures and reporting of the research were correct. 
That is, that the instruments used measured what they were supposed to measure, they 
were properly calibrated, the results were recorded correctly and so on. Yet, that trust 
has been violated only too often, as we have read in scientific journals exposing 
fraudulent research reports. And when those fundamentals are fulfilled to call an 
inquiry a science, philosophers of science pose ontological and epistemological 
questions, such as how we justify the choice of an approach to certain phenomena and 
on what grounds we claim that our methods generate valid and reliable knowledge 
about the phenomena examined. Here opinions vary widely but to discuss them 
further is, however, beyond the scope of this essay. (I may note here that the best 
definition for science I have heard so far states that a discipline must be science if it 
has a chair at the University - especially at the University of Helsinki.503) 
 
In the apparent absence of absolute criteria presented by philosophers of science to 
define science, I will apply, for the purposes of this essay, the eighth definition 
number in the list above. That is, I shall adopt a sociological approach to the problem 
and ask how those involved with scientific research consider the essence of their trade 
to differ from non-science. The problem in this approach, however, is that scientists 
themselves seem to give different criteria for their work being scientific depending on 
the field they are working in. An anthropologist meets different criteria than a 
meteorologist simply because the objects of inquiry are different and thus the theories 
and methodologies they use must be different. Yet both like to think that they have 
met the scientific standards of their field once they have their papers accepted for 
publication in a scientific journal. We may hold, then, that the ultimate test for an 
inquiry to meet scientific criteria in a particular scientific field is acceptance for 
publication in a journal within that field. The criteria for a paper to be accepted for 
publication, in turn, are defined by those active in that particular area of research. The 
process has two stages, editorial selection and peer review, which evaluate whether 
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the paper submitted meets the scientific standards of the field of inquiry. This 
reasoning is circular, but it seems that the situation, too, indeed is circular. 
 
There seems to be more to science, however, than just having one’s paper published. 
If the criterion for science is what the scientific community considers to be a science, 
that is also expressed partly, and importantly, on the grounds of how research funding 
is allocated to scientists. That, in turn, is determined by scientists themselves, i.e. by 
those distinguished in their own fields and holding positions on various governmental 
committees and boards of trustees of private foundations dispensing funding to 
universities and research projects. This, again, is a circular conclusion. But, as we saw 
above, the situation seems to be circular in the sense that there are no absolute outside 
criteria to define science and that the scientific community itself establishes its own 
criteria for the scientificity of their trade.  
 
Yet another criterion for defining a scientific inquiry is the grounds on which a 
scientific community, a university, recruits new members. That is decided, again, by 
those who have gained positions within the particular scientific field. Just looking at 
the long and painstaking process of appointing a professor for a vacant chair in a 
medical faculty is illustrative enough, at least in Finnish universities. This 
phenomenon may, I believe, be observed in many if not all other faculties and 
universities.  
 
The scientific status of psychosomatic research 
 
Can we then consider the research conducted under the concept psychosomatic as 
scientific research in light of those three fundamentals described above, publishing 
policy, money allocation and recruitment process? Apparently yes. First, 
psychosomatic research was funded by prestigious foundations such as the 
Rockefeller and Josiah M. Macy. Second, the scientific community was self-elective 
in recruiting from among those active in various fields of medical research in 
established centres such as Harvard, Cornell and Johns Hopkins universities. As for  
publishing policy, let us examine more closely how those involved in medical 
publishing evaluated the scientific status of psychosomatic research. To find 
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representatives for this we may assume, that journals such as the New England 
Journal of Medicine (NEJM) and the Journal of the American Medical Association 
(JAMA) can be considered to be scientific journals (due if nothing else their 
impressive impact factors) and that the editors and peer reviewers that accept or reject 
papers submitted to those journals base their judgement on rigorous scientific criteria. 
How did they perceive the scientific status of psychosomatic studies? That question 
was answered in the Great Debate arranged at the 59th Annual Meeting of the 
American Psychosomatic Society in Monterey, California in 2001. (The transcriptions 
of the Debate were published in the Journal soon after the event.) 
 
The main question in the debate was, whether or not it had been scientifically 
established that psychosocial interventions can improve clinical outcomes in organic 
disease. Those voting for were Neil Schneiderman, a professor of psychology at the 
University of Miami and Redford Williams, a professor of psychiatry, psychology and 
medicine at  Duke University. Those opposed were Harvard Professor Emeritus 
Arnold Relman, a nephrologist and a former editor-in-chief of the NEJM 1977-1991 
and Harvard Senior Lecturer Marcia Angell, a former editor-in-chief of the NEJM 
1999-2000, after having served as executive editor for the journal for 21 years. The 
discussant of the debate was George Lundberg, professor of pathology at the 
University of Southern California, who had served as an editor of JAMA 1982-1999 
and who was, at the time of the debate, the editor-in-chief of  MedScape.  
 
When reading through the transcripts we may make two observations of importance 
in terms of this essay. First, no questions whatsoever were posed by those opposing 
the motion of the debate, that psychosomatic studies were not scientific. The problem 
was, rather, whether the studies published in the field so far were good science and 
whether the results obtained were convincing and warranted further efforts.  
 
As to the core issue in psychosomatic medicine, the mind-body problem, the 
opponents took a clear stand. Relman opens: 
 
“…Dr Angell and I are not interested in a general debate about the ‘mind-
body  connection’. Mind is obviously a function of the brain and brain is 
obviously an integral part of the body…The mechanisms by which brain and 
 184 
mind interact with the body may be debatable, but the fact of the connection 
is established and we do not doubt that.” 504 
 
The overall problem in psychosomatic medicine for Relman and Angell resided in 
whether there was “any good clinical evidence that psychological and social 
interventions can directly change the course of serious organic disease?”.  By 
“directly” the debaters meant definite effects via some biological mechanisms rather 
than through changes in a patient’s behaviour, be that improved compliance with the 
treatment given or adopting a healthier diet, for example. The conclusion for the 
opponents was that according to the studies published so far there was no scientific 
evidence whatsoever to support the idea that any such direct effect exists. Yet, the 
opponents agreed, there is some evidence that it is worthwhile to try to influence the 
patients’ behaviour in order to restore health, evidence that warrants further and larger 
studies on the matter. For the hypothesis of a direct effect from mind/brain to the 
body affecting the course of a somatic disease in any way Relman concluded, that 
there is no convincing evidence as yet. He stated bluntly, “we just look at the 
data…what is the evidence…we must be driven by the evidence and the evidence 
must be credible…show us the numbers, deal with your data critically, get enough 
numbers, use appropriate controls, randomize where you can, then we will follow the 
evidence.” The question was not that the opponents were in any way “biased against 
studies of psychosocial interventions”, but that those studies must be “conducted 
rigorously”, as Relman closed his case. The opponents did not thus claim that the 
psychosomatic studies published so far were not scientific as such, but that many of 
them had methodological flaws. Therefore, in order to raise their scientific standard, 
they needed to be “more rigorous” in their design and interpretation of the data.  
 
Concept deflated 
 
Apart from the question of the scientific status of psychosomatic studies there is 
another feature in the debate that is pertinent to this inquiry, a feature that was not 
directly addressed by the debaters, however. That is, although the debate was initiated 
by the Society, the concept psychosomatic was hardly mentioned in the transcribed 
version of the discussion. Instead, the participants resorted to using expressions such 
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as psychosocial factors and influence, and for the therapeutic measures the debaters 
did not refer to psychotherapy but to behavioral interventions. It is also noteworthy 
that when commenting on the great debate in the Journal in 2006, Freedland and co-
workers observed that the debate, although of importance, had prompted next to no 
discussion in the five years elapsing since the debate took place.505 The authors 
pointed out, that “the central issues [in psychosomatic medicine] are whether any 
form of emotional dysregulation has a causal role in any serious medical outcome, 
and if so, whether there is anything we can do about it”. The authors acknowledged 
that at that point in time one just could not know this for sure. More research was 
needed to resolve the issue, which was up to the “next generation of biobehavioral 
researchers” to do. (Italics mine).  
 
Now that the debaters presumably more or less deliberately avoided the concept of 
psychosomatic in their discussion, we may ask what happened to the concept? Were 
Friedman and Brown right, after all, in their claims that the term psychosomatic had 
lost its meaning and that the whole field of psychosomatic medicine was gone? As 
seen in the above, the question boils down to two issues, conceptual ambiguity and 
the mind-body problem. As for the first, when psychoanalysis was abandoned as a 
ground theory for psychosomatic medicine, no other theory of mind was able to claim 
its position. That was, I would claim, the very crux of the confusion in the field since 
1950s, as frequently lamented by those writing on conceptual problems in 
psychosomatic medicine. That is to say, that the confusion was not due to the 
methodology of the studies conducted, but to the conceptual structure of the whole 
psychosomatic endeavour, which had lost its explanatory principles for analysing the 
mind-body relation in medicine when psychoanalysis was out of favour. To try to 
replace psychoanalysis with principles derived from animal psychology 
(conditioning) and behaviorism (behavioral patterns) or physiology (stress) was of no 
avail since those substantially different approaches could not be brought within one 
coherent conceptual system and they all avoided the problem of mind in their 
theorizing. That confusion persisted for decades, eroding the concept of 
psychosomatic as a theoretical tool to advance research in the field. 
 
The second conceptual problem was in addressing the mind-body relation itself. 
Retaining the concept of psychosomatic, even though it had lost its theoretical 
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referentials, and taking a monistic position in a dualistic research setting led to a 
further blunting of psychosomatic as a conceptual tool to a point that it eventually 
became useless in medical thinking. As Dr. Schneiderman stated in the debate, “it is 
not about mind-body issues. In my opinion, there is no room for mind-body dualism 
in the 21st century”. With that statement he implied, that the concept of psychosomatic 
cannot be used as a scientific concept, since it denotes dualism in its very structure as 
had been noted so many times before. The concept needed, therefore, to be replaced 
with a more appropriate one for the inquiry. The choice fell on the concept of 
biobehaviorism, since it allegedly does not have any reference to man’s psychic world 
whatsoever (although Bernard Engel saw it merely a disguise for dualism in his 1986 
paper mentioned in Chapter 7). Thus at the turn of the millennium the time was 
deemed ripe to discard the old tool and seize a new one. By adopting the concept of 
biobehaviorism psyche was simply thrown out of the equation and the research 
focused on operationalising man’s behaviour and comparing the data so obtained to 
measurable changes in his or her physiology.  
 
Life of a medical concept 
 
Let us now turn to the second question, is there a discernible pattern in the life-cycle 
of the concept of psychosomatic? Vygotsky claims in his essay The Historical 
Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology, that the development of scientific concepts goes 
through five distinctive stages.506 In the first stage a new idea is introduced to a 
scientific discussion “which reforms the ordinary conception of the whole area of 
phenomena to which it refers.” In the case of the concept of psychosomatic in 
medicine, this stage consisted of the introduction of psychoanalysis to medicine, 
which reformed “the ordinary conception” of the area of phenomena to which it was 
applied, i.e. differentiating and understanding hysteric symptoms with novel concepts 
such as conversion and defence. 
 
In the second stage, Vygotsky writes how   
 
“the influence of these ideas spreads to adjacent areas. The idea is  stretched 
out…to material that is broader than what it originally covered. The idea 
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itself (or its application) is changed in the process, it becomes formulated in a 
more abstract way. The link with the material that engendered it is more or 
less weakened, and it only continues to nourish the cogency of the new idea.”  
 
In this stage Freud’s concept of conversion, which was originally intended to refer 
specifically to hysteric phenomena, was applied to somatic illnesses, i.e. “to material 
that is broader than what it originally covered”. Freud’s approach was, thus, taken 
from its original context to nourish “the cogency of the new idea”, as cast into the 
concept of psychosomatic in medicine. 
 
In the third stage  
 
“the idea controls more or less the whole discipline in which it originally 
arose…because the idea, as an explanatory principle, managed to take 
possession of the whole discipline…[and] adjusted to itself the concept on 
which the discipline was based, and now acts in concert with it.”  
 
In this stage, covering the 1940s, psychoanalytic ideas, especially in the form of 
Alexander’s writing on conversion and specificity, controlled the field of newly 
established field psychosomatic medicine. The content of the concept psychosomatic 
became almost synonymous with Alexander’s theoretical formulations. 
 
In the fourth stage of the process Vygotsky takes the view that  
 
“the idea breaks away from the basic concept… - at least in the form of a 
project defended by a single school… - this very fact pushes the idea to 
develop further. The idea remains the explanatory principle until the time that 
it transcends the boundaries of the basic concept.” 
 
As we have seen in the above, from the 1950s onwards Alexander’s formulations 
were questioned to the point of rejection and the concept of psychosomatic, 
eventually, broke away from psychoanalytic theory while remaining in use to denote 
the problem of the effect of the mind on the body, but seeking new theoretical 
content.  
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In the fifth and final stage of its development the idea expands to the point at which, 
as Vygotsky writes, “it may easily burst like soap-bubble…it enters a stage of 
struggle and negation which it now meets from all sides.” There had been, of course, 
voices opposed to the concept of psychosomatic from its very introduction, but that 
can be seen as a part of normal scientific debate. However, during the decades to 
follow, those clinging to the concept psychosomatic had to struggle their way through 
the negation which the concept met “from all sides”, as we have seen in the above. 
Eventually, the concept was pushed to its limits and reached the stage where it was 
abandoned and new concepts were introduced in  its place. The original problem, 
“emotions and bodily changes”, was reformulated and reconceptualised as a 
biobehavioral problem. As Vygotsky concludes, “when the idea has entirely separated 
itself from the facts that engendered it, developed to its logical extremes, carried to its 
ultimate conclusions, generalized as far as possible…obscured by many later 
developments and very remote from its direct roots and the social causes that 
engendered it…does a particular idea change from a scientific fact into a fact of social 
life again”. Then, “new ways are being proposed to interpret this particular discovery 
and the related facts” and “an idea which revolutionizes the science…ceases to 
exist.”507 Through this process the concept psychosomatic gradually lost its position 
as a scientific concept and it transformed to an everyday concept gaining its meaning, 
as everyday concepts do, according to the context it is used in everyday conversations 
and popular literature, without any fixed scientific content whatsoever. 
 
While Vygotsky based his hypothesis on the development of scientific concepts on 
the conceptual development in psychology, it seems that it also applies to the 
development of the concept of psychosomatic in medicine. Whether the analysis 
above holds and whether Vygotsky’s developmental pattern can be discerned in the 
development of other medical concepts, let alone in other sciences, are questions 
falling to the realm of historiography as will be discussed shortly in more detail. As 
there are no other attempts, to my reading, to apply Vygotsky’s approach in analysing 
the conceptual development in medicine, or any other sciences for that matter, the 
analysis above needs to be seen as a preliminary and in need to be supported or 
falsified by re-analysis or using other scientific concepts for case studies. I do, 
however, assume that similar patterns may be discerned in the development of other 
medical concepts, such as hypnosis and tuberculosis as discussed above. In the case of 
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the former, Mesmer postulated that the phenomena he observed within the clinical 
encounter were caused by physical forces acting between the participants of the event. 
To deal with the phenomena on a theoretical level he had to introduce a conceptual 
system to structure and develop his hypothesis. The conceptual change from animal 
magnetism to hypnosis took place when the phenomena were suggested to be based 
not on any physical interference from physician to patient but on the properties of the 
patient’s nervous system induced by the physician. This relocation of the 
phenomenon needed to be reconceptualised accordingly. Likewise, the explanatory 
principle of phthisis had long resided in dyscrasia of the blood producing nodules in 
the lungs. When the locus of the disease was relocated to the changes in the cellular 
structure of lung tissue, the disease was reconceptualised as tuberculosis. And when 
the mycobacterium was established as the sine qua non for tuberculosis, the 
explanatory principle was reconceptualised from dyscrasia to bacterial infection. 
Fleck made similar observations in his book when he followed the relocation and 
reconceptualisation of syphilis from foul blood to an infectious agent as the 
explanatory principle for the signs and symptoms of the disease. In all these cases a 
deeper analysis is needed to evaluate whether the stages presented by Vygotsky apply 
in their subsequent conceptual development.  
 
It is noteworthy that a contemporary four-volume authorative critical assessment of 
Vygotsky’s legacy508 does not address Vygotsky’s hypothesis of conceptual 
development in science. The critical discussion on Vygotsky’s thinking focuses 
mainly on his theory of the development of childhood cognition. In that discussion 
there are two arguments of interest in terms of the present essay. First, it had been 
argued that Vygotsky was concentrating too much on the development of language as 
a tool for human thinking while underestimating the importance of other sign systems 
for human cognition and communication.509 This may be true when discussing the 
development of human thinking in general but since the focus in this essay is the 
nature, acquisition and use of theoretical concepts in medical thinking, there is, in my 
opinion, no need to delve here in the finer details of the development of childhood 
cognition. It had also been pointed out that the nature of sign function in human 
cognition is somewhat ambiguous in Vygotsky’s theory.510 Again, while that may be 
so, that does not bear any fundamental significance for the focus of this thesis, the 
role of theoretical concepts in medical thinking.  
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Before moving on from concepts in medical theory to the role of medical concepts in 
clinical practice, a few comments are appropriate to discuss the problems of medical 
historiography to clarify the approach adopted in this essay for a historical analysis.  
 
Implications for medical historiography 
 
As emphasised in this essay, to understand the development of medicine through the 
use of its concepts we need to apply historical method in our inquiry. Since the unit of 
analysis is the nature and role of a medical concept in its historical context, we need 
to be cautious, as in any history writing, to avoid attributing our present ideas to 
concepts used in the past. It seems that this has not always been achieved in 
presentations on the history of medicine. For example, we often read sentences such 
as “Mesmer discovered hypnotism in the 1770”511 and “hypnosis had been 
popularized…by Franz Mesmer”512. Even a recent dictionary of psychiatry states that 
Mesmer was the first “who gave a demonstration of hypnotism (animal magnetism) in 
Vienna”.513 In light of historical evidence, this is not and cannot be so. Mesmer did 
not give demonstrations of hypnotism but of animal magnetism due to the sheer fact 
that the concept of hypnotism was not available at the time of his practice. Even more 
so, when we realise that the content of the concept of hypnosis is fundamentally 
incommensurable with the concept of animal magnetism. To ascribe hypnosis to 
Mesmer’s thinking is as groundless as to claim that those using hypnosis as a 
therapeutic tool today are, in fact, using animal magnetism in their practice. Likewise, 
when we speak of contagious diseases it would make no sense to our ancestors if we 
were to talk with them using concepts such as bacterial infection or immunity. And 
although the idea of the spread of a disease from one person to another has existed for 
ages (based on everyday observations), there was no conceptual apparatus available 
until the late 19th century to address the phenomenon in the sense we do in our 
contemporary medicine. It would also sound odd to us if some would claim in the 
case of an anaemic patient, that the problem is in the dyscrasia of the patient’s blood, 
even though the constitution of the patient’s blood is, in point of fact, flawed. All this 
underlines the importance of understanding the content of medical concepts when 
exploring the history of medical thinking. As scientific concepts cannot be transferred 
 191 
from one theory to another, they cannot be moved around history without obscuring 
their theoretical content.  
 
This also applies to writing about the development of psychosomatic medicine. Yet, 
we find articles entitled, for example, Psychosomatic Medicine in the Nineteenth 
Century 514. In his paper the author uses the term psychosomatic denoting the mind-
body problem in general and, in so doing, writing the term psychosomatic into the 
minds of those who had tackled the problem well before the introduction of the 
concept psychosomatic into medical theory. From the standpoint of this essay this not 
only erroneous but, and more importantly, it obscures our understanding of our 
predecessors’ thinking when we attempt to discern the theoretical positions they held 
when addressing the mind-body problem in medicine. On the other hand, when Erwin 
Ackerknect, a distinguished historian of medicine, wrote that “Psychosomatic 
medicine begins with the Greeks”, he was quick to point out that “when it 
[psychosomatic medicine] is defined in terms of a partial, or sometimes total, 
psychogenesis of disease, account being taken of the possibilities of psychotherapy, 
the origins of psychosomatic medicine go back…in time.” Why Ackerknecht took the 
trouble to explain his position when addressing the mind-body problem in medicine 
with the concept psychosomatic, instead of addressing the issue directly without this 
explanatory detour, he does not, however, divulge in his paper. To give yet another 
example of the blurry use of concepts when writing about the history of 
psychosomatic medicine, Edward Shorter lumps a whole lot of symptoms and 
ailments as addressed in medicine over the last two hundred years under the concept 
of psychosomatic in his book From Paralysis to Fatigue – A History of 
Psychosomatic Illness in the Modern Era. 515 For Shorter, a variety of symptoms 
qualify as psychosomatic long before the concept had come into use. This solution 
does not only impose our ideas on the minds of past generations of physicians but also 
on the minds of their patients. One may claim, of course, that Shorter used the term 
psychosomatic to refer to ill-defined symptoms and the mind-body problem in general 
without any theoretical assumptions whatsoever. This is not, however, the case. 
Shorter writes in the Preface of his book, that  
 
“in psychosomatic illness the body’s response to stress or unhappiness is 
orchestrated by the unconscious…no physical lesion of any kind exists and 
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the symptoms are literally psychogenic; that is to say, they arise in the 
mind…psychogenesis – the conversion of stress or psychological problems 
into physical symptoms – is one of the nature’s basic mechanisms in 
mobilising the body to cope with mental distress.”516  
 
Psychosomatic, psychogenic, unconscious, stress, conversion, are all concepts loaded 
with theoretical assumptions, as we have seen in the discussion above. The problem is 
not that Shorter uses those concepts and definitions as the starting point for his 
inquiry, but in that he seems to take them as given, without a single hint of reflecting 
the theoretical assumptions embedded in his position. Some historians would, I 
assume, find that problematic, to say the least, for a historian who is writing about the 
history of anything.  
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Chapter 12 - Concepts in medical thinking 
 
 
Having examined the birth and life of the concept of psychosomatic in medicine, let 
us now look more closely at the instrumental role of concepts in medical thinking. 
While the nature and role of concepts in the development of medical theory remained 
somewhat superfluous in Fleck’s analysis, it is of interest that Kuhn did come close to 
the idea of concepts as tools for scientific thinking in his theory of the development of 
science. Kuhn wrote that, when examining normal science, “we shall want…to 
describe…research as a strenous and devoted attempt to force nature into the 
conceptual boxes supplied by professional education”.517 Here concepts appear not so 
much as tools but rather as moulds into which nature is squeezed in the course of 
research. A little later he writes, however, how “a paradigm can…insulate the 
[scientific] community from those socially important problems that are not reducible 
to the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and 
instrumental tools the paradigm supplies”.518 (Italics mine) While Kuhn’s use of his 
central concept paradigm was somewhat ambiguous, here he sees it as constituted by 
concepts that are used as tools in scientific inquiry. Kuhn also acknowledged the 
concrete role of concepts in scientific research when he wrote that “if, for example, 
the student of Newtonian dynamics ever discovers the meaning of terms like ‘force’, 
‘mass’, ‘space’, and ‘time’, he does so less from the incomplete though sometimes 
helpful definitions in his text than by observing and participating in the application of 
these concepts to problem-solution”.519 And, finally, Kuhn saw science as developing 
through the development of concepts:  
 
“So long as the tools a paradigm supplies continue to prove capable of 
solving the problems it defines, science moves fastest and penetrates most 
deeply through confident employment of those tools. The reason is clear. As 
in manufacture so in science – retooling is an extravagance to be reserved for 
the occasion that demands it. The significance of crises is the indication they 
provide that an occasion for retooling has arrived.”520  
 
Despite occasionally equating paradigm with scientific concepts and seeing their 
instrumental role in the development of science, Kuhn did not develop his theory 
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further along that line of thinking, but stuck to his idea of paradigm changes through 
revolutions. Kuhn’s concept of paradigm, however, is too broad and ill-defined to be 
used to analyse conceptual changes in medical theory. Also, Kuhn’s concept 
revolution is historically too crude to understand the theoretical development in 
medicine. As Latour has put it, “revolution is not an explanatory category in the 
history of medicine, since medicine is revolutionised constantly”.521  
 
The problem of not bringing the concept of concept to the fore in analysing scientific 
development may be partly owing, as Hampsher-Monk has suggested, to the lack of 
interest in conceptual history in the Anglophone world in general, where “anything as 
abstract as a ‘concept’ could [not] be a possible subject of primary historical 
investigation.”522 This, I suspect, may be owing to the ambiguous use of the concept 
of concept in English language referring simultaneously to an idea, word and notion, 
as noted in the Introduction. The problem of this broad understanding of concept is 
not, however, only semantic, but it is based on a more fundamental conception of the 
nature and role of concepts in our thinking. To illustrate this, let us examine how Paul 
Thagard, professor of philosophy at the University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 
addresses the development of medical thinking in his book How Scientists Explain 
Disease523, published in 1999. 
 
The concept of concept 
 
For Thagard, all scientific change takes place through “major changes in conceptual 
organization”,524 which involves more than merely adding new or modifying old 
concepts within the prevailing theory. These changes must be seen as simultaneous 
social and cognitive interactive processes. In this process the social cannot be reduced 
to the psychological and vice versa. 525 This is why, for Thagard, scientific 
development cannot be comprehended by either cognitive or sociological 
explanations alone; those approaches need to be integrated to gain a fuller picture of 
how scientific development takes place.  He calls his approach  Integrated Cognitive-
Social Explanation Schema where “cognitive and social explanations of conceptual 
change can coexist”.526  
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Thagard takes the representational theory of mind (RTM) as his background theory 
for addressing the nature and role of concepts in human thinking. RTM, in turn, has 
its roots in the development of cognitive science. The problem is, however, that there 
seems to be no consensus on what is meant with the concept of concept in RTM. That 
is, when trying to explain concepts as mental representations, it is the nature of those 
representations that remains controversial.527  
 
Jerry Fodor, a professor of philosophy at Rutgers University and one of the main 
proponents of RTM, has criticised cognitive science for not taking seriously enough 
the fact that at the heart of cognitive science is the theory of concepts.528 This can be 
seen in the fact that within RTM there are various understandings of the concept of 
concept such as definition, stereotype, prototype and abstraction of belief system.529 
Fodor writes, that “most of cognitive psychology, including the psychology of 
memory, perception, and reasoning, is about how we apply concepts. And most of the 
rest is how we acquire the concepts that we thus apply”.530 As for the latter, RTM 
holds that some concepts are innate, belonging to the “primitive basis from which 
complex mental representations are constructed” whereas the rest are learned. There 
is no agreement, however, where to draw the line in between those two.531  
 
I shall not go any deeper into the internal debates within cognitive science on this 
matter, but let us take a closer look at the issue of concept through Fodor’s approach 
to understand better the problem at hand. What interests us here is, first, that Fodor 
does not seem to differentiate between word and concept but treats them as 
interchangeable terms. Fodor writes, for example, that “I can’t…afford to agree that 
the content of the concept H2O is different from the content of the concept 
WATER.”532 He does concede, however, that they can be seen as different concepts, 
words, that is. For us the latter concession does not suffice, since H2O and water are 
different not only as concepts/words but they are different precisely because their 
content is different. H2O is a theoretical concept based on the conceptual system used 
in chemistry and refers specifically to the atomistic structure of water within the 
theory and nothing more, whereas water is an everyday word which gains its meaning 
according to the context in which it is used. For example, in the Finnish language the 
expression “throwing water” (heittää vettä) the word water has different meanings 
when we are talking about a child playing on a beach than about a young gentleman 
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standing against a wall on his way home from a pub. We may say, then, that everyday 
concepts (terms, notions, words) are always open and polysemous, while scientific 
concepts, in order to be scientific concepts, need to be closed and monosemous as 
they gain meaning in relation to the theoretical system they are a part of and that only.    
 
As to the acquisition of concepts, Fodor illustrates the process using a doorknob as an 
example. He writes: “DOORKNOB [as a concept] expresses a property that things 
have in virtue of their effects on us…being a doorknob is just having the property that 
minds like ours reliably lock to in consequence of experience with typical 
doorknobs533. (Italics original). Furthermore, “Doorknobs [as things] are constituted 
by their effects on our minds”534 (italics original). What is problematic in this 
approach is that this example takes doorknobs and minds, first, as ahistorical, passive 
and given and, second, it supposes that things have effects on our minds as such – 
echoing the Lockean idea of human mind as tabula rasa. In reality, for someone who 
has never seen a doorknob, and in the course of the history of humankind there have 
been many, the protuberance on a surface does not stand out as a doorknob through a 
mere reflection in our mind, that is, no physical impression upon the person’s sensory 
apparatus spontaneously creates a concept of doorknob in the mind (leaving aside the 
problem of word vs. concept vs. idea). In order for that to happen there needs to be, to 
start with, someone to show the person who has never seen a door that this is a door 
and this is how it works. That process can be readily observed in small children taking 
their first steps and being curious about everything around them and observing the 
way doors are used by others until they grow tall enough to reach the doorknob. That, 
in turn, leads those others to lock the doors to the places they do not want the children 
to go, adding to the child’s understanding of the function of the door and its knob.  
 
When a child understands how the doorknob functions s/he may point to it with a 
finger when s/he wants the door to be opened. The pointing at the doorknob is a social 
event, that is, it is not for the doorknob but it is for the others. That moment is among 
the first steps of acquiring the sign function necessary for our communication. As the 
child matures s/he reaches a stage when s/he is able to acquire verbal signs through 
the interaction with others to add to the finger’s pointing at the door. “Toh”, uttered 
the one-year-old Valtteri the other day and pointed at the doorknob with his finger 
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when wanting me to open the door to my study. “Toh” is not Finnish (or any other 
language to my knowledge) but it still had enormous communicative power for me on 
that particular moment, while it would probably mean nothing to others not initiated 
to the context if I were to present the expression “toh” merely in a written form.  
Now that the boy has grown he has learned to say “avaa” (open). Yet, it will take 
some time for him learn, hopefully, the niceties of human communication, such as 
using the wording “ole hyvä” (please). This enlarges the semiotic function of his 
expression beyond a mere gesture (finger) or a single sound (toh) to a whole utterance 
(open the door, please) as a semiotic device in our communication. It seems, then, that 
although Fodor does refer to experience when describing concept acquisition he 
leaves the matter at that without penetrating into the actual experiential process which 
is, by necessity, dialogical and historical. 
 
In light of the theoretical approach adopted in this essay the question of where to draw 
the line between innate and acquired concepts (even in the sense of ideas) is arbitrary. 
As a child cannot exist without continuous interaction with other people from the very 
moment s/he leaves the mother’s womb, it follows that it is practically impossible to 
differentiate what mental contents are innate and what are acquired during a child’s 
development. If we understand concept as an idea cast into a word (or other sign), we 
can safely claim that there are no innate concepts whatsoever but they are all acquired 
through social interaction.  
 
Returning to Thagard, he asserts, when applying the RTM to the problem of medical 
concepts, that people “presumably have a mental representation for the concept 
bacteria that makes possible their use of the word bacteria.535 But Thagard does not go 
any deeper into how these mental representations come about as concepts. He writes, 
that “although representational accounts of conceptual change do not tell the whole 
story, there remains ample reason to describe conceptual change in part as change in 
mental representations..:”536 A full theory would, in turn, be able to 
“integrate…representational, referential and social aspects” 537 of conceptual change 
in science. I do agree with Thagard’s observation that RTM as a background theory is 
not able to do this. As Müller and Overton have noted, when discussing the problems 
in  RTM, if a theory of knowing “treats the objectivity of the world as a priori given, 
insisting of precoded information, and if meaning is merely the processing and 
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storage of this information in different codes, then all empirical inquiry into 
transformational dimensions of cognitive development becomes marginalized.”538 
That is, the stimulus - computing - response schema is much too simple to understand 
the development, acquisition and use of concepts in human thinking and 
communication. Reducing thinking to a brain process, as done e.g. by Churchland539, 
is as problematic as to claim that it is the eye that sees or the ear that hears. The brain 
does not think any more than an eye does see or an ear does hear. All those organs 
are, obviously, necessary for seeing, hearing and thinking but none of them can 
perform these activities on their own. One needs only make a simple thought 
experiment to support this claim. Let us dissect from a newborn an eye, an ear and 
brain and put them in separate jars with nutritients to keep them biologically alive. 
Does the eye then see, or the ear hear, or the brain think? Indeed, what kind of 
thoughts would the dissected brain of a newborn develop if preserved, say, twenty 
years in a jar? We may conclude with reasonable safety, that none whatsoever. Brains 
do not think. People do.  
 
The RTM schema is, thus, too simplistic to understand the nature and role of concepts 
in human thinking because it leaves out the necessary constituents of human 
cognition, that is, its sociohistorical determinants. This problem is also acknowledged 
by Thagard, when he calls for a theory that could  “integrate…representational, 
referential and social aspects” to understand the development of medical thinking. 
When RTM could not help him to achieve this goal, he resorted to deriving and 
integrating explanations from psychological and sociological theories. As we saw in 
the history of the concept psychosomatic, such an integrative approach does not hold, 
since bringing together theoretical concepts from different disciplines only leads to 
conceptual disarray.  
 
I have argued for the need to consider socio-historical context when explaining the 
role of concepts as tools for medical thinking in general. However when it comes to 
the medical consultation in particular, even this modification may prove insufficient 
for a full understanding. Let us, then, analyse the features of clinical communication 
in greater detail and see whether this is the case.  
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Clinical dialogue 
 
Mikael Leiman, a professor of psychology at the University of Joensuu, Finland, has 
studied clinical dialogue in a psychotherapeutic context and developed Vygotsky’s 
theory of the instrumental role of language in human communication toward a more 
semiotic and dialogic understanding of the issue under a rubric sign-mediated activity 
theory.540 541 When analysing psychotherapeutic dialogues Leiman drew on the Soviet 
Russian philosophers of language Valentin Voloshinov and Mihail Bakhtin, who were 
the main protagonists of the so-called Leningrad circle542, a group of scholars active 
at the time Vygotsky was conducting his studies on childhood development.  
 
Valentin Voloshinov (1895-1936) introduced a theory of cognition in his book 
Marksizm I filosofija jazyka (published in Russia in 1929, English translation in 1973 
Marxism and the Philosophy of Language543) where human communication is seen as 
a sign-mediated semiotic phenomenon. For Voloshinov, human consciousness 
emerges, develops and takes shape through sign processes. Anything that exists has 
the potential to be used as a sign, that is, to mediate meaning between itself and that 
which it represents.544 Signs emerge within inter-individual communicative processes 
where communication is mediated by physical means of gestures, expressions, 
intonations, voices etc. An individual consciousness operates by the signs available in 
the particular time and place the individual lives.  
 
For Voloshinov, an uttered word is a sign par excellence. He concurs with Vygotsky 
when noting that a word as a physical sound composition has no meaning by itself but 
acquires meaning only through social interaction. Through this interaction a word 
becomes not only a mediator of interpersonal communication but also acts as a 
mediator of the individual's inner communication, his inner speech. Our thoughts are 
mediated by words and the act of thinking is, essentially, an act of inner dialogue.545  
 
A word is not, however, imbued only with a specific and closed dictionary-like 
meaning referring to some constant phenomenon. Instead, it resides in a continuous 
stream of denotations and connotations depending upon the context of the utterance 
taking place within a dialogue between individuals. It follows that no language is 
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stable, unchangeable or closed as a system. It is, instead, a continuously generative 
and open process implemented in the social-verbal interaction of the people who use 
the language for their everyday communication.546  
 
Sharing Voloshinov’s idea of the socially developed sign-mediation of meaning 
Mikhail Bakhtin emphasised, that what is expressed by one to the other contains not 
only the referential object (that which is spoken about) but the expression is 
simultaneously modified by the anticipation of the other. As Bakhtin notes in his 
study on Dostoevsky:  
 
“dialogue… is directed both toward the referential object of 
speech…and…toward another discourse, toward someone else’s speech…by 
taking it into account, responding to it, anticipating it…The individual 
manner in which a person structures his own speech is determined to a 
significant degree by his peculiar awareness of another’s words, and by his 
means for reacting to them.” 547  
 
Applied to a clinical context this means that when a patient tells the reason s/he is 
visiting the physician s/he is not only reporting his or her problem as a neutral 
phenomenon to a neutral listener; the patient’s utterance is modified according to how 
s/he anticipates the physician’s expectations and possible responses in that particular 
situation.  
 
This anticipatory feature in human communication is not confined only to clinical 
situations, of course, but it is present in all communicative acts be they conversations, 
speeches or written accounts such as this essay. That is, when writing an article, say, 
to a medical journal, the author anticipates the forum and audience when expressing 
his or her ideas and formulates them accordingly.  
 
To give an everyday example of anticipation in a professional conversation, let us 
picture a car repairman who is listening to his client’s account of a strange noise in 
the rear when driving. When explaining the problem the client anticipates what s/he 
thinks is the appropriate way to explain the problem to the repairman to be sure he 
understands what is wrong. When the repairman listens to the client’s explanation he 
listens to it in light of what he knows about the structure and function of cars and the 
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possible reasons for such a sound to appear when driving. The problem is rarely 
solved by only listening to the client’s description, however. Questions are needed, 
and when the repairman modifies his questions he is simultaneously anticipating the 
client. That is, his expressions are different if he is conversing with a fragile old nun 
with her first and only -71 Morris or with a young businessman with a brand new 
BMW.  And if the repairman anticipates the client erroneously, the encounter may 
fail. Indeed, it would probably be damaging to the customer relationship if the 
repairman were to start asking questions about the car owner’s marital life when 
mounting the bolts. On the other hand, if the car is in a seriously neglected condition 
and the owner does not look any better, it might be anticipatory for the repairman to 
consider the owner’s ability to maintain a car, let alone to drive it.  
 
The similarities of the problems of car repairmen and physicians when dealing with 
their clients and patients are obvious; both engage in a dialogical relation with the 
other when discussing the referential object (odd sound in the rear when driving, pain 
in the left knee when walking). This dialogical relation is constituted not only by 
reacting to verbal stimuli sent by the other, but by anticipating the possible responses 
of the other in advance and formulating one’s utterances and gestures accordingly. 
Our modes of anticipation are there a priori, gained through education and experience 
with others, in both professional and domestic life. Indeed, what we in medicine call a 
“clinical eye” is largely the ability to anticipate the other in order to formulate the 
right questions at the right moments for the right patients to be able draw right 
conclusions, a cognitive process familiar to us in many detective stories such as those 
written by Conan Doyle and what Peirce calls abduction.548   
 
The problem a client or a patient has is identified through the dialogue, but the 
diagnosis is rarely established through that dialogue alone. More often that not a 
physical examination is needed applying the theoretical and practical knowledge of 
the structure and function of the object in question (car, knee) and of the possible 
ways it can be flawed. In this sense the conduct of an encounter in a garage and in a 
surgery are similar. Yet, there is more to be drawn from Bakhtin’s approach to human 
communication than the idea of anticipation modifying a dialogue, that is, the tension 
between everyday language and scientific language. 
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Polyphony and monologue1  
 
The language we use in our encounters is not exact, fixed and closed, but open to all 
kinds of nuances and interpretations, as we can see in our everyday 
misunderstandings and quarrels. Scientific language, by contrast, attempts to be 
precise in its concepts and expressions. In medical consultation our everyday 
language and scientific language meet.  
 
As we have noted above, the way we express ourselves has developed through 
continuous interaction with other people. Our speech is, thus, moulded not only by 
our individual traits and capacities but also by the time, place and people with whom 
we live our lives. This is not only a matter of adopting a local language, dialect and 
style, but also of content. Ideas we have about health and illness vary among local 
traditions throughout the globe as has been vividly demonstrated by medical 
anthropologists. We physicians are also subjected to all of this. Despite the fact that 
the medicine we practice is based on scientific principles and research, we have 
developed our ways of thinking and expressing our thoughts from our own culture 
and immediate surroundings long before starting medical school. Yet, we like to think 
that since medicine is based on science, we doctors are free from cultural assumptions 
and peculiarities when practising our trade. It is, however, easily discerned that when 
one goes from one country to another one encounters different medical ideas and 
practices. Despite all this variability in the way we practice, we physicians do not like 
to make haphazard guesses, toss a coin, or appeal to supernatural powers when setting 
diagnoses and prescribing treatments. Instead, when conversing with our patients we 
attempt to use scientific reasoning and rely on the ideas we have about the structure, 
workings and malfunctions of the human body and mind as gained through medical 
research and cast in scientific concepts.  
 
                                                
1 Polyphony and monologue are standard expressions in English Bakhtin translations 
and are used as such in what follows. 
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The simultaneous presence of our everyday expressions and scientific concepts in a 
consultation creates a certain tension in the clinical dialogue. That tension can be 
seen, to use Bakhtin´s expression, as a tension between the polyphony of everyday 
speech and the monologue of scientific language.549 Now that the way we speak has  
developed through continuous interaction with others, our everyday expressions are 
imbued with the voices of those with whom we have associated. Indeed, we all are 
able to recognise in our speech phrases, intonations, opinions and ideas acquired from 
our parents, siblings, teachers, friends, spouses and associates. For example, every 
medical student (including myself, long ago) has had some revered senior consultant 
during clinical training periods and has not only clumsily used the terms and 
intonations the senior was using, but also copied his or her gestures and even the way 
of walking. This “polyphonic nature of life itself”, as Bakhtin expresses it, is present 
in all our expressions in one way or another. It is in the midst of this polyphony that 
science provides us uniformity and stability by offering us conceptual and practical 
tools to practice our trade as physicians. 
 
Yet, there is even more in our everyday expressions than mere polyphony of ideas, 
opinions and customs derived from our social surroundings. As all of us practising 
physicians know, some of our patients visit us with symptoms that do not worry or 
bother them, but because someone else is worried and bothered. To give an example, I 
recently examined a small birthmark on the buttock of a middle-aged truck driver. 
The mark looked completely harmless, and since it had been there since birth without 
changing its appearances I told him that there was really nothing to worry about. The 
man just nodded quietly while pulling up his trousers. But why was he seeing me with 
that birthmark at this particular moment? When asked him about it, he told me that 
the mark did not bother him a bit, but his wife had become extremely worried because 
her brother had recently died of skin cancer. Now that my patient had got tired of his 
wife’s worrying about his birthmark, he had finally agreed to come and show it to me. 
When I suggested that perhaps we should remove the mark to ease the man’s burden 
with the worried wife, I noticed beads of sweat on his forhead. It then turned out, that 
he had come to see a mature male doctor in the first place, because he was reticent 
about showing his intimate parts to a female physician for such a small reason. It also 
turned out that he was scared to death of needles. We then had a man-to-man 
conversation where I told him that I also hate needles if I am not on the blunt end of 
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them. We then decided to try to appease the wife with a re-examination of the mark 
after a few months. If there were no changes to be discerned, we would apply wait-
and-see policy and hope that the wife would be content with that.  
 
As can be seen in the example above, there was, and I would maintain that there 
always are, more actors present in the surgery than what meets the physician’s eye. 
Leiman calls this phenomenon the epiphanic quality of signs.550 That is, when 
referring to the other, a sign causes it, him or her to be present in the consultation in 
one way or another. In this case, the patient’s utterances acted as signs bringing in the 
voice of the wife who  became a part of the consultation and whom we needed to 
anticipate when deciding what to do with the man’s birthmark. Therefore, we have to 
add yet another parameter to our equation of the structure and conduct of the clinical 
consultation: those who are not physically present in the surgery, but who are present 
in the polyphony of the patient’s utterances as they unfold during the dialogue, 
modifying the content of what is discussed and for what reasons. 
 
As counterpoint to our polyphonic everyday speech, medical textbooks and journals 
attempt to formalize the language we use, since in order to be scientific, an expression 
cannot have multiple and contradictory meanings. A 2 cm stone in the gall bladder is 
a 2 cm stone in the gall bladder. Haemoglobin 14.2 gm/dL is Haemoglobin 14.2/dL. 
Type A beta haemolytic streptococci in one´s throat are type A beta haemolytic 
streptococci in one´s throat. In the attempt to eradicate multiple meanings in its 
expressions science constitutes, in Bakhtin’s terms, a monologic form of knowledge. 
The physician's task is to derive from the patient’s polyphonic utterances, i.e. from the 
variety of opinions, beliefs, fears, or whatever expressed (implicit or explicit) point of 
views s/he may present during the consultation, those aspects that are pertinent to the 
aim of the consultation, that is, to transform the material acquired into medical 
concepts to establish a diagnosis. Through that process the polyphony of the patient’s 
utterances is reduced to a ”systematically monologized whole”, as Bakhtin expresses 
it.551  
 
But if that transformative process is applied mechanically and rigorously, it may 
transform the patient into a ”voiceless object” 552 of medical examination. The patient 
is not, however, a mute specimen in the laboratory and s/he never wholly fits into the 
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”Procrustean bed”553 of any theory or diagnostic conclusion. Therefore, polyphonism 
cannot, and should not, be totally monologized and abolished from medical 
consultations but needs to be heard and acknowledged instead. And it is precisely on 
this axis between monology of medical concepts and the polyphony of utterances in a 
clinical dialogue where the misunderstandings and discontent among patients 
regarding their physicians (and vice versa) emerge. While a physician may be correct 
in medical diagnosis s/he may not notice amongst the patient´s polyphony 
(approaching sometimes a cacophony) those aspects and worries that are crucial to the 
patient. “She did not listen to me” the patient may complain. On the other hand, if the 
physician fails to establish a correct diagnosis, the patient may complain: “He just 
kept asking these questions about my life while I had this tumour in my breast all the 
time”. 
 
A physician needs, thus, to operate with and oscillate between these two modes of 
expression, the polyphony of everyday language and the monologue of medical 
concepts. Yet clinical consultation does not proceed in a logically structured manner. 
Both participants to the dialogue listen and anticipate each other’s questions, answers, 
gestures and intonations in a constant interplay. There are always returns, loops and 
dead ends and the whole process may even take a wrong route from the very 
beginning. That is why a medical consultation cannot be cast into any preformulated 
script or notation. But there is still the main theme to be maintained, that is, to attain 
the goal of the consultation, a diagnosis. 
 
Consultation as a joint activity 
 
Let us now try to illustrate the above by following a clinical consultation from its very 
beginning. A person has, say, a sudden thrust of chest pain. His or her primary 
response to the pain may be just an abrupt change of physical posture. This is a purely 
motor response and it contains no meaning. But as soon as the event becomes 
conscious it becomes a subject of inner dialogue: ”what…?”. This inner dialogue 
seeks meaning through a dialogic question-answer analysis of the possible cause of 
the pain. The content of this dialogue is determined through the socio-historical 
milieu in which the person has acquired his or her ability to use the language and the 
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ideas carried by it in terms of possible inferences of this particular occasion (evil eye? 
heartburn? myocardial ischaemia?). If the pain ceases with no further consequences 
the person may consider it  a coincidental phenomenon and leave it at that. But if the 
person communicates his or her pain to others, the dialogue initiated develops 
following the available inferences on the nature and cause of the symptom and the 
ensuing therapeutic actions. If the problem is not solved by means of domestic 
dialogues and measures, it may lead to a decision to seek medical advice, when 
available. 
 
A person thus visits a physician because s/he (or someone on his or her behalf) has 
considered him or her to be in need of medical attention. During the ensuing dialogue, 
the physician’s primary aim is to arrive at a diagnosis. That aim determines the 
physicians actions. When the physician listens to the patient’s utterances s/he has a set 
of possible diagnoses at his or her disposal and s/he attempts to narrow these down to 
arrive, eventually, at one. (Arriving at the conclusion that there is nothing medically 
wrong with the patient is also a diagnosis). This aim is shared by the patient. S/he also 
wants to find a medical explanation, a diagnosis, that is, for his or her problem. After 
all, this is the very reason why s/he has decided to see a physician instead of, say, a 
homeopath or a faith healer. Medical consultation can, thus, be seen as a joint activity 
between the patient and the physician aiming at a common goal, the diagnosis, and 
that goal determines the subsequent actions for the participants to reach it. The role of 
medical concepts in medical consultation is, thus, preformative. That is, the 
physician’s thinking is preset with a limited number of goals cast in concepts which 
determine the set of procedures to be taken to transform the patient’s complaints to 
them even before the patient has uttered anything in the surgery.  
 
The patient now sits in the consultation room ready to give his or her opening 
presentation that s/he has prepared beforehand, as patients usually have. When the 
physician asks why the patient has come to the surgery the patient replies, for 
example, that s/he has had recurring chest pains for some time. This opening utterance 
orientates the physician to follow a certain line of thinking, which is different if the 
patient says that s/he is feeling constantly tired. That is, whatever the patient utters as 
his or her opening statement sets the physician off on the line of reasoning that s/he 
has adopted through training and experience for that particular type of problem. One 
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may compare it to a drop-down menu on a computer screen. Click “chest pain” and 
you get a different menu than when clicking “constantly tired”. In those menus we 
find imprinted a set of medical concepts, that is, possible modes of chest pain and 
tiredness as understood in current medical theory, such as myocardiac ischaemia, 
reflux oesophagitis, Tieze’s syndrome etc. and hypothyreosis, adult-onset diabetes, 
depression etc. respectively. All those concepts function as icons on a computer 
screen. When opened, they launch certain programs for the physician to use to make 
further inquiries into the patient’s problem in order to establish a diagnosis. However, 
here the similarities with the computers end. Clinical consultation does not follow 
rigid problem solving algorithms, as we already saw when discussing the features of 
the clinical dialogue. And this is precisely why attempts to build clinically reliable 
computer based diagnostic programs have not fulfilled expectations, at least so far.554  
 
The patient has now completed his or her opening utterance, explaining the problem 
that accounts for the visit to the physician at this particular moment. S/he has now 
started, as the old saying goes, “telling the diagnosis”555, at least to a point to give it a 
working title “chest pain”. Usually the patient’s opening presentation, however, is 
insufficient, vague and perhaps completely wrong from a diagnostic point of view. 
Yet, the patient’s opening utterance discloses information that the patient deems 
relevant to his or her problem and is therefore the most valuable tool for the physician 
to make progress. This is why medical textbooks underline that the patient should be 
given sufficient time to present his or her case uninterrupted. It is noteworthy that 
studies published on the length of the patients´ opening statements show that in most 
of the cases the patient spends less than a minute on telling the physician the reason 
for attending the surgery.556 Even if the opening speech takes longer, it provides more 
material for a physician to work with and, if nothing more, time to observe the patient 
more closely. (And if the patient keeps on talking after ten minutes or so - which is 
extremely rare in any case - the physician may consider it a possible sign of a mental 
problem of some kind worth probing a bit further.)  
 
When the patient has completed his or her opening statement s/he expects the 
physician to respond in one way or another. This moment is, perhaps, the most crucial 
in the medical examination. The physician has now some of his or her menus open, 
but where to go from there?  
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It seldom, if ever, does happen that the physician is able to close the case on the basis 
of the patient’s opening presentation alone. This may happen when, for example, a 
young woman who has urinary infections three times a year comes to see her regular 
physician and says ‘here we go again’. Even then the physician is not content to be a 
vending machine and to deliver the prescription in complete silence. Instead, s/he 
observes the patient and engages in a communication of some kind, even a short one, 
to make sure s/he understands the patient’s complaint properly and does not miss a 
case of chlamydia, for instance. That is to say, that in most, if not all, cases the 
physician needs to elicit more information than the patient has presented in his or her 
opening utterance. The physician therefore starts to ask questions. S/he starts, as we 
tend to say, to take the patient’s history. 
 
Patient’s history 
 
As taking the patient’s history is central in establishing medical diagnosis, let us first 
analyse the content of the expression “taking the patient’s history”. First of all, a 
patient is not an object of inquiry producing full answers to standard questions to be 
taken and analysed in an objective manner. As noted above, both the physician’s and 
the patient’s anticipations, let alone how they behave during the consultation, affect 
the way the patient presents his or her problem and how s/he answers the physician’s 
questions and vice versa. This is why the clinical dialogue inevitably varies in words, 
intonations and gestures and, consequently, in the way the consultation proceeds. And 
this is the very reason why the computer analogy does not apply in medical 
consultation, since the polyphony of the patient’s and the physician’s anticipations, 
gestures, utterances and understandings in a living dialogue cannot be preprogrammed 
into any limited set of possibilities.  
 
It follows, that when the physician listens to the patient’s opening presentation s/he is 
not normally hearing a set of factual statements as when a radiologist reports that 
there is a 1.5cm tumour in the patient’s left kidney with metastases in surrounding 
lymph nodes. Instead, the physician is listening to the patient´s subjective account of 
the problem that has brought him or her to the surgery. The way the patient describes 
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his or her case to the physician is modified not only by his or her general ability to 
express his or her symptoms and worries, but also by the language and dialect used, 
by the local ideas of illness and cure and by the setting of the consultation, that is, 
whether s/he is talking to an unknown physician in a busy emergency clinic or to a 
trusted GP in the tranquility of the familiar consultation room. We may safely assume 
that the history the patient presents in those different settings is also different to a 
degree, although the problem that brought him or her to the clinic may be the same. 
 
Yet, the notion “taking the patient´s history” is relevant in the sense that patients do 
indeed have a history. Their symptoms have persisted for some time, sometimes even 
months or years before they decide to come and see a doctor. Taking the patient´s 
history means, therefore, to construct what has happened before the patient´s arrival at 
the surgery. In this sense a physician works as an historian when s/he attempts to 
ascertain what has happened before. 
 
Owing to our basic orientation to the human body as natural scientists, or biologists to 
be more exact, we tend to think of our patients’ bodies as biological objects of 
inquiry. History for us physicians is, thus, primarily natural history, as when 
examining the development of an embryo, the growth of a tumour, or development of 
cardiac infarction during the critical ischaemic moments of coronary thrombosis. The 
problem is, however, that when we inquire into our patients’ history we are not 
observing specimens in a laboratory. We are conversing with living subjects of our 
own kind.  
 
One of the main problems for us physicians, when interviewing our patients, is that if 
we fail to ask relevant questions we may never get relevant information. And even if 
we do ask the right questions, we cannot be sure whether the answers we get are 
valid. Every seasoned clinician can tell endless stories about this problem. “How it 
never crossed my mind that this sweet old lady down the street was an alcoholic when 
I was trying to figure out why she was getting dizzy every now and then, and having 
these bruises everywhere. I did ask her about consuming alcohol once but she only 
smiled and said she would never touch a glass. Well, I guess she must have been 
drinking straight from the bottle.” 
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The patient’s history cannot, therefore, be just taken as picking up an object. Instead, 
as Carr notes, an historical inquiry is “a process of selection in terms of historical 
significance…history is a selective system not only of cognitive, but of causal, 
orientations to reality…from the multiplicity of sequences of cause and effect… [a 
historian] extracts those, and only those, which are historically significant; and the 
standard of historical significance is the [historian’s] ability to fit them into his pattern 
of rational explanation and interpretation.557 If we were to replace the words 
“historian”, “historical” and “history” with the words “physician”, “medical” and 
“medicine” in the quotation above, those sentences could be, curiously enough,  from 
any medical textbook discussing the patient interview. John Vincent writes in a 
similar vein on the problem of evidence in historiography. For Vincent, creating 
historical evidence is “about intrinsically fallible evidence. In this it resembles 
medicine and the detection of crime. And it is about fallible evidence as interpreted by 
fallible people.”558 Vincent could also be describing medical consultation when he 
notes that “if history is about asking good questions, the evidence will not in itself 
choose what the questions ought to be…Two men digging in the same trench would 
produce different answers, because they were asking different questions.”559 This 
phenomenon is familiar to physicians and patients alike. If a patient were to see 
different physicians about the same complaints, s/he would most likely end up having 
more or less different conversations and therapeutic suggestions with the physicians 
even when the diagnosis arrived at might be the same.  
 
It follows, that in the medical consultation a physician faces the same epistemological 
problems as an historian interviewing those who have taken part in some event of 
historical interest and who is trying to construct what it was that took place and why 
in that particular period of time. Therefore, there can be no “The History of Patient 
X’s chest pain” any more than “The History of Britain” in any real historiographical 
sense. There are only histories of Britain as there are histories of patient X’s chest 
pain, because those histories are constructed by different historians for different 
purposes and in different periods of time although their object of inquiry might be the 
same (Britain, patient X’s chest pain).   
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It may be noted here, that the conclusion above seriously undermines what is referred 
to as narrative medicine. As there is no “the history of patient X’s chest pain”, there is 
no such thing to be examined as “the narrative of the patient X’s chest pain” either. It 
should be remembered that the concept of narrative was adopted into medicine from 
literature studies, where it denotes written forms of self expression. What the patient 
says in clinical dialogue is not, however, written anywhere to be analysed as a 
narrative. Furthermore, what the patient says during the consultation is not merely 
self-expression since it is modified as a joint product according to the way the 
consultation proceeds, as discussed in the above. One only needs to think of a 
situation where a patient visits different physicians with the same complaints and the 
conversations would be more or less different. Which one of those is, then, “the 
patient’s narrative” to be examined?  
 
When Charon, for example, writes that narrative medicine means doctors 
“recognizing, absorbing, interpreting, and being moved by the stories of illness” there 
are three fundamental problems in her definition. First, she applies (unconsciously?) 
the very stimulus-computing-response schema criticized above, when addressing the 
clinical consultation. Second, she seems to claim that there really is such a thing as 
the story to be analysed, and, third, the story seems not even to be analysed as the 
patient’s story but as “stories of illness” as if they had some kind of an independent 
existence. And when we read in an introduction to Mehl-Madrona’s book on narrative 
medicine that narrative medicine “seeks to restore the pivotal role of the patient’s own 
story in the healing process”, we only need to think in how many different ways each 
of us recount our illness experiences depending on with whom we are talking, when 
and why. Our ways of telling about our illnesses are, indeed, different, when we speak 
with our spouses, children, parents, friends, doctors, insurance company clerks and 
fellow workers in the office coffee room. Which one of those stories are we talking 
about when we are talking about “illness stories”? Furthermore, when the same 
introduction claims  that “conventional medicine tends to ignore the account of the 
patient”, one can only wonder what the author could possibly mean, since the whole 
medical endeavour begins with listening to what the patient says, as underlined in 
textbooks of medicine, emphasized in medical education and conducted in countless 
conventional surgeries with countless conventional patients every single day 
throughout the globe. 
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From symptom to medical concept 
 
Let us now return to the first moments of a medical consultation. By the time the 
patient finishes his or her opening statement the physician has his or her drop-down 
menu, or several menus, open. S/he has also observed the patient´s physical 
appearance, state of mind and emotional status and related all this to his or her 
previous knowledge of the patient, or similar kinds of patients, if any. But during the 
few opening moments of the consultation the patient has done precisely the same. 
How does the doctor look? Does s/he seem interested in me? Busy? Friendly? 
Detached? Frightening? Trustworthy? Indeed, can I trust this physician? Does s/he 
know what s/he is doing? S/he looks so young. S/he does not seem to listen to what I 
say. S/he is just staring at the computer screen. This all moulds the way the 
participants of the dialogue will express themselves during the consultation, 
anticipating each other’s expectations regarding what is important for the goal of the 
event, that is, to transform the patient’s symptoms into medical concepts.  
 
The patient has now finished and s/he is waiting for the physician to continue from 
there. But how should the doctor proceed? What should s/he say? What question 
should s/he ask? Since each and every doctor-patient encounter is, of necessity, a 
unique phenomenon, there are no standard answers available. No evidence based 
clinical guidelines can tell what the doctor ought to do or say next. 
 
The physician says and does what s/he deems appropriate to proceed towards the goal 
of the consultation. S/he starts to transform the patient’s problem into a medical 
diagnosis following the menus that are there in the open by now and opens new ones 
and closes others when needed. What emerges during the dialogue that follows is 
generated as a joint enterprise, as laying out pieces of a jig-saw puzzle on a table in 
between the participants to be organized to form a recognizable pattern. (This is why 
clinical problems are often referred to as puzzles. If there are too many pieces 
missing, or if they are too ambiguous to be put together, there emerges no picture.) 
Some pieces offered by the patient do not qualify to be taken on the table at all, either 
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because they are diagnostically irrelevant, such as photos of grandchildren, or they are 
a priori unfitting to any medical diagnosis (psychiatric diagnoses partly excluded), 
such as evil eye, bad karma or blocked chacras. It is also important to note that the 
pieces selected for further consideration are not only thoughts casted in words, but 
they are often in a visible, palpable, audible and olfactory form as when examining a 
rash, or a lump, or murmurs, or excreta, or looking at the X-ray pictures, or laboratory 
results or spirometry curves. (In the old days physicians also used their taste, as when 
detecting sweetness in the patient’s urine. Nowadays we are lucky to have chemical 
tests for that purpose). The consultation proceeds, thus, not merely computing 
abstractions in the brains of the participants but concretely within the space in 
between them.  
 
Although the clinical dialogue does not proceed in a linear and logical manner but has 
its detours and dead ends, the diagnostic menus that the physician has at his or her 
disposal form the map and compass for the physician to find his or her way to the goal 
in the midst of the polyphony of patient’s expressions. Often the physician’s task is 
fairly simple, such as when the patient says that s/he has had light fever, runny nose 
and sore throat for a day or two. That information opens a menu “upper respiratory 
tract infection”. This concept contains not only the nature, aetiology, prognosis and 
treatment of choice for the problem, but also what diagnostic measures need to be 
applied to confirm that the patient’s complaint can be transformed into that particular 
concept. In this case, a short discussion, visual evaluation and palpating the patient’s 
neck will suffice. The situation is more complex when the patient complains, for 
example, of recurrent chest pains. To transform the patient’s symptoms into a medical 
concept may in this case require lengthy discussions with the patient, together with 
extensive physical examination, physiological measurements, radiological imaging 
and variety of laboratory tests.  
 
The problem for us physicians is, however, that many of the problems patients present 
with, especially in general practice, do not fit neatly into any of our diagnostic boxes, 
even when forced. We need, then, to content ourselves and our patients to leave the 
diagnosis open and to apply the wait-and-see method to let the problem mature to be 
slotted into some diagnostic category – or to fade away without a name and number. 
And even when the patient’s problem does fit into some of our diagnoses, there is 
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always more to consider such as what kind of worries and fears the patient has in 
relation to his or her symptoms and the way s/he interpretes them. Those fears, 
worries and interpretations may or may not be brought into the discussion, and even 
when they are, they remain more or less concealed. As Bakhtin writes “…a living 
human being cannot be turned into the voiceless object of some secondhand, 
finalizing cognitive process. In a human being there is always something that only 
himself can reveal, in a free act of self-consciousness in a discourse, something that 
does not submit to an externalizing secondhand definition.”560  
 
Despite all the ambiguities and shortcomings in our clinical dialogues, our task as 
physicians is to adhere to our conceptual system and diagnostic goals, otherwise we 
would not be physicians, but healers of some other breed to the extent of being 
quacks. Yet all healers adhere to a conceptual system of some kind and, like 
medicine, all healing systems require the same transformational process from the 
patient’s complaint to the concepts used by the healer. Therefore, when many of the 
so-called “alternative” therapists claim to be “holistic” in their trade, those claims turn 
out to be downright empty. All concepts used in healing, be they scientific or other, 
are monologic in the sense that, as Bakhtin writes, “in the presence of the 
monologized principle, ideology – as a deduction, as a semantic function of 
representation – inevitably transforms the represented world into a voiceless object of 
that deduction.”561 For example, to claim that the patient’s epigastric pain is due to the 
blocked energy channels which are to be opened by massaging his or her footsoles is 
as transformative and reductive as to say that the patient has a ventricular ulcer that is 
healed by diet and medication. To arrive at a diagnosis is, thus, always a process 
where the patient’s experience is transformed and reduced to a concept of some kind 
and that concept determines and organises the measures needed to achieve that 
transformation, be it by holding a pendulum over one’s belly or performing a 
gastroscopy. On the other hand, to anticipate the patient’s fears and worries during the 
diagnostic process and to take them into the discussion, if the patient so allows, is not 
being “holistic”. It is just being a good therapist, since having the experience of being 
heard and understood is in itself therapeutic for any of us, when we are feeling ill and 
miserable and seeking cure, comfort and alleviation.  
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As concepts go by 
 
Having now examined the structure and conduct of medical consultation as a joint 
activity and the guiding role of medical concepts therein, let us return to the concept 
psychosomatic and its place in medical theory and practice by considering the patient 
with whom this essay was opened. The patient’s occasional headaches had been 
diagnosed as migraine. Now the problem was, that she was having debilitating bouts 
of headache on a weekly basis. During the consultation she offered the concept 
psychosomatic as a possible explanation for the situation. As noted, she could not 
have done so if we had had that conversation before the 1930s, because no such 
concept as psychosomatic was then available for her to offer.  
 
Now, if I had seen this patient in late antiquity, I would have followed Galen’s 
doctrine, where occasional lateral headaches were conceptualized as hemicrania 
(literarily: half head). According to this concept the pain is owing to accumulation of 
choler into one half of the brain (the opposite side is protected by the falx cerebri) and 
the treatment would have been targeted, logically, at reducing that accumulation with 
enemas, blood letting and diet.562 The concept hemicrania consisted, thus, of 
describing the symptom (headache on the other side of the head), explaining the 
aetiology (accumulation of chole on one side of the brain) and therapeutic measures to 
be taken (reducing chole in the brain). 
 
If I had seen this patient in the Middle Ages, I would have followed the Galenic 
understanding on the concept hemicrania but, being a keen reader and having access 
to medical textbooks, I would have studied inter alia the works of Paul of Aegina 
(c.625-c.690) who suggested in his Pragmateia, that in a case of hemicrania one 
needs to perform a  
 
“venesection of the forehead and the veins of the nose, if the face is warm, 
and…wine vinegar…and oil of roses applied to the head: otherwise on very 
pungent clysters, the rubbing of the head, pungent sneezing – for example 
[through] the grease of colocynts, sneezewort, cyclame…and rube-facient 
creams.” 563  
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While the author closely followed the Galenic doctrine of the content of the concept 
hemicrania, he did refine the therapeutic repertoire for the ailment in his book.  
 
If I had been practising in Saxonia in 1740 as a student of Stahl, I would have resorted 
to the doctrines above, since Stahl did not have much to add to the diagnosis and 
treatment of hemicrania in his textbook Collegium Casuale published in 1734.564 Yet 
I would have paid attention to the patient’s emotional turmoils when attending 
religious meetings and considered their role in her recurrent headaches.  
 
If I had seen this patient in Paris in 1790, I would have studied Mesmer’s theory and 
methods, which would have changed my conception of the workings of the human 
body with regard to the forces at work in nature. The content of the concept 
hemicrania was still the same when describing the symptom, but the role of chole as 
an aetiological explanation was fading in favour of new understanding of electric and 
magnetic phenomena in living and non-living bodies and of the ways we physicians 
may use them for therapeutic purposes.  
 
If I had been practising in London in 1850, I would have abandoned Mesmerism in 
favour of hypnosis. That shift in my thinking and practice was owing to my reading 
an article in the The Lancet in 1845, where Mesmerism was acknowledged to be 
beneficial in treating migraine (the anglophone version of hemicrania) but now a new 
method had been introduced to medicine called hypnotism, and it had also been 
succesful in curing the ailment.565 Being a keen follower of the development of 
science, I would have studied hypnotism and realized that while the concept of 
migraine was still useful in illustrating the symptomatology of the ailment, the 
aetiology resided in the malfunctioning of the nervous system and needed to be 
treated accordingly. Realizing now that there was no magnetic fluid emanating from 
me whatsoever, I would have resorted to inducing curative hypnotic sleep as 
suggested by my newly embraced concept of hypnosis. (It needs to be noted, 
however, that if I had been a devout Pietist, I would probably have shared Heinroth’s 
stern conception that my patient’s headaches were owing to her sinful way of life. In 
this case the way to cure would be found only in redemption and living one’s life as a 
true Christian.) 
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Had I seen this patient in Berlin in 1860, I would have just finished reading a recent 
German medical textbook Canstatt’s Specielle Pathologie und Therapie vom 
klinischen Standpunkte aus bearbeitet, where the essence of Die Migräne is to be 
found in 
 
“…eine abnorm gesteigerte Sensibilität des Nervensystems, wie sie in 
manchen Constitutionen, besonders aus dem weiblichen Geschlechte, wie sie 
hysterische, hypochondrische, clorotischen Subjecten, Frauen, die durch 
schwere Geburten, durch Blutflüsse  geschwächt sind, Individuen aus den 
hoheren Klassen der  Gesellschaft mit sitzender Lebenweise, Gelehrten u.s.f. 
eigenthümlich ist…”566 
 
I would have had recognised in the above a set of concepts such as “sensitivity”, 
“nervous system”, “hysterical”,”hypochodria” etc, concepts that I had, of course, 
heard before, but which were building now toward a whole new aetiological 
conception of migraine as a form of nervous irritation. As for therapeutic measures, 
the author suggested, accordingly, “Grösste Ruhe, Dunkelheit, Stille, Einsamkeit und 
horizontale Lage…sedativa” (greatest peace, darkness, quietness, solitude, horizontal 
position…sedatives). 
 
If I had been practising in Helsinki in 1890 I would have adopted by then a well 
established concept neurasthenia, which suggested an explanation for migraine built 
on a novel understanding of the function of nervous system. The loss of nervous 
energy was, indeed, a nice explanation for my patient’s recurrent headaches 
considering her burdens in life. Following this new concept I would have prescribed 
my patient rest, diet and walks in our beautiful forests to recharge her nervous energy.  
 
If I had seen this patient in New York in 1940, I would have just read a book by Dr. 
Dunbar on the psychosomatic approach to medicine. That book opened a whole new 
horizon for my daily practice. The concept psychosomatic would have helped me to 
understand the role of my patient’s repressed emotions in discharging through attacks 
of migraine. As a treatment I would have recommended psychotherapeutic measures 
to reveal her inner conflicts leading to headaches as a conversion symptom, and she 
would have agreed to undergo psychoanalysis. I would have considered having 
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myself analysed as well, but then psychoanalysis fell out of favour in medical circles 
and I would have left it at that.  
 
Now that I met this patient in Tampere, Finland in 2006, the concept of 
psychosomatic no longer enjoyed the position of a theoretical concept in medicine. It 
had been deflated into an everyday concept with no place within any scientific 
referential system. In its everyday use it denotes the alleged role of emotions and 
other psychological problems causing symptoms such as recurrent migraines. Being 
devoted to science, I cut short the line of lay reasoning the patient suggested. Instead, 
I followed an approach casted in the concept biobehavioral when I prescribed her 
medicaments to adjust her biochemistry and advised her to change her daily 
behaviour in terms of avoiding certain nutrients and stress which apparently 
exacerbated her headaches. Whatever other problems she had in her life, had better be 
dealt with by psychologists and social workers. That does not mean, however, that I 
was not willing to discuss her worries if she so wished - and indeed in a most friendly 
and caring way. After all, we all know that sometimes even a short discussion may 
open new ways to look at things and that may help us to find ways to cope better with 
our burdens in life. In that dialogue I would express ideas and opinions that I have 
derived from my training and experience in my trade and life in general, anticipating 
my patient’s worries, fears and expectations as well as I could. And if I succeed, my 
diagnostic conclusion is medically correct, the treatment I prescribe benefits her, and 
through our discussion she feels that her plea has been heard and answered. What 
more can, or should, a physician achieve during the few fleeting moments of an 
everyday clinical consultation?  
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Conclusion 
 
This essay is an attempt to contribute to Pellegrino & Thomasma’s and others’ 
initiative to develop a philosophy of medicine on the basis of clinical practice. 
According to that initiative such a philosophy needs to be able to address medicine 
not only as practice but also as theory, since in medicine theory and practice are 
closely intertwined. That is, whatever questions are addressed in medical theory and 
research, they derive their relevance, ultimately, from clinical practice. After all, there 
is no medicine without patients presenting problems to physicians who are trying to 
understand and solve those problems according to the theory they apply in their work. 
Yet, medical theory is still far from being  adequate to solve all the problems of health 
and illness that burden humankind, and this is why new questions and ideas 
constantly emerge in our attempt to find better ways to help our patients with their 
ailments.  
 
Pellegrino and Thomasma also suggested that a philosophy of medicine should  
address medical practice as a form of inter-human activity and also the logical tools 
applied within this activity. In an attempt to answer  this call I have drawn upon 
writings of Vygotsky, Bakhtin and Leiman for my inquiry, writings that have 
contributed to the development of the so-called sign-mediated activity theory that is 
still in the making and which is finding its way to the psychotherapy research through 
the works of Leiman and through this essay hopefully to general medical practice.  
 
According to activity theory any human activity is performed to attain a goal of some 
kind. It follows that, in order to understand an activity, we need to understand its goal. 
The primary aim of the medical consultation is diagnosis. Medical diagnoses are 
theoretical concepts which define the possible modes of being ill according to the 
prevailing theory of medicine. Medical concepts reveal the measurements needed to 
confirm the diagnosis and they also contain the therapeutic methods to be applied to 
cure or alleviate the ailment.  
 
Since medical concepts are socio-historically formed, they are under constant re-
evaluation and change. Therefore, to understand the content of medical concepts we 
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need to understand their developmental history in relation to the current medical 
theory.  
 
To examine the nature and role of theoretical concepts in medicine I chose the 
concept of psychosomatic as a token for my inquiry. When analysing the historical 
development of that concept in medical theory it becomes apparent that Kuhn’s model 
of the development of science through amassing anomalies in the course of the 
research to a point of revolution in the current scientific paradigm does not apply.  
 
When building his theory Kuhn drew substantially on Fleck’s approach to the 
development of science. It seems that Fleck’s conception of protoideas from where 
our contemporary ideas in medicine have developed is more appropriate for analysing 
the development of medicine. However, Fleck’s concept of proto-idea is somewhat 
misleading, since when our predecessors were debating their ideas about medicine, 
they were not debating them as proto-ideas, but as ideas proper. Furthermore, Fleck’s 
approach needs to be enriched in terms of understanding the nature and role of 
concepts as used both in medical theory and clinical consultation. This may be 
accomplished by using Vygotsky’s conception of concepts as tools for our thinking 
and Leiman’s analysis of the conduct of clinical consultation as sign-mediated 
activity.  
 
The approach applied in this essay is not philosophically eclectic one adopted by 
Pellegrino and Thomasma, nor does it attempt to draw on different scientific fields 
such as from psychology and sociology and integrate their theories, methods and 
results, as Thagard resorted to when analysing medical development. Applying the 
Vygotskian approach to the problem of the nature, development and role of medical 
concepts such as psychosomatic offers us tools with which to address the issue, as 
Thagard suggested, integrating “representational, referential and social aspects” of 
medical theory and practice.  
 
The core event in medicine is the consultation. Medical consultation is inevitably 
multilayered and open-ended in nature, mixed with numerous views, ideas and 
opinions finding a particular expression in that particular communicative act. 
Therefore, even when a diagnosis is soundly established on the basis of current 
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medical theory, and an appropriate therapy is chosen, it is impossible in a living 
reciprocal utterance to reach exhaustively unanimous and monolithic conclusion on 
the matter in question, a conclusion where all shades and side meanings are 
extinguished. Few are the circumstances where this phenomenon can be more deeply 
appreciated than in everyday general medical practice. 
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Epilogue 
 
I was once admiring the architecture of the vaults of Durham Cathedral, when one of 
those volunteer guides drew my attention to a change in the decoration in a certain 
section of the roof. At one point the crude and simple became more sophisticated and 
expressive. The guide explained that when building the cathedral in the 13th century 
the architects and builders encountered several technical problems in realising their 
ideas of what the cathedral should look like to express its meaning as it was 
understood in the times long past. To solve these problems new tools needed to be 
designed. The local smiths experimented with different alloys and molding methods 
to provide better tools for the masons and carvers to cast their ideas into the forms 
they were seeking.  
 
When I have written of concepts as tools in this essay I have not used the expression 
in a metaphorical but in a concrete sense. That is, when we realize that our conceptual 
tools are too crude or unfit to help us express our ideas, we need to develop new tools 
to render visible the form and substance of the object we are working with as we 
understand it. It this sense concepts are not abstractions but as concrete as the 
hammers and chisels of the early builders of that magnificent cathedral. Those tools 
were designed and used for particular purposes to achieve the goals the builders of 
cathedrals had in their minds. This also happens in medicine. When our tools turn out 
to be inappropriate for our clinical work, we need to develop new ones. The history of 
medicine is rich, indeed, in conceptual changes of which we have seen a token in the 
above. As Eric Cassell once wrote, “our theories and constructs about sickness and 
disease have come and gone through the ages…[but] the sick have remained 
essentially the same. It is to them that the physician owes his allegiance and, 
ultimately, it is in them that the truth resides”.567 As a clinician, I cannot agree more.  
 
But what happened to the concept of psychosomatic in medicine once it was 
manoeuvred out of the Journal as its core concept? It did find a refuge and a niche of 
its own, after all. In 2001 the Academy of Psychosomatic Medicine applied for the 
recognition of psychosomatic medicine as a psychiatric subspecialty in the USA, and 
the application was approved by the American Board of Medical Specialties in 
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2003.568 Levenson, Gitlin and Crone have defined the content of the concept 
psychosomatic in this new context as encompassing “Consultation-Liaison Psychiatry 
and other aspects of the interface between medical and psychiatric illness”.569  
 
In 2005 and 2006 two new and massive books on this new conception of 
psychosomatic medicine were published in the USA, Textbook of Psychosomatic 
Medicine570 and Psychosomatic Medicine.571 It is noteworthy, that neither mentions 
psychoanalysis in their indices. In the former, the word psychosomatic does not 
appear in any of its article titles, nor is there a single article on psychotherapy, while 
there are articles on other therapeutic methods such as psychosocial treatments, 
psychopharmacology and electroconvulsive therapy. In the latter book one finds the 
word psychosomatic in the index, but the word does not appear in any of its chapter 
titles, while there are separate chapters for topics such as psychotherapy, 
psychodynamic approach and cognitive behavioral therapy. In the Prologue the 
authors write that   
  
“So many clinical and research opportunities prevail under the psychosomatic 
medicine rubric that it remains a diverse and non-instructive name…it 
involves the medically [and] surgically ill who are in need of psychological 
care… psychosomatic medicine…can best be described as the subspecialty of 
psychiatry that focuses on medical and psychiatric co-morbidity”.572 
 
The 2009 edition of a pocket-size manual for consultation-liaison psychiatry, 
Psychosomatic Medicine – A Practical Guide, hardly mentions the concept 
psychosomatic apart from in the title, when focusing on the practicalities of 
consultation-liaison psychiatry in contemporary clinical medicine.573 Whether the 
concept psychosomatic will remain on the title page only, as a veteran who has served 
his term and been given an honourary employment, or whether it will ever again 
return to active service with the status of a scientific medical concept in the sense I 
have argued in this essay is for the future historians to find out. 
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